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AFM 35-15

AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP



DECEMBER 1948

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MILITARY PERSONNEL

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FOREWORD

The purpose of this manual is to enumerate principles and suggest techniques of leadership for use in the exercise of command and in the training of air force leaders.

This manual was written primarily for air force men who have had a minimum of leadership education, particularly officer candidates and junior officers. The manual is based upon the problem of taking today's inducted soldier to war in an air force organization and of getting a normal war-time unit to work cohesively and efficiently towards the accomplishment of the mission. It is intended to be suggestive rather than arbitrary.

The manual will be used by air force schools for guidance in the preparation of courses in leadership. Annexes are appended to encourage the student and to assist the instructor. Each school is urged to devise additional instructional material which will fit the particular needs of its students, whether they be air crews, administrative men, or technical specialists.

Leadership techniques must change as the habits and thinking of the people comprising our units change. This manual attempts to keep abreast with the changes.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force:

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Official:
L. L. JUDGE
Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

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CONTENTS

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

		Page
Section I	The Objective of Leadership Training	1
II	Need for Leadership	1
III	Limitations and Scope of this Manual	2

Chapter 2. WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?

Section I	Definition of Leadership	4
II	Leadership and Command	4
III	Leadership and Authority	6

Chapter 3. MISSION

Section I	Victory in Battle	8
II	Leadership and the Mission	8

Chapter 4. RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND

Section I	The Responsibility Problem	10
II	Responsibility to Mission	10
III	Responsibility to Higher Headquarters	10
IV	Responsibility to Collateral Units	11
V	Responsibility to Your Unit	11
VI	Responsibility to Individuals	12
VII	Responsibility to Act Decisively	12
VIII	Administrative Responsibilities	13
IX	Management Responsibilities	14
X	Summary	16

Chapter 5. TEAM MEMBERSHIP

Section I	Unity With the Team	17
II	Esprit de Corps	18

Chapter 6. INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION

Section I	The Individual	21
II	Knowing Your Men	22
III	Success	23
IV	Assignment	23
V	Advancement	24

Chapter 7. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Section I	The Feeling of Responsibility	25
I	Assigning Responsibility	25
III	Delegating Authority	26
IV	Decentralizing Authority	27

CONTENTS—Continued

CHAPTER 8. CONFIDENCE

		Page
Section I	Power in Confidence	29
II	Confidence in Self	29
III	Confidence in the Unit	31
IV	Confidence in the Leaders	31
V	Confidence in Objective	35

CHAPTER 9. DISCIPLINE

Section I	Need for Discipline	37
II	Punishment	37
III	Reprimand	39
IV	Justice	39
V	Military Custom	41

CHAPTER 10. MORALE

Section I	Definition of Morale	43
II	Influencing Morale	44

CHAPTER 11. ATTRIBUTES OF A LEADER

Section I	Introduction	48
II	Integrity of Character	48
III	Sense of Responsibility	50
IV	Professional Ability	51
V	Energy	52
VI	Emotional Stability	52
VII	Humaneness	52
VIII	Summary	53

BIBLIOGRAPHY 53

ANNEX A—The Leader Speaks 55
ANNEX B—Psychology and Leadership 60

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Section		Page
I.	The Objective of Leadership Training	1
II.	Need for Leadership	1
III.	Limitations and Scope of This Manual	2

Section I. THE OBJECTIVE OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Leadership is learned by practice and study, just as the pilot learns to fly or the athlete learns to play baseball. You cannot become a successful leader by reading this or any other book. A prerequisite for good leadership is a certain amount of innate ability. This manual assumes that you have that ability. You were chosen to be an officer because you have the potential qualities of a leader, just as an athlete is "signed" by a big league team and the aviation cadet is selected for flying training because they have certain innate abilities. Once selected these men enhance their talents by practice. So must you develop your abilities by applying the correct mechanics of leading until your leadership becomes natural. Leaders who never progress beyond the mechanics are poor at best. Normally your leadership will not be successful if you rigidly adhere to rules or try to exactly imitate a successful leader. You must develop the techniques which best fit your own personality.

The very fact that leadership is an art should discourage your becoming a mechanical leader. Leadership does not provide formulas, rules, or methods which will fit every situation. Leadership is an intangible quality which cannot be seen, felt, or measured except through its results. Moreover, you cannot predict the results with mathematical accuracy. If you have skill as a leader, however; you can predict results within the limits of your objectives.

There are some general principles of leadership which have been used successfully throughout the centuries, but these seem of little value unless they are translated into techniques. Since leadership is a form of human relations, it must take into consideration the changeable and complex personality of man himself. Techniques of leading must keep pace with changing customs, beliefs, and ideals of the society in which we live. Some techniques that were sound in the past century are worthless today. Those which are sound today may be valueless tomorrow. You, as a leader, should not become stereotyped. You must develop and use techniques of leading appropriate to immediate conditions, and base your techniques upon principles that have no age.

Perfection in leadership, as in any art, will never be realized. No matter how skillful you become as a leader you can always improve. Until comparatively recent times, results of inquiry into human nature were colored by prejudice as to what it ought to be.[1] (See footnotes to chapters.) Today the sciences of psychology and sociology have made great strides in treating leadership realistically. Professional fields such as education, industrial management, personnel management, advertising, and selling have added to the knowledge of leading and influencing others. You can obtain more help now than ever before in learning to be a better leader. (Annex B, p. 60, will give you some idea of what psychologists can tell you about leadership.)

Several well-known air force pilots with long and illustrious careers have expressed this thought, "When I return from a flight without having learned something about flying, it will be time for me to quit." Continual improvement in leadership is even more necessary. Not one man's life but conceivably the life of a nation depends upon the leadership afforded its components. You must develop and use leadership to the maximum of your ability. We hope this manual will guide your efforts and clear your way.

Section II. NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

In 1943, a subcommittee of the National Research Council conducted a systematic poll of opinions on leadership from a representative cross-section of the army. The findings were published in a book entitled *Psychology for the Fighting Man,* which stated: "* * * the quality of leadership in any army is the most important single determiner of morale and performance." [2] The necessity for

[1] S. B. Brierley, *An Introduction to Psychology* (London: Metheun & Co., 1923), p. 1.

[2] National Research Council, a committee of, *Psychology for the Fighting Man* (5th printing, Washington: Infantry Journal Penguin Books, 1944), p. 307.

the best possible leadership in the air force is a truism held not only at the highest planning level but by each man of the organization. Improvement in leadership can and must be made. The air arm of our country must be modern, economical, efficient, and effective. One essential of an air force is superior leadership from each responsible member. In order to find a feasible approach to superior leadership, however, it will be well to consider some of the factors which contributed to instances of inferior leadership during the immediate past.

Between September 1939 and May 1945 the Army expanded its strength from less than 200,000 to more than 8,000,000. This great army was created by augmenting the prewar establishment with civilians. At the same time that the size of the army increased, the implements and methods of warfare became more complex and more highly technical. Positions of responsibility, increasing in proportion to the size and equipment of the World War II army, had to be filled without hesitation. The training that was possible during such a short period was limited to emphasizing technical knowledge and skills. Leadership, of necessity, could receive no more than nominal attention. A report to the Secretary of War presents this situation concisely:

> In most instances poor leadership resulted from the thrusting into positions of authority, men who were inherently unqualified or were inadequately trained as leaders. This was brought about by the rapid expansion of the officer corps called for by the national emergency. There were errors in selection. Orientation and indoctrination were inadequate. Training was abbreviated. All this resulted in failure to emphasize the importance of morale, efficient personnel management and responsibilities.[3]

As the demand for quantity and quality of leaders increased, it became necessary for men to assume duties far beyond their experience or reasonable capacity. More and more rules and regulations were written to direct effort and impose conduct consistent with the objectives. Commanders found it increasingly necessary to supervise lower units in more detail. Over-centralization resulted. Delegated authority decreased and, with it, initiative, interest, and sense of responsibility. At the end of active hostilities, there was a marked disintegration in morale, since the *victory* incentive for coordinated effort no longer existed. In many instances selfishness and irresponsibility resulted in social misconduct. The situation was not unexpected; similar experiences had followed other wars. But better leadership throughout all echelons could have diminished or prevented the let-down.

The highly complicated weapons of the future, coupled with continually increasing speeds of operation, demand a more intricate organization with more complex duties than ever before. Contrary to some popular thought, future warfare, however automatic, will necessitate more intelligence, skill, courage, and responsibility by the men using the weapons than was ever necessary in the past. Only sound leadership will insure that air force units will successfully accomplish their tasks.

The soldier also is becoming a more complex being whose behavior can less and less be placed within any simple pattern. Our benevolent Government and our more easily obtained luxuries have helped foster the soldier's selfishness and individualism and have decreased his sense of social responsibility. Our civilization has made him more competitive, cynical, and aggressive. It has filled him with increased anxieties and insatiable wants. Although the soldier is better educated than before, this does not entirely offset the fact that he is more difficult to lead. Blind devotion is being supplanted by the eternal question, "Why?" The soldier of today cannot be driven or intimidated. He must be led.

Section III. LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS MANUAL

This manual will present leadership techniques applicable today in an organization similar to a World War II air force unit composed of civilians who had to be quickly trained as soldiers.

There are three elements of leadership: (1) The leader, (2) the men, and (3) the situation. These elements are interdependent at all times. We cannot discuss the leader, his qualities, techniques, and personality as if he were the exclusive component of leadership. We must, then, cover the other two elements with equal emphasis in order to give you a good understanding of individuals, singly and collectively, and of conditions likely to be encountered.[4]

Of course there are an infinite number of combinations of the three variable elements: The leader, the men, and the situation. Only a sound understanding of all elements, plus good judgment, will result in good leadership. Although all three elements will be considered throughout this manual, the situation will be stressed in chapters 3 and 4, the men in chapters 5 through 10, and the leader in chapter 11.

Chester I. Barnard, when lecturing to the Air War College, said, "No matter what one may do with respect to controlling or influencing collective action, always there may be expected some reactions which were not foreseen; perhaps good, perhaps bad, and often difficult to ascertain." [5] The countless variables of leader, men, and situation combine to make a great number of problems. Even when they seem alike and when similar methods are used, contradictory results are possible. This precludes defining absolute leadership methods. Leadership techniques demonstrating leadership principles can be expressed only in tangible terms using a small number of specific leader-men-situation equations as illustrations. You must keep the principles flexible so that they are applicable to other problems and conditions.

The scope of this manual is to give an outline foundation of leadership principles and techniques which you, the young leader, can use as a stepping-stone to develop your own techniques.

Of the many aspects of the subject, the following will be emphasized throughout this manual because they are of primary importance to air force leaders:

1. *Mission.*—Although the mission is not an element of leadership, it is the *reason for* leadership. All leadership principles and techniques, therefore, are colored with decisions and actions which will best result in mission success—not, necessarily, decisions and actions which will result in your success as a leader, however desirable that may seem to you.

2. *Integrity of character.*—Insofar as you, the leader, are concerned, integrity of character is considered your fundamental requirement. The brand of leadership required in the air force is not that of Cesare Borgia, Adolf Hitler, or Genghis Khan, but rather that brand practiced by George Washington, Stonewall Jackson, and General Eisenhower. Your honesty must be unquestioned, your word relied upon and trusted with complete confidence, your loyalty to the mission unchallengeable, and your moral strength as sound as bed-rock. Only with integrity of character in all leaders can the air force advance as a unified and efficient organization.

3. *Responsibility.*—All leaders assume responsibilities. You must understand your responsibilities; must be able to visualize them and judge their relative importance. You must voluntarily accept responsibilities without pressure from outside. And you must act upon your responsibilities just as you would act upon a direct order.

4. *Influencing men.*—Greater efficiency and better results are obtained by influencing the collective action of your unit than by bluntly making demands. Your ability to influence your men is an important tool of leadership.

5. *Knowing men.*—To influence your men you must know them. A great source of knowledge of your men is found in their background. Their past dictates the attitudes, beliefs, and habits which you must guide into channels of organized unity.

6. *Unity.*—The opinion of the group affects all action. Most of the individual's activities are subordinate to, and controlled by, social pressure. Hence you must develop a spirit of unity, with each man having a sense of belonging to the group. The feeling of each soldier that he is essential to the group is closely related to morale.

7. *Morale.*—Morale is the combined effect of all leadership actions. When morale is good, there is a united willingness of all your men to be led towards accomplishment of the mission objective. This ability of a unit to fit its purpose, apart from mission results, is a good leadership test. A high state of discipline accompanies high morale, for only with high morale will your men respond to orders promptly and willingly.

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[3] *The Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relations* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, June, 1946), p. 25.

[4] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (5th printing, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. 258 ff.

[5] Chester I. Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. and author of several books concerning leadership, in lecture to the Air War College, Maxwell Field, Ala., on 21 October 1946, subject: *Principles of General Organization.*

Chapter 2

WHAT IS LEADERSHIP?

Section		Page
I.	Definition of Leadership	4
II.	Leadership and Command	4
III.	Leadership and Authority	6

Section I. DEFINITION OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the art of influencing people to progress with cooperation and enthusiasm toward the accomplishment of a mission.

The sole objective of leadership, then, is to *accomplish a mission.* Your objective is not to make everybody happy nor to make yourself popular with your men. In fact, you can be a successful leader without happy men or popularity provided that your men progress with *enthusiastic cooperation* toward the mission objective as you transmit and interpret it.

The art of obtaining the enthusiastic cooperation of your men is the crux of your leadership problem. The mission objectives as you interpret them may not at first seem desirable to your men. It is up to you to make these objectives seem desirable. Through your ability, personality, and education you must inspire your men, individually and collectively, to their best efforts. Ascertain their abilities and use them to make the maximum progress toward your unit's objectives. Only on rare occasions should you find it necessary or desirable to use legal compulsion to put your policies into effect or to follow popular opinion in order to secure cooperation. You must be capable of discussing problems with your subordinates, utilizing their knowledge and judgment to arrive at wise decisions, and securing their whole-hearted acceptance of your decisions. You should direct rather than domineer, inspire rather than demand, and lead rather than drive. To be a good leader you must *accept* responsibility and *delegate* authority.

Section II. LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND

Command is the authority and responsibility vested in you by law to lead a military unit and, with it, to accomplish a mission.

You must be an executive to command. You must plan and make decisions, utilizing all sources of assistance in such a way as to employ your manpower to the best possible advantage, directing and organizing work so that the maximum contribution will be made toward accomplishment of the mission. You must insure that your men have adequate information concerning the objectives and means of accomplishing them and you must coordinate their activities. Finally, you must quickly transmit directives from higher headquarters. These functions of command—planning, making decisions, insuring information, coordinating, and transmitting directives, together with headquarters supervision—are better performed when leadership is fused with command.

You can be a commander without being a leader, or you may be a fine leader without a command. But you must be a good leader to be an efficient commander. You must fulfill your command responsibilities by exercising leadership. To the extent that you find it necessary to invoke the authority of your position in dealing with your men, you are a poor commander. It has been said that the good leader secures the cooperation of his men in their joint undertakings rather than demanding their obedience in what appears to be his own undertakings. In short, the poor commander drives, the good commander leads.

Since the beginning of military history it has generally been considered that to command is to organize, to indoctrinate, to plan, and to execute.[1] This concept of command implies the factor of leadership, but has the additional meaning of conceiving and planning the technicalities of an intended action. In practice, however, the mental picture of a commander and a leader differ still further.

A few years ago, command and military leadership were considered one and the same. The military services did extensive research on command, command practices, and allied subjects,[2] with little reference to the word leadership. Today, popular conception of military command is taken from the limited definition of the word itself, "To order with authority," and hence the word carries a widespread interpretation of an offensive, arbitrary, and domineering attitude not at all in keeping with the broad definition of command as used in a military sense. The professional soldier, then, finds it desirable to use the popular term *leader,* and to refer to old concepts of command as *military leadership.*

There are aspects of the military system which do not parallel civilian practices. In the military there are greater obligations and responsibilities. As an example, a worker in industry who becomes dissatisfied with his job or boss may quit and find other work. A military man cannot so choose his duty or superior. Thus the word *command* is retained in military parlance to refer to certain functions and responsibilities peculiar to the armed services.

Your leadership responsibilities may be delegated because they are unofficial and dependent upon your own ability and initiative. Your command responsibilities reside only in yourself because they are vested in you by regulation. While *authority* evolving from these command responsibilities may be delegated, the final *responsibility* remains yours.

Command responsibilities demand that the mission be fulfilled by whatever legal means possible. Legal procedures to carry out the mission exist and these have become identified with command. For practical considerations, command is your legal responsibility for the mission. When, on the other hand, the mission is accomplished by the collective desire of all concerned, the technique which induces such action is called *leadership.* Command denotes the exercise of legal power over people; leadership creates and uses the power within people.[3]

One of the responsibilities of a commander as required by law is that of leading. This is stated in AAF Letter 35–280, dated 19 September 1945, from which the following excerpt is quoted:

> The function of command requires continuous alertness and willingness to accept changed conditions. Our commanders must exert superior leadership; they are expected to know and influence their soldiers. Exert your leadership—see that your soldiers "think straight." You won't have all the answers, but you can at least tell your soldiers that.
>
> (Signed) H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Another slant on the nature of command is given by Army Regulations 600–10, *Military Discipline,* which opens:

> Military discipline is that mental attitude and state of training which render obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions. It is founded upon respect for and loyalty to properly constituted authority.

Let us visualize the meaning of instinctive rendition of obedience and proper conduct. It is not the sullen and superficial obedience of a man being driven against his will. It is the willingness of the man to accept obedience as a natural and necessary part of the system under which he lives. It implies leadership.

Neither true respect nor true loyalty can be ordered or demanded. These must be inspired through proper treatment of your men. Paragraph 3, Army Regulations 600–10 states:

> Superiors are forbidden to injure those under their authority by tyrannical or capricious conduct or by abusive language. While maintaining discipline and the thorough and prompt performance of military duty, all officers, in dealing with enlisted men, will bear in mind the absolute necessity of so treating them as to preserve their self-respect. Officers will impress upon the young enlisted men lessons of patriotism and loyalty, will instill or develop in them the concept of democracy as a form of government ideally suited to the American way of life, and will teach and impress upon them the necessity for obedience and military discipline in the service. The Articles of War will not only be read to the enlisted men but be explained and their purpose laid before the young enlisted man in such a way as to make him understand that in becoming an enlisted man he has subjected himself to a new control and has assumed obligations of service that did not rest upon him as a civilian. Officers will keep in as close touch as possible with the men under their command, will take an interest in their organization life, will hear their complaints, will endeavor on all occasions to remove the existence of those causes which make for dissatisfaction, and will strive to build up such relations of confidence and sympathy as will insure the free approach of their men to them for counsel and assistance, not only in military and organizational matters but in personal or family distress or perplexity. This relationship may be gained and maintained without relaxation of the bonds of discipline and with great benefit to the service as a whole.

It can be readily seen from the above that leadership is not a new thing in the army, but in the past it was more likely called command practice.

There have been instances in history when arbitrary and domineering commanders have been successful. The civilizations of certain times and locales naturally fostered a tyrannical type of leadership based on dominance by force. In America, where the dignity and self-respect of all individuals is a stronger ramification of the national philosophy than ever before, such is not the case. Only true leadership will, in the long run, insure command success in the United States Air Force.

In cases of emergency, when there has not been time to indoctrinate your men, you may have to resort to arbitrary command to get the job done. Or occasions may arise when, because of security measures or other reasons, you cannot prepare your

[1] Colonel Lucas, French Army, *Qualities of Leadership,* trans. Capt. E. M. Benitez and Maj. L. L. Pendleton from Revue Military Francaise, October and November 1927, The Army War College MSS, November 1928.

[2] See *Command,* lecture delivered by Brig. Gen. Edward L. King, commandant, the General Service Schools, to the Command and General Staff School, September 11, 1925 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: The General Staff School Press, n. d). Also see Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation, *Study of Command* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931).

[3] Ordway Tead, *The Art of Leadership* (12th printing, New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935), p. 12.

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men for the intended action, or, less frequently, when the assigned mission is considered untenable by the men and you are unable to convince them of its necessity. The success of an operation under such circumstances does not lie solely with the way you exert command then, but lies to a great extent upon previous good leadership practices. If you habitually command in an arbitrary fashion, however, you are not exercising leadership and you will not long control your men effectively. Your legal responsibility and acceptance of the power derived from laws must merge with your moral responsibility of influencing your unit. Only by union of command and leadership can the full potentialities of an organization be attained.

Section III. LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Authority is the right and power to command.

The need for control causes all permanent organizations to make laws and designate the authority to enforce them. Large organizations find it necessary to divide themselves into smaller units, each with a chief recognizing a senior chief. The legal echelons of control given a military organization are called commands. The chain of command authority insures centralized control and unity of purpose. Without legal authority there can be no ultimate guarantee of organization and no delineation of the functions of a commander.

The democratic form of government is designed to insure to each responsible citizen a voice in prescribing laws, sanctioning enforcement, and selecting administrators. Technically, the government is the people. The authority vested in officers by virtue of their commissions is given in the name of the President based upon the power granted him by the will of the Nation. The commission contains this sentence, "* * * and I do strictly charge and require all officers and soldiers under [your] command to be obedient to [your] orders as an officer of [your] grade and position." This is not merely a badge of military status or position. It is a trust, a responsibility, and a presentation of authority.

Further authority vested in you as an officer of the air force is implied by the objectives and standards described in Army Regulations, AF Regulations, and other official publications. They are the foundations upon which authority rests and the limits within which the objectives must be reached. Army Regulations 1–15 is quoted in part:

> The President, who is the constitutional Commander in Chief of the Army, is vested with a general and exclusive authority in the execution of the laws to make and publish proper regulations for the government of the Military Establishment without legislative authority, in the same way as he may give orders as Commander in Chief. Within their scope, therefore, administrative regulations so made and published have the force and effect of law to the Army and those whom they concern and are binding and conclusive. Their legal force and effect is subordinate to statute law and limited in that such regulations must not contravene existing law and must not legislate, must be uniform and confined to their subject, and should be equitable.

A most important aspect of authority is the effective interpretation and application of the limits of command. The *Manual for Courts-Martial (U. S. Army)*, with its Articles of War and Table of Maximum Punishment, is an exact measure of a commander's sphere of authority. These important powers granted a commander must be tempered by common sense and good judgment. You must exercise care to prevent exceeding or minimizing the law and its intent.

In the intended result of law lies its essence. What is the intent of regulations? No one can doubt that laws, rules, and regulations are designed to increase the effectiveness of collective action. Yet it is often said that a rule hampers the accomplishment of the mission or that the effort necessary to enforce a law outweighs its benefit. "Red tape" has become a contemptuous name for many legal processes. How just is this criticism? Some criticism is undoubtedly reasonable, for rules of conduct have to do with human elements and human relations. Such rules must be based upon past experiences, whereas future conditions and man-made reactions cannot be absolutely predicted.

The fact that rules have grown out of many experiences which indicated their need is evidence that generally such laws are necessary and vital. Civil law results from thousands of years of living in groups and can be traced back to unwritten laws and customs of ancient times. Army regulations are based on centuries of military command. Sometimes the law and its intent may appear to be in conflict. When this is the case, look deeper into the law. If you still see a conflict, take action to get the law amended. There is no regulation so sacred that it cannot be changed.

To illustrate how laws and regulations originate, consider the growth and use of flying regulations. The number of aircraft in the 1920's was so small and the type of equipment so simple that men flew according to their individual judgment and responsibility. Few regulations were needed. Within three decades the increase of air knowledge, air traffic, and complexities in technical equipment placed a premium on control. No longer could man fly without being accountable to his fellow man. Flying became everyone's business. Huge sums of the taxpayer's money were allotted to military flying. Air travel became commonplace. As the number of airplanes and the air mileage jumped into large figures, every person and all property underneath were liable to damage from falling aircraft. Common-sense regulations for efficient and safe air operations were written. Accidents, crashes, and foolhardy pilots created other problems. Flying regulations had to be supplemented with rules to protect the unsuspecting victims from the foolish and careless pilot, as well as to protect him from himself. Such rules may be distasteful to the average pilot, but how else can the job be done? When a law is conceived for whatever necessity, all concerned must comply. All must stay within the meaning and limits unless, under some unusual circumstances, it may be correct to ignore temporarily its literal interpretation. For instance, AF Flying Regulations may state that no landing will be made at a certain airport. In an emergency, if there were no other field available, you would certainly land on the restricted airport. Such a decision is unquestionable under the circumstances.

All decisions, however, do not involve simple situations. More difficult decisions are open to question, for results cannot always be clearly seen. Take for example a soldier returned from 4 days' absence without leave. Regulations specify 12 days' confinement at hard labor as the maximum punishment for the offense. You have authority to ask for the trial of the soldier or to punish him summarily. Many men in your squadron, however, feel that the soldier was justifiably absent. Feeling may run so high that morale may be greatly decreased if the offender is punished. If he were not brought to trial, however, other men in the unit might take this apparent laxity as an indication that the door would be open for their own misdemeanors, and far-reaching disciplinary problems might be created. The proper course to take will require the greatest possible understanding of the case. Solutions to similar problems will be discussed later, but the point to remember here is that you must judge wisely in exerting your authority, always considering the effect your actions will have on the over-all mission.

Exceeding authority is rarely justified. Before you decide to go against any rule or order you should be positive of both the intent of the law and the possible results of your transgression. It must be remembered that when you exceed or minimize the rules you take the responsibility from the higher authority and place it squarely upon your own shoulders. Orders and regulations not only serve to accomplish the aims of the superior agency but also define your responsibilities and authority.

You have still another kind of authority than that specified or implied by regulations. The authority given you to command implies that you must use initiative and *assume* other authority to arrive at the desired ends. This moral authority exists because all situations and contingencies cannot be foreseen. When a course of action not covered by existing authority is clear-cut and *right*, it is justifiable. At a blacked-out combat station, for example, you are attempting to get bombs loaded and fused in your airplane. During the ticklish operation a stream of supply trucks from another outfit drives dangerously near your airplane. The drivers have authority to use that route and to drive fast. But a collision with your airplane in the blackout is imminent and will blow you all to kingdom come. Time will not permit you to go to the truck drivers' commanding officer because the danger is immediate and requires immediate action. You have a moral authority to alter the route of the trucks.

An interesting story illustrates moral authority as exercised by a squadron commander. On December 8, 1941, he had orders to move his unit at maximum speed to a port of embarkation. Two other organizations on the base had received similar orders. This officer's squadron progressed nicely with its loading and it appeared the squadron would roll on time. Then he discovered that three large trucks were missing. On checking, the commander learned that a strange soldier had tricked the dispatcher out of the truck keys. Obviously one of the other moving squadrons had made up its shortage. The commander eventually located the trucks. They had been loaded with supplies and were guarded by another outfit. No one present had the authority to unload and return them. The great confusion of the day made it impossible to locate responsible people or to get a decision. The trucks could not be spared; they were essential to complete the commander's scheduled move. Exercising his moral authority, strengthened by physical force, he collected a detail of men, had them arm, and led them to the hangar where his trucks were held. The trucks were immediately unloaded and returned. There were no repercussions; the trucks were his rightful property. The unorthodox manner of recovery can be criticized but, under the circumstances, it may have been the only possible solution. In any event, moral authority assured success without censure.

Within your own unit the extent of your moral authority will vary almost directly with your leadership ability. If you are respected and admired by your men, they will concede you many authorities in your dealings with them. The backing they give you upon your expression of a *right* course of action will result in social pressure against offenders. This is a strong power. It is authority resulting purely from leadership, and it must be used with caution.

Chapter 3

MISSION

Section		Page
I.	Victory in Battle	8
II.	Leadership and the Mission	8

Section I. VICTORY IN BATTLE

In seeking improvement in detail, we must not lose sight of the fundamentals. The ultimate objective of armies is to be ready in national crisis to win victory on the battlefield.[1]

The Secretary of War made the above statement of mission in 1946. For the air force, the battlefield is the air. Air battle includes the application of any weapon in, from, or through the air at great ranges.

The ultimate mission of the air force is to be ready to win victory in air battle. You will readily visualize this definition with respect to the air combat of fighter aviation, but you might question its application to bombing or employment of guided missiles. Bombing is the application of a weapon *from* the air, while employment of guided missiles is the application of a weapon *through* the air. You might better picture this definition of air battle by considering a proved principle of air strategy. With air superiority gained from victorious air combat, bombing of ground targets amounts to purely an exploitation of the air victory. This exploitation by bombing is carried on concurrently with the air combat because, except in the final stages of a war, air superiority is limited in time and space. Employing guided missiles at tremendous speeds and extreme altitudes may preclude countermeasures, resulting in air superiority. When enemy air action is no longer effective we have air supremacy and the exploitation by further bombing becomes so overwhelming that national victory is a foregone conclusion.

Of course, victory gained through means other than air warfare is of great importance to us as it will further success in the air war. But such victory by other means is the mission of other arms, whereas victory in the war itself is the primary mission of the President and the people. As citizens in time of war, national victory is also our mission. But our responsibility as air force officers lies clearly in the *air* war, and unless directed otherwise, there lies our primary mission.

In time of peace, *readiness* for air victory is our aim. What will constitute our being "ready" is a never-ending problem with constantly changing factors and limitations. First comes study and research; then conception and planning of the general strategy; then development and procurement of equipment, refinement of tactics, and training; and finally organizing, coordinating, and planning for operations and logistics which will insure unity and economy of effort. All parts of this program are carried on concurrently. All are pointed at *readiness.*

In our effort to be ready and thereby to carry out our ultimate mission there are many intrinsic limitations. Naturally there is seldom enough money, enough people, enough equipment, enough research and development, enough time. And there are conflicting requirements—diplomatic, political, economic. Hence the planning and preparation for readiness is subject to countless judgments and compromises. But decisions *are* made, and they are usually the best decisions that can be made under the circumstances. They come to you through command channels in the form of official publications of all nature and in verbally expressed policies. In them you will find your ultimate mission in greater detail.

You are expected, however, to use initiative in conceiving more efficient ways in which the mission of readiness may be fulfilled and not merely await orders and directives. If you conceive of some new practice that is authorized, by all means execute it. If the new practice has promise but conflicts with regulations, it is your duty to recommend it to higher authority. You can never relinquish your responsibility to further the mission of *readiness for victory in air battle.*

Section II. LEADERSHIP AND THE MISSION

Leadership is not an end in itself. No matter how well you apply the art of leadership, no matter how strong the unity or high the morale of your men, if your leadership is not directed completely toward the mission's execution, your leadership has failed. At times, however, the mission is synonymous with leadership principles in almost every sense, so much so that leadership appears to be the end in itself. One of the best examples occurred at the end of World War II. With active hostilities suddenly brought to a close, former objectives disappeared. "What need is there for an army?" the men began to ask. "Why remain overseas?" Overnight it became necessary to redirect the activities of millions of men from the tangible, necessary, and desirable mission of defeating the enemy to a mental and abstract objective which was difficult to grasp.

Educational and recreational programs were set up. The welfare of the troops, both mental and physical, became a temporary mission as well as the means to achieve it. General Arnold stressed this type of mission in a letter which reads in part:

> You must recognize your mission as "readiness for combat" and to maintain a high degree of combat efficiency; however, as combat requirements slacken, you must use the facilities of your posts to offer self-improvement, both on and off duty time, to all soldiers. Programs on stations similar to the self-help of the AF convalescent hospitals, i. e., machine work, woodwork, hobby shops, and many other things which you can put into effect will be of great help.
>
> The policy of the AF is to see that the soldier has the necessary assistance to improve himself in his studies, if he so desires.
>
> I expect my commanders to send each soldier back to civil life—at least as good as and, if possible, a better man than he was before he entered the service.[1]

The peacetime establishment of military services has a similar mission without the huge problem of demobilization. You must understand the mission, both the abstract and the tangible.

Let us continue with the statement of the Secretary of War which was quoted in part at the beginning of this chapter:

> There can be no democracy in the platoon advancing under fire to take a tactical objective. Only discipline of the highest order can then win the fight at the least cost in lives. Every soldier knows this—most of all the men that actually carry on the battle. The situation is one where the authority of the leader must be unchallenged. Men will fight well only with a leader who does not hesitate to accept the tremendous responsibility involved and to exercise authority equal to that responsibility. The other fundamental of the problem is to fit this inescapable requirement [to win victory on the battlefield] into the organization and into the control and command practices of the Army in such a way as to avoid unnecessary violence to our national concepts of freedom and democracy.[2]

On the surface it may appear that you are required to reconcile two contradictions: "Discipline of the highest order" versus "freedom and democracy." Through the practice of leadership you will find that, in truth, there is no contradiction, and that the high order of discipline necessary to accomplish the mission can best be achieved by adhering to the national concepts of democracy. Discipline so attained will be the *willing* cooperation of your men.

Without question, your mission comes first in all considerations. Should your mission be impaired through the unwillingness of your men to cooperate, you have no recourse but to resort to arbitrary command; your whole reason for being and the reason for being of your unit is to accomplish the assigned mission.

General Grant was achieving his mission of successfully commanding the Union Armies when the critics were putting pressure on President Lincoln to remove him. They said Grant drank too much, for one thing. The President responded with the request for Grant's brand of liquor so that he could send some to his other generals, who possibly were more popular but less determined to win. George II, upon being told by one of his ministers that the hero of Quebec, General Wolfe, was mad, made the remark that he wished Wolfe would bite his other generals. Wellington was most unpopular, yet he never lost a battle and has his pages in history as a great general. These and numerous similar examples could be cited, not to condone leadership shortcomings but to illustrate that the final criterion of military leadership is success in battle. Indeed, you may speculate how much greater these men might have been had they possessed the human understanding of great leaders such as Washington, Napoleon, and Lee.

Combat leadership, of course, can occur only during the war. Still there are always signs of your mission attainment. The state of training, teamwork, discipline, and morale of your unit indicate the degree of success you would most probably achieve in time of war. Success in these will mark your leadership ability and indicate the degree to which you are fulfilling your mission.

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[1] AAF Letter 35–280, dated 19 September 1945, signed by H. H. Arnold, commanding general, Army Air Forces.

[2] *Statement of the Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, Reviewing the Report of the Doolittle Board* released to the press on 26 June 1946.

Chapter 4

RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND

Section		Page
I.	The Responsibility Problem	10
II.	Responsibility to Mission	10
III.	Responsibility to Higher Headquarters	10
IV.	Responsibility to Collateral Units	11
V.	Responsibility to Your Unit	11
VI.	Responsibility to Individuals	12
VII.	Responsibility to Act Decisively	12
VIII.	Administrative Responsibilities	13
IX.	Management Responsibilities	14
X.	Summary	16

Section I. THE RESPONSIBILITY PROBLEM

As a leader, your responsibilities will be numerous and continuous. You have a responsibility to your mission, to higher headquarters, to other units, to your unit, and to the people in your unit. Frequently they will appear to conflict and your problems of divided responsibility may be difficult to solve. You must continually choose one line of action from among several apparently correct lines of action. Not only does the rejected action often appear correct to others, but you yourself may question your decision. Nevertheless, you must act. You must be decisive. You must be the judge and jury every minute of every day. To help you in deciding problems of conflicting responsibilities, you should have some basic principles to follow.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITY TO MISSION

You can generally find a right answer by referring to the common denominator for your entire effort—THE MISSION.[1] One of your most difficult tasks will be to give unflinching loyalty to the mission. Affection for your unit, for example, must time and again be held subordinate to the mission, because to accomplish it you may have to sacrifice your unit and yourself. Never forget that responsibility to your unit is definitely secondary to your mission. In carrying out the mission, the esteem your men hold for you may at times suffer, yet you have no choice but to strive continually for that one all-important goal. This firmness of purpose will be a test of your integrity of character.

If your men have been thoroughly indoctrinated with responsibility for the mission, their confidence in you will not decrease when you must openly sacrifice them in order to "get on with the war." Properly indoctrinated, they will realize, as you do, that the mission objective is paramount. Hence you should impress them with this fact by talks, discussion, ceremonies, training, example, and every other means within your power. There will always be a percentage of backsliders from the "mission religion." Selfish desires and the will to survive are difficult to overcome, but repeated hammering on the mission goal will convert the wise and the strong men of your outfit. The stupid and the weak will be carried along with the tide.

Section III. RESPONSIBILITY TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

At times during the war there was a tendency in our air force to place unit responsibility above responsibility to the higher echelons of command. Commanders themselves sometimes fostered this error by blaming disagreeable orders and directives on the higher echelons and by taking a resigned rather than a cooperative, enthusiastic attitude in carrying out those orders. This was a violation of the concept that responsibility to the mission is supreme. Each successively higher echelon is in a better position to visualize and interpret the grand mission and to designate objectives to the subordinate units. Likewise the leader, being closer to the mission concept than is the unit, must know that the higher echelon's orders and directives are elements of the mission itself; he must carry out such directives with eagerness.

If you, as a leader, fail to support your superiors sincerely, you will compromise your own efforts. When you criticize your own leaders and their methods you can rest assured that you, yourself, will be criticized by your men. Your own poor example will have pointed the way. So to inspire confidence of the mission, you must inspire confidence in the higher command echelons as well. To do this, carry out directives of higher echelons as if they came from your own headquarters. When you disagree with those directives, deal directly and confidentially with your senior commander, but never disclose the disagreement to your men. Once having voiced your disagreement to the proper person, if the directive still stands, carry it out with your utmost enthusiasm and do not alibi or pass the buck.

Even responsibilities to higher commanders may conflict upon occasion. The volume of your responsibilities are covered in extensive written orders and regulations. Should your immediate commander, for example, direct you to do something contrary to regulations, don't hesitate to draw his attention to the fact. When he is fully aware of the conflict and again, formally, directs you to carry out his original order, do it enthusiastically. He is assuming full responsibility for any question of the order's rightness. Remember, he is nearer to the top than you and can better understand the elements of the mission.

It has been said by a great modern general that the good leader is one "who stands for something." Our great leaders have stood for the accomplishment of their mission. They unwaveringly stood for victory by our arms over the enemy. Their staunchness of purpose, their tenacious determination to win, was one of the prime elements in their greatness.

Your responsibility, then, is first to the mission and next to higher command, always keeping in mind that directives from higher command are elements of the mission interpreted on a level which permits greater vision of the goal and the means to reach it.

Section IV. RESPONSIBILITY TO COLLATERAL UNITS

You owe, too, a responsibility to other units not in your chain of command. Sometimes higher headquarters will specifically indicate this responsibility to collateral units, but often it is only implied. The commander of a fighter unit escorting a bomber formation is not only accepting the responsibility for protecting a collateral unit but the duty emanates from the coordinating order of a higher headquarters and is incident to the all-important mission itself. In fact, almost any association between your unit and other organizations—irrespective of service, arm, or command—may be considered as a responsibility closely associated with your mission, and without which there would be no team-work nor close meshing of the gears of war.

Technically, it is not your problem if an adjacent squadron is so badly hurt as to be below operational efficiency. Will you be miserly and without foresight or will you offer all the parts, equipment, and men you can spare to help that unit in order that you may both fight the war with an over-all maximum efficiency? A greater portion of the mission is at stake than that for which your own unit is charged. Your responsibility to collateral units transcends the responsibility to your own unit when your resulting combined effort better performs the grand mission.

Section V. RESPONSIBILITY TO YOUR UNIT

Responsibility to your own unit is the one most gratifying to you. It is your specific trust and a tangible evidence that a job is required. Your unit is composed of people you know well; people you see daily; people who share your joys and sorrows, success and failures; people you admire and respect. Your concern for them will become so great that integrity of character is necessary to subordinate your unit to your mission and to higher command.

The feeling for your men tends to weigh heavily on you at times when you must order them into combat or make them work beyond endurance. You must not be over-conscientious in this regard when you are called upon to make such decisions. It has been said that one factor which makes a good commander is his ability to get away from the feeling for his fellowmen at times when he must plan for their possible destruction.[2]

Your regard for your unit is greatly enhanced by the unit's selfless, crystal-clear conception of the mission. In fact, it is consciousness of the mission that makes the unit cohesive, purposeful, strong, and inspiring. Should you compromise your mission for your unit, you will destroy the very thing that makes your unit a great and noble entity.

Maximum safety consistent with the mission requirements is a major responsibility you hold to your unit. A unit properly prepared for combat is the unit most likely to survive. No matter how good your intentions may be or how well your unit performs the mission, if it is unnecessarily damaged through faulty preparations or inept operations, you are likely to be held accountable. Your unit is a valuable weapon and must be treated as such. When voluntarily committing it to danger, weigh your values closely to be sure that there is high probability of success with acceptable losses. At all times, be on the alert to improve its safety factors and reduce its losses.

It is inevitable that you will make good friends within your unit, and even though you strive not to become too friendly in order to lessen your emotional shock from battle losses, you cannot avoid developing deep feelings towards many individuals. At times, you must subjugate your friendship for individuals to your responsibility to the unit. It may sometimes be necessary to sacrifice your closest friends for the good of the unit. When that time comes, don't hesitate. Lean over backwards to present a picture of complete impartiality and unit loyalty. The soundness of this principle was repeatedly demonstrated in the strategic bombing operations during the war when units had a split-second timetable to follow, and one unit could have disrupted the operation of the entire task force. Formations could not slow down to wait for the stragglers. Here responsibility to the individual was subordinated to responsibility to the mission.

At other times, unit safety may be the deciding factor. A formation under heavy fighter attack, for

[1] U. S. Military Academy, *A Syllabus for Military Psychology and Leadership, First Class Cadets* (West Point, N. Y.: Hq., United States Corps of Cadets, 1946), pp. 2 and 36.

[2] Dr. Hastings, head, Department of Psychiatry and Neurology, University of Minnesota, in lecture to the Air War College on 30 September 1946, subject: *Basic Personality Structures.*

example, cannot always aid badly shot-up stragglers. To slow up the entire formation would expose it to fire for a longer period, which would most likely result in even more casualties. The responsibility to unit safety is greater than responsibility to individual safety.

In the early days of the war, when the going was tough, the need to sacrifice the individual for the unit was driven home time and time again. Once a flight leader of B–17's noticed one of his wing men straggling. Five Jap fighters were pumping lead into him. The flight leader pulled out of the relatively safe group formation and, with his other wing man, went back to help the distressed straggler. More enemy fighters appeared. The straggler went down in flames. The flight leader's other wing ship was shot up so badly it never reached base, and the flight leader himself crashed and burned short of base. Two airplanes and crews were lost in a futile effort to save one. Unfortunately, similar incidents were repeated throughout the war. You must avoid heroics which endanger the unit. War is not run on the ideals demonstrated in a western movie.

Section VI. RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIVIDUALS

Apart from your responsibility to the mission or to the unit, however, you have a definite responsibility to the individuals of your unit. As has been stated, the treatment of your men according to the concepts of democracy and the dignity of man is an element of your responsibility which is fundamental to your leadership. This responsibility will be elaborated upon in succeeding chapters. Here we will only deal with some typical situations which occur when your responsibility to an individual runs afoul of your responsibility to the unit or the mission. At such times you must exercise the keenest judgment to arrive at a proper solution.

During wartime, for example, there is one escape from the tension and conflicts of a dangerous and difficult task that will still permit an individual to retain the respect of his unit. That escape is illness. One can become sick either voluntarily or involuntarily; that is, the sick individual himself does not always know that his illness is caused by fear or tension and that it is an escape mechanism to avoid a hazardous task.

Your first reaction will be to send the sick man to the flight surgeon to diagnose the trouble. In this particular case, let us say, it is simply a physical reaction to fear. The flight surgeon may advise you to take the man off flying. Here you must tread lightly and consider the questions: How will this action affect the other men? And how will that, in turn, affect your accomplishing the mission?

Only you can make this decision. In wartime you may find that the flight surgeon, like many of your men, is fresh from civilian life. Not having become fully conscious of the "mission religion," he may hold individual rights and justice above all else. Hence you must at times modify his advice because you, above all others in your outfit, should realize that true rights and justice can only be upheld by ultimate victory.

Now, should you permit all men with any trace of combat fatigue to be relieved from combat with honor, you would most likely get into serious trouble. Even you are subject to this desire to escape fear and killing, and so you can rest assured every man in your unit is likewise affected. You cannot consider combat fatigue as the same kind of an illness as, say pneumonia, for every man in your outfit is afflicted with some degree of combat fatigue. So if you are too lenient with cases diagnosed as combat fatigue, you will likely have more than your share of such cases and your mission will be greatly jeopardized.

On the other hand if you are too strict, you may sacrifice several innocent crews by sending out a man with severe combat fatigue. At a crucial moment, he may fail to behave with the required decisiveness. Get all the facts beforehand to be reasonably sure that he will not crack-up under stress. Remember that in the final analysis you must always consider the mission first.

During World War I when the Germans introduced chlorine gas, there was a hysterical reaction among the French troops. Many soldiers choked and showed all the symptoms of having been gassed when no gas had been used. This imagined sickness became so widespread that, to stop it, an order was published that anyone falsely turning himself in as a gas victim would be shot. It worked.[3]

Section VII. RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT DECISIVELY

On some occasions you might have to go against the wishes and beliefs of your command. For the time being your leadership technique may appear faulty. If your men are ultimately convinced that you were right and that you had the moral courage to act on your knowledge, however, their increased respect for you will more than make up for your past unpopularity. Careful judgment of your interrelated responsibilities to mission, unit, and individuals will determine your decision.

Your responsibility to command carries with it the responsibility to make decisions and to act. It is your responsibility to know your mission, to study the problems of your unit, to get all the advice possible, to decide the course of action, to plan, to coordinate, to issue directives, and to see that those directives are carried out. Equally important, of course, as previously pointed out, is your responsibility to see that the directives of higher headquarters are carried out.

Rarely is a directive not questioned by the people required to execute it, if for no other reason than pure curiosity. It behooves you, then, to explain orders and directives whenever possible, giving reasons for them that will best answer the unspoken questions of your men. They must be kept "in the know," and be shown how wholehearted fulfillment of the order will further the mission.

When advice on an intended action is split, it is your responsibility to make a "command decision." In other words, you must judge the pro's and con's, and then decide the line of action. Occasionally you may feel it right to decide contrary to all advice. This, too, is part of your responsibility to command. Your men may sometimes wish to take an easier course which will not be so apt to arrive at the mission results. You are the leader with the prime responsibility.

You will seldom have unlimited time to make decisions. Usually there will not be time to assemble all available information and advice to forecast most accurately the consequences of your action. Nor are you likely to have ample time to influence your men to completely accept the decision. A vital part of each decision is time. In wartime you are always pressed for time—it is one element you never have enough of. You will be required to make many on-the-spot decisions which must be acted upon immediately and which will affect your entire unit. For example, suppose you are leading a bomber task force and are confronted with an unforeseen weather front in the distance. You must decide quickly whether to go over, under, through, or around it; how to maneuver your force; and what commands to give. A moment's delay will commit you to an unwise line of action. Air leadership, particularly in combat, necessitates countless immediate decisions. You may not always be right, but you must decide—and quickly. Only your previous training and experience will guide your thought to the correct answers for your on-the-spot decisions. Hence, to insure success in discharging your responsibility to your men and the mission, you must know your professional job.

Not only do you have a responsibility as a leader to act decisively but your men demand energetic, purposeful direction. They want the leader to set up methods and channels of activity through which they can assume responsibility and work creatively to help their unit attain its objectives. By means of personal achievement, they identify themselves with the unit. Should you fail to point the direction and to give them the green light, you will make your men idle and discontented. Your men want to be told what to do, and they want you, their leader, to tell them. They do not always wish to be told *how* to do it, for they usually consider themselves competent and well qualified to devise their own methods. Yet they do wish to have objectives set for them, goals requiring efforts which will give them a sense of accomplishment and success and a sense of contribution to the outfit and the mission.

Don't worry too much about potential mistakes. The leader who makes no mistakes is not making decisions or is not *doing* anything. He is no leader; he is a drifter. General Pershing, when told that a certain officer in combat was making mistakes, remarked, "Yes, but he is making them fast." The General knew that action, even with mistakes, is more desirable than inaction. When there is a task to be done and you act sincerely according to your best judgment, don't blame yourself for a failure. Learn to accept your errors in stride. Always try, of course, not to repeat your errors or make others. But realize fully, once you have made a mistake, that mistakes are human, and cannot always be avoided. Cast aside any sense of guilt and go on to the next problem with a clear mind. No doubt your commander will call you to account for a serious mistake. When this occurs, be frank in explaining your motives and methods. If your commander is assured of your integrity of character and the soundness of your past judgment, he may overlook your mistake. Of course, do not parade your mistakes before your men but if a mistake is apparent, don't try to brazen it out. Admit it, explain it, and make it clear that the mistake will not be repeated. This calls for a healthy kind of humility, not the abject kind. It is humility coupled with moral courage: a winning combination in a situation like this.

To have the courage to make a command decision, sometimes against the advice of others, will require integrity of character, self-confidence, and the willingness to take a chance. Few military decisions are made without a calculated risk. Only you, weighing the mission, the situation, and your people, can make such decisions. And you must make them, difficult as they may be. Should you vacillate when the moment requires a decision, your well-knit unit will degenerate into an aimless crowd.

Section VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

We have discussed your responsibilities to the mission, to higher headquarters, to other units, to your unit and your people, and your responsibility to command. We have shown how each responsibility is intertwined with the others, yet how each, when taken separately, has a definite priority. To correlate and discharge all these interrelated responsibilities requires professional knowledge, intelligence, analysis, judgment, and integrity of character. We shall now briefly discuss some detailed responsibilities to your unit, which, taken apart from your other responsibilities, are almost axiomatic to the qualified leader. In fact, they have not changed since Socrates wrote: "The general must know how to get his rations and every other kind of stores needed for war."

You are responsible for efficient administration of your unit. General Wavell has gone so far as to

[3] *Ibid.*

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assert that this is the military leader's first responsibility.[4] Because many manuals deal with administration, it will be treated only briefly here, yet its importance must not be overlooked. Mess, billets, and uniforms are essentials of your unit, for they have to do with the most important tools of war—your men. The mechanical tools of war to accomplish your mission come next. Good administration results in getting these essentials in adequate quality and quantity, getting them soon enough, and keeping them in good condition.

Never forget Napoleon's maxim that an army marches on its stomach. No other one element of your administration can be affected so greatly by you as the mess can be nor will it have such far-reaching effects on your men. Good food, cleanly prepared and served with variety and imagination, will go far to solve many of your leadership problems which, semingly, are in no way related to your mess. A good mess gives your men something to anticipate three times a day. And the most unhappy of the lot begins to doubt his discontent when satisfied with palatable food.

The housing you use will be assigned to you whether it be permanent barracks or combat tents. You should see that initial assignment of housing is prompt so that your men will not miss their rest and relaxation unnecessarily. Once assigned, the quarters can be made much more attractive and livable if you use a little ingenuity. More will be said about this later.

Give strict attention to uniforms. They must not only protect your men from the elements but they must be comfortable, well-fitted, and clean, to sustain pride and self-confidence. Uniforms, too, will be issued, but it will be your duty to assure that they are adequate and have a snappy appearance.

Finally, there is your duty to draw and maintain your supplies of war. Without your supplies you have no military unit because you can perform no mission. Your success in collecting and maintaining your unit equipment will hinge on your professional knowledge and upon your energy. Confidence in good leadership stems from confidence in good administration.

Section IX. MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Management used to be considered synonymous with administration, but recent usage has given it a more restricted meaning—it is a part of administration. *Administration* covers the process of assembling all the required materials, including men, and the managing of them. *Management* refers to the most efficient utilization of those materials to accomplish a mission. This definition of management, particularly when limited with the prefix "personnel," is very similar to the definition of leadership. There is a slight difference, however, and it can be noted in the words *utilization* (for management) contrasted with *influencing* (for leadership).

The personnel management program instituted in the air force was designed to get the fullest utilization of people; the most valuable production per man-hour expended.[5] To do this, of course, people had to be *influenced,* and so, injected into the personnel management program are many of the elements of leadership. Since both personnel management and leadership have the same objectives, the difference is not so much in the meaning as in the emphasis on the methods. Personnel management emphasizes time-saving practices, motion economy, and mass production techniques and controls that have been so successful in industry. Leadership emphasizes simply the *influencing* of people so that they will *want* to produce at their maximum capacity. Yet personnel management and leadership are so interrelated that to avoid repetition this section will briefly discuss only the efficient control and *utilization* of people. Aspects of personnel management pertaining to leadership, to influencing people, are discussed throughout this manual.

You are specifically charged by regulation with responsibility for sound management of your unit. Scientific research and long usage have proved some principles of management that are basic and, with rare exceptions, will apply to the management of your unit. Two such principles, long practiced in the military profession, are *unity of command* and *homogeneous assignment.*

Unity of command simply means that each man has only one immediate supervisor. Each man is primarily responsible to that one supervisor, and reports to him. It also means that each supervisor has a definite number of subordinates for whom he is primarily responsible and that no other supervisor has immediate responsibility for them. Each member of your unit must know to whom he reports and who reports to him. Your organization, then, becomes a triangle-like structure composed of smaller triangles. At the top of each triangle there is one man.

If you should assign your communications section to two officers of equal rank, to whom would your radio mechanics report? To both? What if the officers give conflicting instructions? When your radio mechanics fail in their duty, which officer would you call on the carpet? The situation is ridiculous but, unless you are alert, it may occur. Even though you assign one officer as the chief and the other as the assistant, the assistant may be the better leader and may throw his weight around without coordinating with his chief. The net result will be divided command, confusion, and inefficiency. It takes more than an organization chart to get unity of command. You must first know your men, then make proper assignments, and finally follow up to see that the organization is operating as it was intended.

Poor understanding of the difference between *staff* and *line* assignments frequently results in violating unity of command. Staff assignments are *assistant* assignments. Staff members and assistants have no authority for direct command except in the name of their chief. Their whole function is to assist their chief. On the other hand, line assignments are links in the chain of command. Each person in a line assignment, whether worker or supervisor, has some authority to act in his own name and on his own responsibility.

A danger to command unity always exists when a strong staff officer is teamed with a weak commander. In such cases the whole problem must be reviewed to determine whether the mission is best accomplished by reassignment or whether compromise of the unity of command principle is warranted.

Homogeneous assignment of responsibilies refers to the placing of similar functions within each job assignment. It is a vital complement to unity of command, since unity of command must pertain to jobs and responsibilities as well as to people. Responsibilities of your men must have the smallest possible overlap, and you must assign them as specifically as your knowledge and foresight will permit. Do not leave the impression that your assignment of specific responsibilities is a ceiling to their activity or it may stifle initiative and individualty. But indicate that the duties are of first priority and a "must" in order that the unit may advance as a team.

Insofar as you can foresee them, each necessary function of your unit should be charged specifically to an individual, and it is good planning to assign functions of similar nature to a given man. Every duty assignment must have limits which make it possible of accomplishment within the time allotted. If you pile too much on one man or give him too few assistants to carry out what you ask him to do, he is apt to become frustrated. Remember, however, that people are not all molded alike, and one man's capacity for work may be far in excess of another's. Furthermore, the degree of enthusiasm for the work is reflected in capacity to produce. Good leadership will create enthusiasm.

You must also keep in mind that there is a limit to the number of subordinates one man can supervise effectively. When the number becomes too large, the group must be broken up and subsupervisors appointed. It is said that a man can supervise directly only three to seven people, but the number may vary from that, depending upon the supervisor, the subordinates, and the kind of work. In any case, there is an optimum number of subordinates for each situation, and you must try to arrive at that figure to gain maximum efficiency.

The personnel management program uses the term "span of control" to group the optimum number of subordinates with the factors of (1) distance between the chief and his subordinates and of (2) processing work through many hands. The best distance to maintain between a chief and his immediate subordinates is again a varying factor and must be studied to determine the optimum under the particular situation. The chief must be close enough to keep an eye on the work, to be available to give instruction or advice, but still not so close as to heckle his men and deprive them of their sense of individual responsibility.

The processing of work through many hands as considered in "span of control" does not refer to production-line processing but to approval processing and more logically falls under delegation of authority which will be covered in chapter 7.

So much for the principles of management. The *functions* of management as listed in the personnel management program are: *Planning, organizing, directing, controlling,* and *coordinating.*

The functions of management are similar to the functions of military command except that they do not include *conceiving, judging,* and *influencing.* Management functions are discussed under other headings in this manual and will be only lightly touched here.

Planning prepares the machinery to arrange the organization in time and space to perform a future task. Because all the factors cannot be forecast, planning must be continually corrected. With the known factors you must check every plan by asking: Why, what, when, where, who, and how?

Organizing is the process of determining the jobs to be done, setting up a structure of responsibilities and authorities following the unity of command principle, and allocating personnel to fill the structure.

Directing simply refers to assigning duties and giving orders to activate and pursue the established plan.

Controlling includes supervision, inspections, checks, and the use of standards to be sure that a task is being fulfilled. First, the machinery for controlling the work must be set up to include systems, reports, and responsibilities. Take care that this is not overdone or your unit will be all controls and no production. Next, set the standards required for each task and see that checks are made in terms of each standard. This permits your men to see exactly where they stand and assists impartial treatment. When performance is below standard, yet the job and the man are right, you must train the man to meet the standard.

Coordinating is vital for smooth teamwork. It can be accomplished in many ways, formally or informally. Periodic staff meetings, visits, coordinating sheets, and telephone calls are some methods of coordination. Guard against over-coordination

[4] Gen. Sir. Archibald Wavell, *Generals and Generalship* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1943), pp. 2 f.

[5] AAF Regulation 37–1 authorizes an air force wide personel management and utilization program to be given all in the organization who supervise more than three people. A minimum of 20 hours is specified for the course which is based on the material found in AAF Manual 37–34–2, being revised.

and the bogged-down action it will cause. Coordinate only with those whose responsibilities will be affected by the project. If you coordinate with others who are not concerned, it will waste their time and yours, and delay the project.

Section X. SUMMARY

The whole subject of leadership can be resolved into a series of related responsibilities, both specific and implied. We have enumerated many responsibilities in this chapter in order to indicate their relative importance so that you may be added in judging the correct line of action—that line of action most likely to result in mission success. We have briefly covered the principles and functions of management, correlating them with the responsibilities of leadership. The next six chapters will cover your responsibilities to the individuals of your unit and the problem of influencing them.

Chapter 5

TEAM MEMBERSHIP

Section		Page
I.	Unity with the Team	17
II.	Esprit de Corps	18

Section I. UNITY WITH THE TEAM

The desire to be an integral part of some social group is one of the basic urges of human nature. A child's first social contacts are with members of his family. As his social contacts broaden, this identification with a group does not die out but is simply extended to include identification with more and more diverse groups. Witness the rebelliousness of the adolescent when he is called upon to do something that will set him apart from his gang. Remember that the most severe punishment in penal institutions is solitary confinement, away from all human intercourse, and the strength of this urge to belong to a group becomes apparent.

In orientation talks the virtues of the air force are extolled so that the recruit will want to identify himself with it. But orientation talks taken alone are inadequate to give him a sense of belonging to a team. In the first place, the air force is such a huge and impersonal thing that one may as well try to inspire a man by reminding him that he is a member in good standing of the human race. Secondly, a man must have something more than the intellectual understanding that he is a member of a group. He must be made to *feel* a part of that group.

In the mass-production system by which soldiers were turned out in the past war, individualized attention was limited and most of it was devoted to the grim business of teaching techniques which would enable the recruit to perform his military job and to stay alive. Furthermore, a man was essentially a transient with no real unit affiliation for a long period after his induction. The marvel is that after such dismal beginnings the newcomer, tossed into the midst of a fighting unit, was able to identify himself with it as well as he did.

There is only one reason why he was able to do so. The personnel of his group made him one of them. He was shown by actions as well as words that he was a member of "The 348th." He soon came to realize that he was a part of the unit in the fullest possible sense. The welfare of the unit was his welfare. His fortune and that of the unit were one.

It is essential that you do everything possible to make each of your men feel that he is a vital part of your unit. Try to extend a personal welcome to each newcomer joining your outfit. In the course of your welcome make him feel that he is not only wanted but needed. If possible, tell him his duty assignment before orders are issued, and always let him know for what, for whom, and to whom he is responsible. After such a talk the newcomer should feel that he is placed clearly in your organization and is off to a good start.

But your work is not over, for not all the members of your unit will accept the new man as you have. Some will attempt to place him on probation until he has proved himself. New crews joining a fighting organization have been known to suffer all the pangs of hell in anticipating combat as pictured by the grossly exaggerated tales of bloody war spun by the older crews. The recruits were obviously not fully accepted as part of the team. Your leadership techniques should alleviate this natural reluctance to accept new men.

Even though the man is accepted by his comrades you must still give him all the individual attention your time will permit, just as you must do for all members of your team. Each must be continually assured that his work is essential and that he is a definite part of the unit. It is an endless process.

In combat, this feeling of identification with the unit, this drawing of confidence and security from group solidarity, bestows its ultimate value. The identification of each man with the unit, an identification so strong that he feels his fate and the fate of his unit are one, is a good guarantee that he will work and fight with it. He must be so much an integral part of the unit that he draws strength and courage from its mass and power—so much a part of it that, not even realizing he is doing so, he thinks in terms of its objectives rather than his own. In a large measure this will determine his combat effectiveness.

Data collected during the war attest to the strength of this sense of belonging. At one time, when the going in combat was tough, about 20 percent of the flying personnel who were returned to the zone of interior was hospitalized for operational fatigue, although these men had demonstrated no such illness during combat. Since they had not yet been sent to their homes, domestic problems could not have accounted for their sickness. The Medical Corps attributed the sickness to "loss of group support." A man going through danger day after day draws moral support from his unit. Loss of that support may show up in excessive anxiety.

Section II. ESPRIT DE CORPS

Even though you instill a fair sense of team membership in your men, they may yet lack the dash and spirit so necessary for an air force unit. You will find that your men want to belong not to just any outfit but to a strong, outstanding, and illustrious one.[1] They want to have pride in their unit and be able to boast about it. It is your duty to give them that kind of a unit.

A priceless asset in developing this pride is the tradition of your unit. Now, as never before in our history, we have many outfits with bright chapters of heroism and achievement. Every man entering your unit should be told its history; told by you, preferably, in your welcoming talk. The idea is to impress upon him that he is honored by association with such a unit, and that the unit expects him to keep untarnished, and to augment, the heritage of fame which it already possesses.

Don't despair if your unit was not active in wartime. Combat service is not necessary. Tradition can be developed over a period of months, weeks, or even days. Tradition is a sense of pride in what has been done in the past. It need not be the distant past. There were many new groups of World War II which celebrated their first anniversary with all the spirit and tradition of outfits that had fought in the Revolutionary War. Barracks talk harks back to a glowing example which occurred a year, a month, or a week before when the activity was, judged from the story, remarkable and outstanding. Do not worry too much about accuracy and truth in such tales. Let the stories develop. Let them grow more colorful as time goes on. You can sacrifice exactness, when it is unimportant, to give your men tradition. That tradition will do more towards making your unit what you want it to be than any meticulous exactness you might use to puncture the fat balloons of legend. About the only time you need to inject exactness is when the legends have morals which do not reflect the mission ideals. When the time comes, spike the stories ruthlessly with the cold steel of fact.

Dig up pictures of the unit in action, pictures of past commanders, pictures of memorable events with the unit as the central theme and hang them throughout your offices and barracks. Assemble scrap books with pictures, newspaper clippings, and any other material pertinent to your unit. Have the scrap books located in a prominent spot where people can readily look at them. Do not mind if they become worn and tattered. The scrap book will be of no value to you or your unit if it is locked up in a filing cabinet. Be glad that it is getting worn. That means people are looking at it.

Display your unit's insignia attractively in every possible way. Be sure your people understand its significance, history, and tradition. If you design an insignia, try to make it distinctive of the unit itself. For example, a spontaneous motto of a wartime group was "Keep the show on the road." This was the encouraging greeting on the first card sent to his group from a prisoner of war, who was downed on an early mission. The phrase was used in designing the group insignia which naturally became very popular.

Keep a unit history where it can be read by your people. One wartime group published a little booklet at its own expense entitled "Know Your Group." It was highly prized by all members.

Do everything you can to get your unit's name and activities in print, whether it be a mimeographed post newspaper or *Life* magazine. If you keep your eyes open to possibilities of publicity, you may be assured that there will be no dearth of news on your unit. Today's acclaim adds to tomorrow's tradition.

A bomber group in the ETO dreamed up the bright idea of flying some of the unused candy and gum rations to the children of a French city. The commanding officer saw possibilities not only of spreading a little American-French good-will but also of getting the unit a national news story. The plan also would give the men something to think about, make them feel generous, and help them celebrate Christmas. The project, once under way, snowballed until it required three B–17's to carry the presents to France. Not only did the unit personnel turn themselves inside-out contributing to the venture, but families at home caught the spirit and sent tons of packages. The unit got almost as much publicity as if it had won the war on a single mission. Every English-speaking newspaper carried the story, and the publicity reflected back to encourage unit spirit.

But your tradition and unit spirit, like an individual's self-respect, cannot survive on the unusual stories alone. They must have the meat of excellence to survive. Your unit must excel in some form of admirable activity, preferably connected with the mission. Use caution when you ride your own hobbies in striving for your unit to excel. Be careful about dissipating your man-hours in landscaping or other nice but secondary activities which are not directly associated with the mission. Remember that your first job is to be ready for wartime operations, and find some activity which will enhance the skill of your unit to achieve its ultimate objective. There are many other units comparable to yours, and to be tops in any category is not always easy. It is best for you to compare your unit with similar ones and decide just how you might become outstanding. The possibilities are unlimited.

You may notice, for example, that units associated with yours fly a loose formation; then, by paying particular attention to close formation in your outfit you may excel in this. Or you may specialize on the mess and make it more attractive than the other unit messes. Or you may specialize on gunnery, bombing, air assembly, airdrome technique, athletics, aircraft in commission, or any other activity, until your unit becomes recognized as tops in that particular line. Try to keep your unit good in every respect, of course, but find one or a few activities in which it excels and stress these. Have the most accommodating headquarters, the fewest disciplinary cases, the most original day room, the snappiest drill, the fewest flying or other accidents, or give the most cheerful hospitality. The area of proficiency is not so important as the fact that your men can boast of some outstanding achievement of a commendable type.

In the 8th Air Force there was a particular group that had a reputation for outstanding formation flying. Group leaders of other outfits, when assigned to assemble with the tightly stacked "360th," invariably commented: "I had no trouble identifying the '360th' for assembly. They were flying such a sweet formation that I could recognize them before I saw their identification flares." Those picture-like formations, with not an airplane ever as much as a foot out of position, were a beautiful and distinctive sight to see. The fame of the formation flying of the "360th" spread throughout the air force and came home to the members of the "360th" in the form of justifiable pride that added much to their esprit de corps.

Pride in the outfit, however, will not be sustained unless your men feel they are getting a square deal on living conditions. They won't mind if living conditions are substandard for appreciable periods when they know you are doing everything possible to improve them. But they will not accept substandard conditions indefinitely. They may not blame you, particularly if you are setting an example and undergoing the same hardships, but they will blame someone. If they accuse higher headquarters, this is just as dangerous as blaming you because the spirit and confidence in the big organization will be threatened. In wartime if you can influence your men to believe the enemy is responsible for your hardship, so much the better, they will fight harder. In peacetime if you can influence them to direct their energy to relieving the hardship, they will work harder.

The comfortable living and security your men have enjoyed in their past environment will be a burden to you. They will not long tolerate the hardships a soldier of the eighteenth century had to endure. That soldier was accustomed to personal hardship before he joined the service. Your soldier was accustomed to home life, comfort, and entertainment; so you must give him as much of the home life, comfort, and entertainment as you possibly can. It complicates your task, but it is essential.

All American men have a deep nostalgia for home. Home in America is usually a very comfortable place. The meals are good. There are good beds and comfortable chairs. It's a place to relax, visit, read magazines, play games, listen to the radio, and carry on hobbies. The military situation does not permit you to make such a home for your men, but it will often permit you to come close. Your beds are G. I., but your mess need not be so uniform. A little ingenuity, extra effort, and training can give you such an outstanding mess, at no extra cost, that your married men will use every possible excuse to eat with their unit even when they can go home.

With a little enterprise you can make attractive and comfortable day rooms, have magazines, window curtains, good lights, books, radios, games, big chairs, and rugs. In fact, if you make your unit's living conditions approach those of home, you will go far towards achieving the ultimate in esprit de corps. When you find a large majority of your men hanging around barracks during their off-duty periods, entertaining themselves as they might at home, you can be pretty sure that you have given them a place to live they appreciate and enjoy.

You will find, though, that many men living together will not habitually keep their surroundings clean and orderly without outside influence. At home, it was usually their mothers who made them pick up after themselves. In the air force, it's up to you to see that their barracks are neat and clean. If you let up on your efforts, they will, it seems, be content to live in dirt and refuse. From a health point of view, if nothing more, you must be responsible for policing up, and, like a woman's work, yours is never done.

In war there is a pronounced tendency to let down on the standards of police. The urgency of the combat mission makes policing seem relatively unimportant. It will require additional effort on your part to retain your previous standards of cleanliness. If you fail to exert this effort you soon will find your men living almost like animals, their health dropping, and their morale suffering badly.

Ceremonies where you assemble all your men will improve unit spirit. Each soldier, seeing the others assembled and at their best, will feel more closely identified with the unit and will absorb some of the collective spirit. Ceremonies, as such, can be overdone. Their value may not be apparent to your men. You will find, however, that ceremonies connected with some important work, such as a presentation of awards or a practice combat mission, will be better received than ceremonies for their own sake. Dinners can be made into acceptable ceremonies. A large number of your people all neatly turned-out fosters a sensation of pride in each one. The power in numbers—numbers that can be seen—although intangible, is a very real thing.

While it is usually necessary to start with the smaller unit in developing unit spirit, you must strive to extend the concept of unity and confidence-

[1] Emory S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology* (3d ed., New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942), chs. XXXI and XXXII.

in-units to ever higher and more remote echelons of command. Men change from one unit to another. Little is gained if a soldier, by reason of his pride in the "271st" squadron, for example, comes to feel that the rest of his group is a rather inferior bunch. He is a member of a group, wing, division, air force, and command as well as of the "271st."

When each man feels he is an essential part of your unit and when the unit spirit is such that each has constant sense of pride in the strength and greatness of the unit, you have esprit de corps. Esprit de corps is not a violent passion but a deep and enduring feeling of loyalty to and confidence in the unit. It is akin to the feeling you hold for your country, your school, or even for your family. It is blended with a feeling of the collective strength of the unit and a confidence in that strength. In esprit de corps you have a winning combination that will give you victories in peace or war. When you achieve esprit de corps, your job of leadership is more than half done.

Chapter 6

INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION

Section		Page
I.	The Individual	21
II.	Knowing your Men	22
III.	Success	23
IV.	Assignment	23
V.	Advancement	24

Section I. THE INDIVIDUAL

To this point we have discussed elements of military leadership which tend to satisfy the human urge for selflessness in some great feeling—the mission, responsibility to things other than ourselves, and the unit. You have certainly felt the satisfaction of losing your identity in something big such as religion, love, or enthusiasm for a cause. This human desire to be a part of a greater entity exists to some extent in all of us. It is the source of faith and ideals. It is the force that causes all of us to seek identification with groups and to conform to the standards of those groups—our country, our religions, our clubs, our military units. It gives us true patriotism, unity of purpose, tenacity, and the fighting heart. It is the power that permits some men to die willingly.[1]

A conflicting and more conscious human urge is that for self-realization. Self-realization is demonstrated in an attitude toward the self which is opposite to that of the selfless urge. The individual is considered of prime importance. Our national philosophy is based upon self-realization—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We do not entirely ignore the selfless attitude since it is fundamental in human nature and is typified by many of our institutions. But our society and system of living continually stress the individual until the average soldier feels strongly that his principal efforts should be devoted to improving his own position.[2]

You can readily see that a good soldier is one who has a healthy blend of both attitudes toward himself. He should be able to immerse his individuality in the ideals of the unit to give him an unwavering determination to fight with it to destruction, if necessary. On the other hand, he should have a sense of his own importance as a person to give him ambition, initiative, and aggressiveness.

This chapter and the one following will consider the very pronounced human urge of the average soldier to further himself as an individual. His environment has stimulated the self-realization urge to such an extent that he frequently is not aware that the selfless urge exists, and he even has preconceived ideas which cause him to resist it. A good method of influencing him, therefore, is to approach him through his intense desire to advance himself.

You may believe that by treating your men so as to assist self-realization you are babying them, and you might justify your reasoning by historical example. True, the average soldier in the old days had little opportunity to improve his position, yet he fought well. Some minor self-realization such as love of adventure and desire for loot and glory contributed to his will to fight and suffer hardships.[3] Fear of punishment was also a force. But there can be little doubt that the dominant force was the selfless group ideal—"the cause." This is borne out in that revolutionary armies, whose belief in their cause is always greater than their opponent's, have been the ones to overcome the greater obstacles and bear more suffering.

In the old days the average soldier could identify himself more closely with the cause. His existence in or out of the army was rigerous, with little opportunity to assert his individual identity. It was natural, then, for his attitude to stress the selfless pleasures found in religion and the family, and to lose his identity in things bigger than himself. Hence, in wartime it was natural to devote himself to the cause of his fatherland and to closely associate that cause with his religion and family. But today, the young American is different. He is much more concerned with himself as a complete entity than he is with any great outside influence—at least he is consciously so.

At the same time that you must awaken his dormant urge to lose himself in the great ideals of the mission and the unit, you must give him every possible break as an individual so that he can satisfy his more pronounced desire to gain recognition and success. In the short space of time during war that you are likely to have for training your men, you may find that you are unable to rectify fully the environmental influences that have made your men so cynical of ideals. Yet, surprisingly, by proper indoctrination and training you can weld your young Americans into the best fighting team of the modern world.

Your approach, however, must be a positive one. Here are your men. In general, you know their

[1] Karen Harvey, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1937), pp. 271 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] General Wavell, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

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background. What in their background will aid you? They have many outstanding soldierly qualities, and these you must recognize and develop. Should you attempt to use some leadership techniques of the past, such as beating your men over the head until they fit the mold, you will fail. Their early environment has given them a skeptical attitude toward traditional military values. Should you show displeasure over this, you will be confronted with an insurmountable wall of resistance which will ruin your leadership. Accept your men as they are, capitalize on their strong points, and bolster their weaker ones by training, suggestion, and example.

In association with your men you will observe many common traits, characteristics, and skills which will aid you materially in giving individual recognition. You will find that the culture which made your soldiers doubtful of traditional values has given them inquisitive, questioning minds. They accept nothing that isn't shown or proved to them—the logic required may not necessarily be sound, but they seldom accept dogma, tradition, or blind faith as an adequate reason for any course of action. Hence, you must sell them your program. Don't forget that they come from the most well informed country on earth. Not only are they always asking "why" but they are always being told "why." If you attempt to break this habit overnight you will run into trouble. Don't expect your men to obey orders without question like old soldiers with high military ideals. Give them logical reasons with which to build their confidence in the military system. Soldierly ideals will come later.

Another quality which will possibly be outstanding in your people is their mechanical ability. They have made things go since early childhood and, in this age of technical warfare, you are blessed by this aspect of their early environment.

Still another is their active energy (a phase of environmental restlessness). They have never been an idle nor an inactive people. They are used to moving fast and moving often. Their lives have been spent going places and entering into innumerable activities and hobbies. Keep them busy and occupied at whatever cost. They are not contented types, and when idle they blow up like broken watch springs. Their active energy can be directed into channels you desire and they will move rapidly. Their capacity for work is almost always underestimated by the average leader.

They are studious people. They are people who, in general, had been studying all their lives until they came to you. They are used to learning. Their minds are flexible. They generally grasp the essence of any problem and are able to solve it. It is easy to teach them systems and techniques. They are, too, most apt to suggest valuable improvements.

To capitalize on these great assets, keep their minds busy. Train them continually under all circumstances. Since study and learning are habits they like, keep them at it. Continually run schools and conduct studies and experiments. There will always be time. Even under the most active combat, unit schools and training never stop. When a man knows one job, teach him another. It will make your unit more flexible, improve each man's over-all understanding of the mission, broaden his field for possible advancement, and above all, give him the personal prestige and recognition he requires.

Section II. KNOWING YOUR MEN

If you are to use the natural tendencies of your men to the best advantage of the unit, you must know them. Many have common tendencies, yet no two men are alike. To learn their individual differences and characteristics together with their common desires and aspirations, you must spend much time with them. It is said that Julius Caesar, during the Gallic wars, could call a great number of his legionnaires by name. Being able to call a man by name is important, but you may be sure that a general who troubles himself to that extent has a much deeper motive than pure sociability. He used the soldier's name as a basis for cataloging a mass of information about his abilities, peculiarities, virtues, shortcomings, likes, and prejudices. You cannot effectively utilize a man unless you know enough about him to evaluate him intelligently against the work he might be assigned. You should accumulate all possible information about your men.

If you know your men you can increase the efficiency of your unit. By permitting the best possible use of all their potentialities, you are simply utilizing all human resources to reach the objectives. The carpenter who uses a hatchet to cut a 2 by 4 to the proper length is no more inefficient than the leader who utilizes only the mediocre aptitudes of his men. It does not matter that all jobs are being done. They could be done much better. Don't be content to let things ride just because everything seems to be getting along all right.

But utilizing each man to his maximum ability is no more important than giving him a sense of identity by knowing him as an individual and treating him cordially. A good attitude toward each man will have its own reward in enhancing his loyalty and respect for you. This reason for knowing your men will be covered in greater detail later.

You can gain much knowledge of your men by paying close attention to their personal needs. Because environment has given the young American so many diversified interests and because he is relatively well educated, he will have numerous personal needs which are only vaguely, if at all, connected with his military life. Our higher standard of living has given the young man who becomes your private a life as full of varied personal activities and stimuli as only kings in ancient times could

afford. And the personal needs of your private are as vital to him as are yours to you.

Your private, however, being relatively strange to the service, feels frustrated in the attempt to satisfy his personal needs. Agencies such as special services and personal affairs were set up during the last war in an effort to assist in fulfilling these personal requirements. Assistance and advice were given on every matter from buying razor blades to life insurance. Entertainment was supplied in every way from printing him newspapers and giving him his radio programs to finding him dates and throwing parties for him. Every possible personal need was considered and an agency was organized and charged with the responsibility, within limits, of supplying that need. In the mass-production manner we assembled our forces, this centralization of personal assistance activities was necessary. But there is a strong school of thought which believes that many of the personal needs should be taken care of by the operating unit rather than a centralized agency because of the great stimulus it will give to individual recognition. Others believe that an over-stress on personal assistance tends to weaken individual initiative and responsibility. Many soldiers had no vital needs that were not fully taken care of by the service, and they sometimes drifted in a spirit of indifference, confident that the service would adequately care for all their wants.

Yet the mechanics of caring for the personal needs of your men are not so important as the fact that you must exert yourself to provide for those needs. You should make full use of whatever system is set up for this purpose. When there is no such system, it will be necessary for you and your assistants to fulfill these personal requirements. Concern for, and assistance with, the personal problems of your men will permit you to know them and will give them recognition. It gives them the feeling that they are individuals and not machines. Consciously they dislike regimentation and when their individuality is ignored they feel like pawns in a game from which there is no escape. Treat each man as an individual with unique problems.

Section III. SUCCESS

You will find that one of the strongest common tendencies of your men is a desire for successful achievement. An individual usually prefers success in a specific field. If that is not forthcoming he will usually shift his attention to some other field in which he may achieve the desired success. The new success-goal does not always conform to conventional ideas of an admirable objective. In most cases it has been found that a man denied success in approved and praiseworthy fields will still attempt to satisfy his desire for success, even in an illegal or condemned activity. Every school teacher quickly becomes acquainted with the child who, unable or unwilling to achieve success by excellence in his school work, seeks attention by his misconduct. And those super-realists, the press agents, readily admit, "Give my client favorable publicity, if possible. If not, then give him unfavorable publicity, but give him publicity." In short, anything which attracts attention may in some circumstances be considered success. You must guide this tendency for recognition into acceptable channels and let it work for you.

All Americans love a winner. We play the game to win. We exercise unlimited effort to be successful. We eat up the plaudits of our fellows when we achieve any measure of success, and we shower applause on those of our number who are successful. So give each man a chance to be a success, to be important, and to achieve something. Then give public praise to the successful achievements.

A group commander, for example, found his maintenance lagging. He established a system of awards for success in maintenance. The awards in themselves were insignificant, consisting merely of "certificates of merit," small cash prizes, scarce items from the PX, and 48-hour passes. Awards were given for the fewest number of aborts due to maintenance, the fewest mechanical failures of equipment on missions, and the most number of days aircraft were available for combat. Frequent ceremonies were held in order to give the widest praise and publicity to the prize winners. Pictures were taken and sent to hometown newspapers. Competition became intense—not for the sake of the prize necessarily, but for the sake of the local fame and success that accompanied the prizes. Needless to say, the group commander eventually had an outstanding maintenance record.

Herein again we may repeat the previously stated advice: Make allies of human nature's tendencies. Don't "buck" them as enemies. This desire for success and recognition is one of your most valuable assets in leading. Design an opportunity whereby a man may achieve success and you will help him to be a cooperative member of your unit.

Section IV. ASSIGNMENT

In every-day activities, if you are going to design an opportunity for your young soldier to be successful, you must place him in the job for which he is best suited. Any system of handling men which attempts to make the man fit the job without first considering his aptitudes is foredoomed to failure. Of course, the whole function of your unit is definitely pointed at certain objectives and it is not implied that you should alter those objectives to fit your men. But considering your mission as a picture puzzle that must be assembled and your men as the pieces, it is far better to find where the pieces best fit in your puzzle than to try changing the shape of the pieces.

You will undoubtedly run into circumstances where it seems impossible to use a man according

to his best ability. If an ex-dressmaker should be assigned to your combat squadron as a basic soldier, no amount of study would fit him in your table of organization. The answer is to consider his secondary qualifications and determine his interests. You may find he has potential ability with personal equipment. When you have placed him, you must then train him to meet the standards of his job.

The air force has an excellent system for classifying military personnel according to their specialized skills. It is explained in AAF Manual 35–0–1. Each individual is given an MOS (military occupational specialty) number according to his skill or skills, and an effort is made to assign him where his particular skill is most needed. But the system is only a tool to assist proper assignment. People change, jobs change, and objectives change while the MOS may lag behind; it can give you only a rough idea of a man's true worth to your unit. The classification system will assist you greatly, but always bear in mind that it is not infallible and that it most definitely is not a substitute for your responsibility to find the right men for the right jobs and vice versa. You cannot relinquish that purely command responsibility of properly placing your men and fully utilizing their abilities.

A corollary to getting the right man on the right job is: Eliminate the wrong man from the job. Not all job functions can be altered to fit a man—essential jobs *must* be done to perform your mission. When no one can be found who is particularly adapted for a job, remember, you must assign the man who is most likely to qualify and train him. But when you have done your utmost to train him and to give him incentive, and he still fails to perform the essential job functions, you must remove him.

Here you must tread with caution. There is much authorized machinery for removing the unfit man, and in obvious and drastic cases you must eliminate him quickly and ruthlessly. But when the considerations are marginal, with an element of doubt, you may incur such ill feeling among his comrades that your improved management will be far overshadowed by your loss in leadership.

By adroit maneuvering, which will include prior suggestion to condition your unfit man and his friends for his reclassification, reassignment, or even discharge, you can ease him out of his job so quietly as to cause no adverse comment whatsoever. If possible, do it in a manner which will not injure his self-respect. Try not to let him feel unwanted or that you think him hopeless. Should he feel thus, he may attempt to sabotage your leadership. In any case, if he is to be further utilized his value will be considerably reduced. Make him feel that his removal is just and that his talents can be better utilized elsewhere. The guiding principle is to plan and execute the removal of an unfit man so that the over-all effect on your unit will be an improvement.

Section V. ADVANCEMENT

Remember that your men are individuals with ambitions and aspirations. As a leader, you must encourage them. No man can improve if he feels that he is at the peak of advancement in his position, and that he will nevertheless be held on that job indefinitely. Permitting dead ends to develop is a sure way of courting mediocrity. Everyone is familiar with "the indispensable man." He is so essential that his leader blocks his advancement to a higher position in another section. Only a short-sighted officer fails to see that the temporary benefit gained through holding a competent man is trivial compared to the advantage of utilizing his talents at a higher level. In addition, a competent man will soon cease to do outstanding work when he learns that his very excellence on the job is blocking his advancement.

With your table of organization filled you may consider all advancement blocked, but never is such a situation more than temporary. Normal personnel attrition through transfer, sickness, discharge, or other casualty, will keep your organization fluid. With initiative you may influence the flow of personnel and create more position vacancies by eliminating the unfit, by demotion, and by finding higher level jobs in other outfits for your better people.

The feeling that certain key people are indispensable to your unit is hard to overcome, but you will generally find that many of their subordinates are at least equally proficient. If subordinates are advanced, they frequently make up in enthusiasm and drive for what they lack in skill. A B–29 leader in the Marianas was so busy on operations that he could not spend enough time on the ground with his unit to determine the exact causes for weakness in his various sections. Following Napoleon's maxim that there are never poor organizations, there are only poor commanders, he arbitrarily removed the leaders of weak sections and advanced the man next in line. If time had not been at a premium such a leadership technique would, of course, have been unwarranted. In this instance it may have been necessary, and in any case, it worked. Soon he had no weak sections.

With all your efforts to let each man achieve a measure of success, you may still find some soldiers who lack ambition. Such an attitude calls for careful attention to remedy the cause. The man who is satisfied with his present state may be desirable in some situations, but in general, he is a dubious asset. This is true because situations change and methods change, and he must keep abreast of these changes to maintain efficiency. If he is unwilling to put forth energy and initiative to better his own position, he might not adapt himself to the inevitably changing circumstances in his everyday work. In the long run, the ambitious soldier is the most satisfactory soldier. Encourage ambition in your man.

Chapter 7

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Section		Page
I.	The Feeling of Responsibility	25
II.	Assigning Responsibility	25
III.	Delegating Authority	26
IV.	Decentralizing Authority	27

Section I. THE FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY

Chapter 4 discussed your responsibilities. This chapter will explain the necessity for your men to sense a feeling of responsibility, and the principles you should follow to help make each man feel responsible.

A man's efficiency is increased and his self-respect is lifted through feeling that he is being depended upon to see that a task is properly accomplished. Nothing is more demoralizing than the idea that his function is simply to carry out the orders of others. If he is to maintain self-confidence, he must be given reason to believe that his superiors have confidence in him. A soldier must have reason for thinking himself reliable and efficient enough to accept responsibility.

Normally no man is more reliable, responsible, or efficient than he thinks he is. You should see that every man in your organization has a definite area of work for which he feels that he alone is responsible. If you do this, the work will be done. There will be no complaining about a little overtime if a man feels that he is actually doing his own job and not taking his free time to do a job for someone else.

Assignment of responsibility has been found to be one of the most dependable methods of dealing with habitual disciplinary problems. Warden Lawes of Sing Sing said that frequently more can be done to increase the efficiency of a problem man by giving him responsibility than by any other means. Many men will respond to a feeling that others are depending upon them for the efficient management of an area of work; whereas, without that feeling of personal responsibility, they would be shiftless and delinquent.

The old idea was that a man must demonstrate fitness before he is given responsibility. You, too, may say that you can't give a man responsibility until he has proved himself. The question boils down to this: Are you trying to see that none of your men gets anything he hasn't earned or to see that your unit functions at the highest possible level of efficiency?

Or you may say that you can't trust the man with responsibility until he has demonstrated his trustworthiness. If you are to make people feel responsible, you must believe them to be fundamentally honest. In other words, trust them until they have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted. This is a positive approach.[1] You don't assume that their integrity is doubtful and wait to see if it is good. You assume to begin with that it *is* good. More than likely, by showing your trust, there will be less chance for something to occur which might prove you wrong.

You can readily see the close interaction of responsibility with all the leadership elements discussed previously. A man feels himself to be a part of his unit because he knows what it is doing and approves, and has a responsibility that is his alone to see that certain parts of the mission are accomplished. The responsibility affords him self-confidence and inspires respect for you who gave him that responsibility. Still more, when he feels himself responsible for an area of work, your controls for that work can be reduced or even eliminated. Your inspections need be less frequent because he will perform his duties well regardless of inspections. And your detailed controls, such as standards, procedures, orders, and regulations, will be at a minimum because you can be assured that the truly responsible man will far exceed any standard of performance you might set up. He may also devise improved methods and techniques for his work far more efficient than any that could be written. Supervision is reduced to its lowest denominator. When people feel responsibility, the jobs run themselves.

Section II. ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY

As previously stated, your management responsibilities require you to assign every necessary function of your unit to an individual insofar as those functions can be foreseen. These functions, listed as duties, must be clear-cut and consistent with the individual's ability. By so assigning functions you place responsibility for an area of work and for an element of the unit's mission. Assignment of such functions must not be so detailed as to indicate that you think the man is an automaton. In other words try to assign an end product, the final result, rather than a by-the-numbers listing of what the man does hour by hour. For the sake of coordinating responsibilities, such as may be necessary when under-

[1] Dr. George Gant, director of personnel, Tennessee Valley Association, in lecture to Air War College in October 1946, subject: *Personnel Management.*

taking unit operations, you should, of course, give detailed listing of responsibilities for how, where, when, and who. But, whenever possible, develop more of a sense of responsibility in your men by simply telling them why and what.

It must be understood that assignment of responsibility to a subordinate in no way relieves you of the ultimate and complete responsibility entrusted to you by your superiors to get the job done. It has been said that responsibility is like the flu, you can give it to someone else but in doing so you don't get rid of it yourself. Hence it is said that responsibility is assigned but never delegated, for delegation implies a relief from responsibility, which is never the case in a military organization. Assignment of responsibility is not for the purpose of lessening your own responsibility, but rather to assist you in fulfilling your responsibility.

No matter how energetic or able you may be, or how small your unit, you cannot perform all your responsibilities by yourself. Even if you have a unit as small as a bomber crew, you can only perform your duty efficiently by designating certain members of our crew to assume various elements of your responsibility. When the work is evenly placed among all the members of your unit, you are then properly utilizing your time and men. Should you not place responsibility thus, you will find yourself working beyond endurance, and your men will be busy only when you happen to give them a one-time task. Supervision in this case becomes an overwhelming problem, for you must either perform each duty yourself or direct that it be done by a crewman. You will find yourself forever giving orders and directions, yet nothing is being done well. Furthermore, when you are absent or incapacitated the crew degenerates into an aimless group.

To prevent this unhappy situation you must divide your responsibilities among your crewmen as full-time jobs. The co-pilot will most naturally be your deputy. He can assume all your responsibilities in your absence, but you may give him, as well, full-time responsibility for the entire airplane. The bombardier, in addition to his bombing equipment and bomb loading, might be held responsible for all emergency equipment and procedures. The navigator, in addition to his normal responsibilities, might be designated by you as the crew adjutant to look after all the housing and messing problems of your crew. The engineer might be held responsible for the personal clothing and equipment of the crew. Every foreseeable responsibility that you have should be assigned to one of your subordinates as a *continuing* task. Under this plan, not only will the work be accomplished with a minimum of supervision but each crewman will feel that he has a definite stake in the crew's mission. Remember, whatever command you are given, it is too big for you to handle alone. You must have help. You must assign to your men the elements of your responsibility.

With larger units, such as a squadron, you must assign responsibility not merely for tasks but for supervision as well. That is, you assign so much responsibility to one man that he needs assistants to fulfill his responsibilities. It seems that the average American soldier will assume specific task responsibilities much more readily than he will take over supervisory responsibilities. It is distasteful for him to "boss," and to control firmly the activities of his subordinates. He would much rather be considered a "natural leader." But he generally hasn't the faintest idea of how a leader gets his people to cooperate towards a common goal and to act at all times like a cohesive well-disciplined unit. Hence the new leader's unit often degenerates into a sloppy, whimsical type of mob, being a team only when a directive is received from a higher leader. The new leader of a small unit, say a combat crew, often hopes to secure the cooperation of his men as the result of personal popularity, and to gain this end he will be extremely informal, familiar, and overly indulgent. His small unit, then, knowing that they have a pilot who is a "good egg" and who will overlook almost any misconduct and negligence, will never use initiative. His men will have few duty assignments, will rarely be present for duty, will malinger and be utterly uninterested in any activity except that which is obviously concerned with the mission, like flying. How can you make this leader assume responsibility for his unit 24 hours a day, 7 days a week? You will never do it by telling him to *be* responsible—he hardly knows the meaning of the word. Here is the answer:

Give him, as a leader, much work for his unit. Ignore the personnel *in* his unit insofar as the work is concerned, and deal with the leader exclusively. Hold the leader responsible for the unit tasks, and never dip into his small unit, going over his head, when there is praise or correction to be given. Praise and correct the *leader* for the work of his unit. Give directives and instructions to him, not to his subordinates. Then give him loyalty, support, and authority. Finally, give him, as the leader of his unit, opportunity for success and recognition by minor competitions with other units in such fields as interphone technique, gunnery, bail-out procedure, first aid, dress, barracks neatness, care of personal equipment. Soon your leader will acquire the habit of supervisory responsibility.

Section III. DELEGATING AUTHORITY

When you assign responsibility, it is essential that you delegate commensurate authority. If you are going to hold a person responsible for a job, you must free him so that he can do his best in his own way. You should not hinder his effort by a lack of authority. If you are afraid he will take undue advantage of his authority, you do not trust him and you ought to find another man for the job. Having given a man authority to fit his responsibility, you must be prepared to sustain that authority by backing his decisions. If you are not prepared to do this, again you do not trust him, and soon he may not trust you. Again he is no longer your man and you ought to replace him.

In the air force, authority exists in proportion to rank and position in the table of organization. That is, everyone in a responsible position is backed by legal authority. But the authority you must delegate is a moral one based on your trust in the man. Let him know that you will support his action. Once you have given him authority, let him make his own recommendations for promotions, demotions, passes, leaves, furloughs, awards, and punishments of his own men. Then approve his recommendations without being obvious in your scrutiny. Show him in every way that you are back of him, that you depend on his skill, ability, and judgment. That is the kind of authority you must delegate when you assign responsibility.

Remember, to delegate authority you must have confidence in your responsibility assignment. Give the man the job with confidence that he can perform it and show him your confidence. The confidence you show will assure the man that he has authority to act with initiative.

You will have more confidence in a man who is properly trained and able to discharge the responsibilities you give him. It is evident, then, that the more training you give and the more able your man is, the more authority you may delegate to him. And don't forget that the more authority you delegate the more capabilities you may discover.

Individual ability combined with coordinated skill and effort will determine a man's efficiency and the authority you can delegate to him is affected by that efficiency. A man must not only be able to do his own job but must know how to relate it to other jobs. Without this efficiency you cannot give him the maximum freedom of action for fear he will duplicate or interfere with someone else's work.

Efficiency is never stable. You must constantly strive to maintain and increase it. Send men to schools, do on-the-job training, conduct conferences to coordinate the work, discourage excessive transfers, and try to attract good men into your organization. The level of your efficiency determines in a large measure your capacity to delegate authority and get things done.

Whereas individual skill is usually something a man brings to your organization, the coordination of these skills is the job of your organization. Because new men are continually coming in and others are leaving, the coordination needed for efficiency is constantly threatened. To help solve this problem it is generally a good technique to have each section keep an up-to-date list of the responsibilities of each man. The basic elements of his authority are then outlined in black and white. If this is done it will be easier for a new man to quickly take over a job.

Besides your descriptions of jobs, the air force usually has typical organizational and functional charts for your unit. These charts are simple and effective methods of showing not only the relationship of units but also the responsibilities of each. Since these charts are official publications, authority is implied. They are useful in quickly orienting the new man to the organization.

Because all organizations are undergoing change, charts and standing instructions rapidly become obsolete. They must be continually revised according to current requirements. Yet, even up-to-date charts and standing instructions are not adequate substitutes for personal discussion of problems and for verbal directives. Charts and the printed word tend to paint the rosy picture of the job progressing nicely. For this reason, continually balance all instructional media by conferences and personal supervision.

Protect your efficiency by taking steps to prevent indiscriminate changes of personnel within your unit which cause a loss in cooperation, coordination, and continuity of the jobs. Movement of men from one job to another must be critically studied. A change usually presents a conflict between your desire to put the right man in the right job and your desire to recognize him by advancement. To protect your efficiency (the cooperative skill to get the job done) you strive for static assignments. To give individual recognition, you strive for fluid assignments. You must weigh all factors with the mission and judge accordingly.

When you delegate authority to each of several different men in an organization, there is bound to be some overlap. If this arouses bickering and conflict, the net result will certainly not be teamwork. Anticipate where cooperation is essential and stress it at the time. Then be ready to give a decision when a conflict arises.

See that your men have the tools and the personnel they need. Train them to perform their duties efficiently. Keep your instructions clear as to what you expect accomplished. Finally, give them your confidence and back their actions. When you have done all this you have fully delegated authority.

Section IV. DECENTRALIZING AUTHORITY

Delegated authority is held to a minimum in poorly trained organizations; organizations which have no clear conception of mission requirements force higher echelons to send down a flood of regulations, charts, directives, controls, and inspections. The unit commander is then swamped with so much detail that he has little freedom to exercise initiative or judgment.

This over-centralization of authority slows much other activity because an excessive number of approvals are required to begin any unforeseen proj-

ect. So many echelons have to review the new project and refer it to still higher echelons that, by the time final approval is obtained, the requirement for the project may no longer exist. Likewise, old directives from the centralized authority may become valueless before they can be revised.

The evils of centralized authority were perceived by General Arnold when he issued a letter on 15 June 1942, directing "the maximum decentralization of authority to lower echelons." But decentralization of authority cannot be secured by a directive alone. All personnel in authority and all personnel who supervise must have the desire and the trust to relinquish most of their authority to their subordinates. Giving up authority may seem contrary to human nature because we all like to feel important and appear important. Yet if you are to really *be* important, your job must be done well and it will only be done well by delegating your authority.

Human nature tends to centralize authority and to resist decentralization. You have frequently witnessed the growth of a topheavy empire whose greatest mission is to perpetuate itself. It hangs on like a parasite, poisoning everything it touches, until some leader with courage abolishes the whole empire from top to bottom. This same evil can occur in your unit on a smaller scale unless you are continually alert. It takes constant effort, working against continual resistance to decentralize authority, down and down, until the soldier actually doing the job has the fullest possible freedom of action. Only then will he have a maximum sense of responsibility.

Chapter 8

CONFIDENCE

Section		Page
I.	Power in Confidence	29
II.	Confidence in Self	29
III.	Confidence in Unit	31
IV.	Confidence in Leaders	31
V.	Confidence in Objective	35

Section I. POWER IN CONFIDENCE

The uncertainty that results from lack of confidence is one of the most straining of emotional states. To maintain the highest efficiency a soldier must have confidence in four things: Himself, his unit, his leaders, and the objective toward which all are working.

The confidence in himself comes from assurance that he is doing a worth-while job which contributes to the mission, and that he is fully capable of performing it with success even under great danger to his life. Confidence in his unit arises primarily from the belief that his unit is stronger than the enemy and that it will therefore accomplish its objectives. Confidence in his leaders must be such that he feels them competent to lead him into any activity with the greatest probability of success, and that they will give him every possible consideration consistent with the mission. Confidence in the objectives comprises confidence in our Government, the American way of life, the mission, the remote leadership of the high command, and the elements of the mission which are the visible objectives of his unit and position.

Confidence is not a static emotion. It fluctuates continually. You should gage it at all times and take steps to fortify any weaknesses found. The elements of confidence stated above are interrelated; each confidence affects the others to some extent. Thus, a lack of confidence anywhere will seriously affect all the elements of your leadership like a rotton apple in a pile. Everything you do as a leader will influence the confidence of your men. Hence you must plan your actions with this in mind.

Even though you have done everything in your power to instill confidence in your men, they are still human and will be subject to low moods when they will take a dim view of life in general. The length of time they stay in these low moods will depend upon a number of things outside of your control. At such time your men may need to draw upon something greater than mere human resources. This will require an act of faith; a higher form of confidence. Many great Americans have attributed their successful endurance of these barren mental periods to a tenacious faith in Divine Providence. This faith has restored their confidence in the worthwhileness of their cause and mission. It is wise, therefore, for you to provide time, facilities, and encouragement for practice of their religious faith.

Section II. CONFIDENCE IN SELF

The idea that a soldier must have self-confidence and self-respect is a comparatively new one. In ancient times an officer frequently had the power of life and death over his men and he treated them as mere instruments of his will. The sixteenth century concept that the individual soldier is a nonentity, with little self-respect and few rights, has gradually been replaced by recognition that the most effective soldier is the one who has pride in himself, confidence in his ability, and respect for himself as a man. In America, particularly, the dignity of the individual has been recognized.

Some have always feared that recognizing a man with praise might "spoil" him. Their reasoning ran: If a person were praised, he would think that he was "pretty good" and not in need of improvement. This belief, it was argued, would discourage him from striving for better results. On the other hand, criticism, it was believed, would show the person that the very best that he could do was hardly good enough, and as a consequence he would be eternally straining every nerve lest he be unable to keep up.

All this may appear logical but it has been conclusively proved by repeated experiments in all types of situations to be false! In fact, nagging criticism works in just the opposite direction from that intended. It ignores a basic fact of human nature. *Man works for one primary reason: To gain satisfaction of some sort.* The nature of the satisfaction may be of any form: Money, advancement, affection, esteem of others, selflessness in a cause, in short, anything that is pleasant. If, as a result of his work, a man does not approach his desired end, his enthusiasm quickly drops, and with it drops the quality of his work.

To assist your men in gaining confidence in themselves, then, you must help them to achieve the satisfaction desired. When their ends are not practicable, you must attempt by suggestion and other means to redirect their desires so that they can be fulfilled within the limits of the mission.

Many of the principles to be followed in building self-confidence and self-respect have been covered

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in previous chapters, and still more will be discussed in the following chapter. One phase of self-confidence, however, which must be touched again here is that achieved by training.

No man can have self-confidence if not convinced in his own mind that he is qualified to perform the job he is assigned. Previous chapters have stressed the necessity for properly placing him in a job, but your duty does not end there. You must, after he is placed, further train him to improve his ability and increase his self-confidence.

Don't fear that you will make a man overconfident. Overconfidence is a word loosely used and, when analyzed, usually turns out to be not overconfidence at all. It may be boredom resulting from a feeling that the job is not worth while or that the individual's abilities are not fully utilized or appreciated. Or it may be a pose to cover up a feeling of inferiority and lack of self-confidence. Adequate recognition of the individual should dispel his boredom, and continued training and encouragement should counteract his inferiority complex. He will lose his so-called overconfidence and become truly confident.

Besides confidence in his technical ability, in warfare the soldier must have a superior confidence in his strength, both physical and moral. In war your men will not only do a job as in civilian life, but they will do it under conditions of hardship and danger. These two added conditions, hardship and danger, are what make the military leader's task so much more difficult than that of the civilian leader. They necessitate your building the soldier's confidence in his moral and physical strength.

A soldier's moral strength will be influenced most by the ideals and esprit de corps of his unit. He will conform to its standards of conduct and his courage will be upheld by its collective force.[1] Influences which tend to shake his confidence in his own moral strength or courage can be rationalized to weaken their force. Using statistics to show a high chance of survival, avoidance of unnecessary association with or reference to the wounded or dead, spiking of rumors that may lead to fear or panic, and other techniques, are all helpful in sustaining each man's confidence in his own moral strength.

Probably the best way to prevent confidence in moral strength from being damaged is to keep your men busy. When people suffer a shock and are permitted to dwell on it, their imagination will magnify the shock. They will reflect on what might have happened and upon how close was their call, suffering new and increased fear with each mental picture. Each new fear weakens their courage. But if you keep them fully occupied on essential tasks, their minds are busy with the work at hand and the original shock is accepted objectively and in its true light.

A bomber group commander in Europe aptly demonstrated the wisdom of keeping his men busy during emotional strain. His group had suffered excessive losses in a series of hard-luck missions, and his men were rapidly losing their moral confidence, becoming jittery, morose, and hard to handle. Morale became so bad that higher headquarters even considered splitting up the unit. On top of this difficult situation, a great catastrophe occurred. The group went on a mission with 18 bombers and ran into such vicious opposition that only 6 aircraft returned. The group commander knew all would be lost if he failed to prevent the inevitable wave of despair, self-pity, and fear from sweeping his group and ruining it. Since his group was not scheduled to fly the next day, he opened the bar and let them ruminate with their depressed emotions. Then he and his staff went to work. For the following day they prepared a program of intense activity for every man on the station. Beginning at reveille there were inspections, drills, and practice missions that kept everyone extremely busy the entire day. By night the men were so worn out that all slept like babies. And on the third day they went on another combat mission, deporting themselves with honor. The tragedy was history.

But keeping your men busy should not be confined to the extreme cases like the one just described. Those men were kept more than busy; they were purposely worked to produce fatigue and physical discomforts that would distract their minds from grief and pain. Self-confidence should be developed by giving your men a full day's work at all times. You must schedule your men efficiently and assure them that there is an essential need for their tasks. Even in their free time you must protect them from idleness by making available every possible recreational activity and encouraging their participation. In keeping your men busy you wield a two-edged sword: Their self-confidence is enhanced because they are occupied with essential tasks, and many elements which might destroy their confidence are barred from their minds.

Always remember to foster this self-confidence in your busy men by letting each one know how he is getting along. Figure out what you expect of him and then either commend him for his results or tactfully point out ways he can improve. Look for extra or unusual performance and never fail to give it credit. If you tell him while it's hot your praise will have its greatest effect.

To a soldier, confidence in his *own* physical strength is likewise closely integrated with his confidence in the physical strength of his unit. If the standard of training of your unit is so high that you look and feel ready for combat, your people will feel strong individually. In training you must simulate combat conditions as closely as possible, particularly the hardships and even some of the dangers, so that each of your men may have living proof of his own strength.

The training to harden your men for the rigors of combat should be undertaken as a game. Maneuvers, contests, practice moves, hikes, and the like can present many hardships, but do not stress the hardening objective as such. Competitions or races against time will be more successful than undertakings with the avowed purpose of conditioning your people to hardship. They will be so conditioned, nonetheless, and gain confidence in their strength. But intentional hardship purely for the sake of conditioning is not generally acceptable to the young American. He will run his heart out to *win* but he will rarely trot to get strong unless he has another objective in mind.

Section III. CONFIDENCE IN UNIT

Added to this confidence in himself as an individual, a soldier must have confidence in his unit. A man must feel that, like himself, his associates are competent men on whom he can depend whatever situation may arise. No man can do his job well if he is constantly wondering whether his fellow-workers are properly accomplishing their part of the task. A real commendation of a man's dependability is contained in the expression: "He is a good man to have flying on your wing." In other words, with that man to cover your tail you can proceed with your mission without worrying that you will get bounced from behind.

But more than simple confidence that all members are dependable is confidence that the unit, as a whole, is unbeatable. Appreciattion of the high standards and invincibility of your unit will be a powerful force to keep a man's behavior at a level in keeping with good military traditions. Pride in his organization, realization of his identification with an admirable and efficient unit much larger than himself, gives a man opportunity to draw strength and confidence from that organization surpassing that which he might feel in himself alone.

One of the most widely publicized examples of this principle was found in the old Texas Ranger organization. The legends about this outfit filled both its members and the general public with an awe which gave the Rangers a power in their own eyes and in public imagination quite out of proportion to the abilities of the individual men. Once when a lynching was threatened in a small Texas town, the terror-stricken mayor telephoned the governor to plead that a detachment of the Rangers be dispatched. At the appointed time the train pulled into the station. The mayor and dignitaries were horrified to see alighting from the train a single Ranger, unflustered and competent-looking, but undisputably alone.

Stuttered the mayor, "Y-y-y-you mean there's only o-o-o-one of you?"

Came the matter-of-fact reply, "They's only one lynchin, ain't they?"

Each member of your unit must feel that all other members are working to fulfill the same unit ideals with equal enthusiasm. A deteriorating influence to unit confidence was noted in some air force units during the last war when ground personnel were separated from flying personnel. For the sake of management efficiency some units were completely split between ground and flying personnel, with separate messes, separate barracks, and even separate recreational facilities. The evils of this system quickly became apparent in the lack of confidence demonstrated by each of these groups for the other. Ground people complained that flying men got all the glory and decorations and loafed most of the time, while flying men complained that ground people, who suffered none of the great danger, failed to appreciate it, and didn't keep the airplanes in good shape. This dangerous lack of mutual confidence was remedied in most cases by a complete integration of ground and flying personnel. As soon as their separate identity became less marked, they learned that each other's ideals were identical. The men began to know each other and to appreciate each other's problems. Some leaders went so far in the integration process as to have flying personnel do enough ground work to understand the difficulties involved, and to send ground personnel on a few combat missions.

Only through teamwork developed during close association will your men have faith in the unit. Napoleon attributed his defeat at Waterloo to the fact that his men "had not eaten soup together long enough." Your men must live and work with one another; otherwise your unit will break up into bickering cliques and you will have a house divided. Teamwork is a cardinal feature of unit confidence.

Section IV. CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS

No amount of confidence in self or unit can suffice, however, if your soldier feels that his leaders are unfair, incompetent, or disinterested. The average American will not accept someone's assurrance that a leader has high capabilities: he wants to be shown. Your everyday activities must leave no doubt in the minds of your men that you are striving for their welfare and the success of the unit. Your soldier will not be nearly so impressed by a list of your past accomplishments as he will be by some minor act of yours that *indicates* your ability or your sincere interest in him. A man's outlook is governed more by emotion than by reason.[2]

A poll was made during the past war to determine what soldiers expected in their leaders. The qualities desired in a leader were summarized in the following order of importance: (1) Ability, (2)

[1] Norman C. Meier, *Military Psychology* (1st ed., New York: Harper & Bros., publishers, 1943), pp. 53–60.

[2] F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (6th printing, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 26.

interest in the welfare of the soldier, (3) promptness in making decisions, (4) teaching and instructing ability, (5) judgment and common sense, (6) refraining from "pulling rank" or giving unnecessary orders, (7) the practice of recognizing and praising good work, (8) physical ability, (9) good education and a sense of humor, (10) impartiality, (11) keeping from shirking his share of "dirty" work, and (12) giving orders plainly and clearly.[3] Obviously the soldier wants a well-nigh perfect leader, and the world has not yet produced such a man. But even if a leader does possess most of these qualities, unless the soldier were *aware* of these qualities, he would still lack confidence.

In the final analysis, then, you must not only strive to achieve all the desired qualities, but, more important, you must *appear* to your men to have as many of the qualities as possible.

Stir yourself to be known and seen. Frequent informal visits throughout all activities of your unit will make you a familiar figure. Don't take a snooping and critical attitude when making such visits, but rather be interested and friendly. Sometimes you will recognize useless work, but don't ever intimate that you know this to be so. It is better for you to divert the effort along what you might call "more urgent" or "more important" lines. Sometimes you will find outstanding examples of productive work. Praise it not only to the individuals concerned but to the unit as a whole. Sometimes you will find misconduct. Single out the offenders promptly and take care of them in private. Sometimes you will find misplaced personnel. With your personnel officer you can generally effect transfers that will speed up the job and make everyone happier. The things you will learn by *seeing for yourself* are innumerable, and they will help you feel the heart-beat of your unit. Also, by being known and seen, you are selling yourself.

Try to eat meals in all your messes at regular intervals or, if you have but one mess, at each table of the mess. Chat with your men and learn their names. Be present at odd intervals for every representative activity of your unit from reveille to bed check. This should include nonduty activities, such as a wedding or a ball game.

Inspections not only allow you to see the status of training and police of your unit, but they permit the unit to see you. If you fail to present yourself in a favorable light at inspections, you are losing a chance to make a good impression on your men. You can take advantage of inspections not only to ask questions at random from the men inspected, but also to make comments which will later spread throughout your unit by word of mouth: "The Old Man said that if we got up to 90 percent aircraft available, we'd be tops in the Air Force and that Joe Ducrot's communications section had one of the toughest nuts to crack to make that record. I think the Old Man sure wants to make that record." Such remarks indicate interest in your men and unit, putting you in a favorable light. They show your personality, and can also serve to get your unit to regard duties, such as inspections, as something other than a device for giving them extra work and restrictions. For instance, if you can persuade your men to think of inspections as an opportunity for receiving favorable attention rather than as a pretext for heckling them, you will have done much to promote confidence in your leadership.

This method of spreading favorable remarks is not limited to inspections, of course, but can be applied to all ceremonies, visits, meetings, conferences, lectures, staff meetings, critiques, briefings, and parties. If you are alert, you will always take advantage of these opportunities to reach a part of your unit. Such remarks, however, should have the desired results. If you are thoughtless and make unsavory or disparaging comments, you will spread remarks through your unit that may destroy months of effort. Censure spreads more rapidly than praise. An unfortunate remark or tone, or even appearance, may lower your stock tremendously. Guard, too, against sarcasm. It is always resented and seldom forgiven.[4]

The speed with which your remarks spread through the unit depends not only upon what you say, but how you word it, and under what circumstances. Phrase your remarks as colorfully as possible to give them emphasis and interest. One leader once stated: "Anyone failing to salute the General when he comes on our Post will be hung by the neck from the top of our control tower." The message of the leader was remembered, spread, and his desire accomplished because of the way he phrased it. The threat was so preposterous that no one regarded it as vicious. It demonstrated the anxiety of the leader for good performance without, in actuality, threatening punishment for offenders. A threat of a weekend's restriction to the field would have been deplorable; genuine threats are to be avoided like the plague.

General Patton was an expert at phrasing remarks that stuck. In a speech to his Third Army he said: "Why, by God, I actually pity those so-and-so's we are going up against. By God, I do." Because of the unusual twist of this remark, it was quoted throughout the entire Allied Forces. And a remark attributed to Nathan Bedford Forest, because of its quaintness, has become historical: "Git thar fustest with the mostest." At another time, upon being informed that the enemy was in his rear, this colorful rebel general reputedly said: "Wall, then we're in their'n!" Original remarks which catch the imagination are a form of dramatization that spreads the leader's personality far and wide.

[3] National Research Council, *Psychology for the Fighting Man, op. cit.*, pp. 307 f.

[4] General Wavell, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

Remember, your motive is to give your men confidence in you. Always avoid any appearance of egoism and never give cause for your people to believe you are pushing yourself into the limelight as an individual. You should always appear to be carrying the ball for them, publicly spreading their fame or fighting for their welfare.

At an English station one AF commander customarily broadcast results of the day's operation over the public address system. This practice served several purposes: It told the men the results of their efforts. It enhanced unit spirit because it extolled virtues and successes. And it permitted the group to hear it from the "horse's mouth," thereby creating confidence in the leader.

Admiral Kirk, who commanded the amphibious landing of the Seventh Army in southern France, made wide use of the public address system to broadcast the results of the day's operation. Loudspeakers in every vessel carried his voice from the command ship. As the landing progressed he kept up a running commentary so that all personnel knew the situation almost as well as he. You can imagine the confidence the men had in their leaders who kept them so well informed. Those men in the succeeding waves felt stimulated when they learned that the first wave met little opposition. The Admiral's voice bolstered their spirits. The listening itself gave them something to do to relieve their anxiety.

Examples of clever dramatization are numerous. General Patton's shiny boots and helmet, plus his twin pearl-handled revolvers, made him a picturesque and talked-about character. General Montgomery's Tank Corps beret, on which he wore the insignia of his regiments, added to his color. The regulation which permits senior generals to vary their uniform is obviously not without purpose. You, of course, cannot go so far in originality of uniform, but you can follow the principle in other picturesque ways. Proudly and boldly display your unit insignia in all possible ways permitted by regulations. If you wear well-tailored and neat uniforms, you will never fail to attract attention.

Your actions more than your appearance will give you greater freedom to win the confidence of your men. Don't hesitate to show your enthusiasm for any worthy unit activity or enterprise. Suppressing your emotions at such times only tends to deaden the enthusiasm for the enterprise itself. Enthusiasm breeds enthusiasm and is accompanied by emotion. By all means, *show* your emotion when that emotion will have a favorable reaction on your unit and on yourself. Be demonstrative when the occasion warrants it. Only when emotions are likely to set an unfavorable example should you avoid giving vent to them. Do not show anger, for example, except towards the enemy, and then show it with all the vehemence you can command. There may be rare occasions when a *show* of anger will get you results, but if you truly feel angry, suppress it. Avoid a show of excessive sadness over casualties, as it will tend to spread self-pity in your unit. Of course, it goes without saying that you should never show confusion, frustration, or anxiety. Particularly when things are blackest, you must demonstrate cool self-possession. Keep a calm demeanor even though you are boiling inside.

Confidence in your leadership is enhanced by your technical skill. Flying, for example, is admired as such by all airmen and is a good way for you to demonstrate your ability. Perhaps you might not be the best all-around flier in your unit, but you are apt to excel in at least one phase. If you are good at instruments, for example, don't hesitate to make some instrument flights your people will admire. If you are hot at formation flying, show them by example how to fly a wing or tail-end Charlie position. Or if you can bomb well, or navigate, or shoot well—show them. Advertise your outstanding abilities, but do it subtly. Never appear to be a show-off or your results will backfire.

When the B–26's first arrived in the ETO they were very unpopular. There had been many B–26 crashes and some referred to them as "killers." Naturally there was considerable reluctance to operate them to their full potential. General Doolittle visited a B–26 group, listened with sympathy to the tales of woe, and then asked to fly the airplane. After putting it through average maneuvers he feathered one propeller on landing and took-off again with one engine. Still flying with one engine, he repeated his previous maneuvers, and then landed. Upon discussing the airplane further with the group staff, the General conceded that it wasn't the best airplane America could build but that he thought it could do the job. After that the B–26 became a great airplane with an operational record that is history.

Since you are human, you will want desperately to be popular with your men. Suppress this desire; it is a pitfall. Popularity does not always carry confidence, respect, admiration, and obedience. Inspiring those qualities is far more important than gaining popularity. An easy-going, indulgent commander is generally popular. But when his unit has a tough job, he fails. He is not a leader. He is more like a politician whose actions are guided by the will of the men. Most great leaders have been unpopular at some point in their careers and still successful, whereas when their followers lost confidence in them, defeat invariably followed. Popularity, then, is not essential to leadership, but confidence is.

Shortly after you take command of your unit you will become conscious of the fact that your every word and act is closely regarded. Not infrequently you must make unpopular decisions without having first conditioned your unit to accept those decisions. Unfavorable reaction will be very apparent and extremely annoying to you. It will be no less difficult for you yourself to carry out those decisions

than for your men to do so, you think, and you are apt to develop a righteous indignation. To aggravate this indignation, your men will heckle you in every possible way. The combined force of their antipathy will be directed at you as an individual rather than towards the unpopular decisions. People always tend to make their objections and displeasures a personal matter even though no individual is truly responsible. You must school yourself not to be affected by heckling. Even though you may feel you are being crucified, use every ounce of your self-control to keep from showing, by word, expression, or act, any of the resentment you might feel towards your men. Ignore the opposition. Do not attempt to further justify the decision once it is made and explained. Further justification will only add fuel to the opposition. *Weather the storm.* It will blow itself out sooner than you think.

You will have assistants or a staff who will act in your name. Your assistants can either improve or injure your leadership. Unless you choose them carefully and use them wisely, they may destroy the confidence your men have in you. When possible, select your assistants for their integrity of character, for their loyalty, for their leadership ability, and for their technical skill.

Integrity of character will be typified by modesty, honesty, and a firm purpose to complete each task as planned or directed. Should you suggest that an assistant fly a mission into enemy country to reconnoiter a vital enemy field, and he merely nods, if he has integrity of character, the flight will be made regardless of weather or enemy opposition. No formal order is necessary.

All good men are ambitious, but, if they are wise, they realize that working for your success and the resultant success of the unit will give them more true recognition than if they were to work directly for their own aggrandizement. No more outstanding example of this truth can be shown than in the career of General Eisenhower. His work on the War Department General Staff, prior to assignment as commander of the European Theater, was marked by excellence and anonymity. Only his leader, General Marshall, was widely known. Yet Eisenhower's modesty was no detriment to his eventual selection to lead the largest military command of our entire history.

A modest assistant will be a better member of the team than one who is continually blowing his own horn, and it is more likely that the modest assistant's reports to you will be honest and accurate. When a report is colored, the chances are the reporter has an ulterior motive. A leader cannot condone such intellectual dishonesty. You must have the full truth, not half truths.

Your assistants have but one function, to assist you. In selecting your staff keep this function in mind. You can readily see that, if they are to honestly assist you, they must be loyal to your ideals. They must believe in your fundamental concepts and must respect you as an individual and as a leader.

Bear in mind at all times that you do not want "yes men" and rubber stamps. You want your assistants to use initiative and to produce ideas which will further the unit objective. Do not misconstrue nonagreement as disloyalty, provided such nonagreement is constructive and justifiable. When time permits, you should even encourage arguments in order to make your staff think.

The ideals most apt to be conflicting, particularly in time of war, are the supremacy of the mission *versus* the supremacy of man. The quickly trained officers and men just out of civilian life will, to a certain point, realize the importance of the mission. But their conviction will often be held with reservations and, when bloodshed and death become frequent, they will tend to compromise the mission to protect the men. Yet you must use many men who have not had a military background, and you must even select assistants and leaders from among them, for generally you have no other material. Your wisest plan is to select those men who approach the high standard of devotion to the mission that you hold and essay to strengthen their weakness.

A clashing of military ideals between the leader and his assistants is the greatest enemy to loyalty and confidence. You should try to select assistants with military ideals similar to your own. But, in the absence of authority to make your own selections, you should tread lightly until you have determined the beliefs of your staff. You can then determine which are your men and which are apt to be unreliable. If you are unable to convert the dissenters to your policies eventually, you would be wise to remove them from your staff, even though replacements are not available. It is far better to have a zero quantity than a negative one.

To be of most value to you, your assistants must be leaders in their own right. A good assistant will not only assume your responsibilities in your absence, but he will carry out much of your routine administrative work, thereby permitting you to devote more time to direct association with your men. By having this extra time, you can better inculcate your policies, spread enthusiasm, and inspire confidence.

Finally, in selecting your assistants, look for ability. They must be experienced and capable in the specialty to which they are assigned, not only to direct the tasks specified, but to secure confidence of their subordinates. You will gain materially if each staff officer is approved and respected by the unit.

Assistants can make or break a leader. No matter how closely an assistant tries to follow your wishes, he will unconsciously sabotage your efforts unless he generally sees eye to eye with you on fundamental issues. Abraham Lincoln's letter to

Hooker which gave him command of the Army of the Potomac explains why it is essential for a commander to have the full support of his subordinates:

> I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appears to me sufficient reason, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; *I think that during General Burnside's command of the Army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could,* in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honourable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up as dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that *the spirit which you have decided to infuse into the Army of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him will now turn upon you.* I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Lincoln gambled on Hooker's skill and ambition but lost. Hooker, like Burnside, was a failure. His men sensed his own lack of loyalty to his superiors and lost confidence in his leadership.

Section V. CONFIDENCE IN OBJECTIVE

To be fully effective your men must be convinced of the worthiness of the cause for which they are fighting. History affords hundreds of examples of the incredible feats performed by forces inferior to their enemy in numbers, training, and equipment but superior because they were imbued with a feeling for the justice of their cause.

The French and German armies in 1940 differed greatly in faith in their cause. The Germans were filled with crusading zeal; they were impressed with a driving determination to conquer. Their mental attitude was one of "Attack!" and they had the conviction that they were fighting in the noblest of causes. The French, from highest commanders to men in the ranks, were uncertain, lackadaisical, and cynical concerning the cause for which they were fighting. Their attitude was "hold what we have. They don't want to fight any more than we do." The result of this difference in spirit is well known.

In America confidence in the mission has usually been assured by most citizens before we start to fight, since a declaration of war is made by Congress as influenced by public opinion. But this American confidence is not characterized by a burning zeal and it frequently deteriorates in the recruit. When he starts training, accompanied by the necessary menial and unfamiliar tasks, the forced regimentation, the hardships and dangers, he is not so apt to consider the cause so noble a one as he did when he was a civilian. When he gets into combat and finds even his chances of survival a question, he doubts still more the worthiness of the cause. In fact, one of the greatest points of difference between combat soldiers and civilians is in their conception and feeling for the cause.

You can attempt to bolster your soldier's faith in the cause by programs of education but you will find this method meets with only mediocre success. You can influence him more by redirecting his confidence in the original cause to confidence in the unit mission. His faith in the American way of life and democracy will be pretty sound. Regardless of *why* you are fighting, if you *lose* the war he will lose those elements of life most dear to him. His faith, then, should be directed to the goal of the unit—*victory*—rather than to some high-sounding cause which he might continually doubt when measuring it against his own life.

This redirection of his confidence from political to personal reasons for fighting should be one of your objectives. The American soldier is more apt to risk his life for his wife, sweetheart, family, or community than for abstract political issues. Try to identify your unit victory with the ones he loves and your men will have a firm faith in your objectives.

The average American despises war and, when fighting it, one of his greatest desires is to end the cruelty, waste, and slaughter that war causes. Only victory can put a stop to the dirty business. This is another approach to strengthen his motivation.

Correlate all activities with the unit mission and explain their relationship. Remember, reasons for doing a routine task or assignment may be self-apparent to you, but not to your men. Witness the case of the railroad yard worker, who for 30 years had been inspecting rolling-stock bearings for hotboxes and was at last retiring. In appreciation of his long and faithful service he was given a dinner. In the course of the festivities he was asked

whether he had anything he would like to say. "Yes Sir," he said, "there's a question I'd like to ask. What've I been lookin' for in them boxes all this time?" If your men are similarly ignorant of the purpose of their duties, they may resent what seems to them a needless imposition upon their time, and their duties may be poorly carried out. Explain the situation fully in the first place. Tell your men that as individuals they are vital factors in the accomplishment of the mission and it matters greatly who they are and what they do in the organization. Do this as a regular essential procedure. Then, when circumstances demand an instant, unquestioning obedience, the men have a background of experience to remind them, whenever you have set them a task, that task has always been necessary and worth while. With such a background of confidence, men will be much more likely to accept an assignment when the reasons are not readily apparent.

Remember that your enemy, too, has confidence in the merit of his goal. Ironic as it may seem, history is filled with heroes and martyrs to mistaken causes. Yet they had great confidence in their missions and that confidence gave them strength. Men have fought well for every possible cause, good and bad. Effecti e leadership gave them that confidence.

Chapter 9

DISCIPLINE

Section		Page
I.	Need for Discipline	37
II.	Punishment	37
III.	Reprimand	39
IV.	Justice	39
V.	Military Custom	41

Section I. NEED FOR DISCIPLINE

It took an old-time air force sergeant to clarify the meaning of discipline to a recalcitrant soldier just before D-day. They were practicing the loading of a glider at an air base in England. When not satisfied with the job, the sergeant ordered his detail to reload it. Not liking to do it over, one private lost his temper and turned on the sergeant with the crack, "Kinda feeling your stripes, aren't ya, Sarg?" Then the so-called soldier stood up and waited for what he thought was the inevitable. Instead of letting loose with a volley of colorful language, the sergeant walked slowly up to the shortsighted recruit and delivered this practical piece of advice: "Look, Bud, war is dangerous. You're liable to get hurt—some of the boys even get killed—and *that's why we've all gotta SOLDIER!*"

So there it is! The immortal realism of that sergeant gave an irrefutable answer to the questions about the necessity for military discipline. War is dangerous—that's why we've got to soldier. *Soldiering* embraces discipline, typified by the appearance and conduct of a man in the military service. We must have that discipline which produces instinctive obedience to orders from top to bottom in order to meet a professionally efficient enemy machine which has been trained to kill. Discipline reduces the hazards of war and saves many lives. Only with discipline can victory be possible.

Any endeavor in which human life is endangered requires the firm control and direction which can be assured only by an extremely high state of discipline. Since hazards are great in the air force, nowhere is discipline more essential.

Section II. PUNISHMENT

Few words in military usage are defined in so many ways as is discipline. As used here, *discipline* means the will of an individual or of a group to conform to the requirements of their leaders and the service. This will to conform is not enhanced greatly by fear of punishment. Psychologists state that man's conduct is not primarily governed by fear of punishment or hope of reward.[1] Strict fear-inspired control meets with questionable success and is justified only as a last resort. Whereas training that instills in men an attitude of responsibility for their own self-government gets results.

Many people speak of punishing a man as "disciplining" him. Let us consider this matter for a moment. By military definition, discipline refers to a man's government and control of himself to conform to the demands of the service. Government and control of one's self are taught. Punishment is one method of teaching discipline, but it does this only if it brings about a better attitude in the man or his unit. When punishment merely wreaks vengeance, it is not discipline.

Now to restate the simple principle which has been proved true so consistently that its correctness is not open to question: To be most effective a punishment must be accepted by the one punished (and his fellows, if they are to be helped) as a just and inevitable result of his misconduct. Whenever you are considering punishment, make this principle a guiding factor in determining the course you follow. It is true that you have the authority to punish a man arbitrarily, but if your sentence leaves the man with a sense of having been wronged you have lessened that man's usefulness. If his associates believe that he has been wronged, you have lowered the discipline and the usefulness of your whole organization.

You may think it unreasonable that the punishment of a man must be justified to him and his associates. However, the unalterable fact of human nature remains: A punishment which is regarded as unjust may do more harm than good in altering the behavior and discipline of your organization. So unless you are sure your men feel that a punishment is just, it is best that you explain it to them.

You may find frequent punishment is necessary when your unit is newly organized or your men have not yet accepted as their own the standards of conduct you require. You must, then, devote serious thought to your punishment problems.

First, get the facts. If you rush into judgment on a man without having learned all you can about his infraction and the facts bearing on it, you are liable to make a wrong decision. After being informed of a misconduct, interview witnesses and

[1] John H. Burns, *Psychology and Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1934), p. 19.

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others concerned. Study the orders or regulations bearing on the case. Determine whether the misconduct is general or whether it is an isolated case. Look up the offender's record and, after reviewing it, question him. Be sure to get the true picture before making any decision as to the man's guilt and punishment.

By all means, never fail to interview the offender. With patient, tactful, and sympathetic questioning try to gain an insight into the basic factors which produced his misconduct. Gilbert and Sullivan's celebrated line, "Things are seldom what they seem," is nowhere more applicable than in determining the true causes of human misbehavior. To say a man "just doesn't care" and believe that this explains his wrong-doing is as far from understanding the matter as to say that a plane crashed because it hit the ground. Just as the plane hitting the ground was a result, rather than a cause, so a man's poor attitude is a symptom (and a result) and not a cause of maladjustment resulting in misbehavior. You can no more cure a man's behavior by punishing its symptoms than you can cure an abscessed tooth by using a pain-deadening drug. Hence you must reason with the offender and bring yourself and him to understand the real basis for his poor attitude. Does he feel that he is stuck on the job and has no chance of promotion? Has he family trouble? Is he generally dissatisfied with army life and trying to escape from those aspects which he most dislikes? You must know the cause before you can handle the symptom (or result) intelligently and justly.

Once you have the whole story, your next step is to weigh the information and decide on the guilt and the punishment, if any, you plan to administer. Here you must consider many factors. Even though you have decided that the man is guilty, you obviously want to reform him rather than to get revenge. Study your emotions with care to be certain your punishment is free of any vengeful motives. Then estimate what effect the punishment will have on the unit. You want it to be an educational experience that will improve discipline.

A man's dislike for his sergeant is not an adequate reason for failure to report for work under him, but simply forcing the man to report to that sergeant is not a complete way of handling the situation. The man must report, of course. Certainly personal whims must not be allowed to disrupt performance of duties. But, when the man gets on his job, how are you going to prevent his grudge from causing him to work slowly or poorly and spread discontent among other men?

There may be nothing you can put your finger on and make an issue of, but a generally unwholesome attitude may prevail. The wise leader will undertake to find the basis for the dislike and remove it, or he will separate the two men.

Punishment is not an end in itself, and there are often better means of achieving discipline in your unit. But the old Mosaic law of "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" is so deeply rooted in the minds of the general public that it is usually expedient to gratify it to some extent. Three points should be kept in mind, however, when an offense is to be dealt with:

1. *Always take some corrective action.* It is the feeling of certainty that some punishment will be given, not the severity of the punishment, that constitutes the chief deterrent to wrong-doing.[2] In seventeenth century England the penalty for highway robbery was death. Today it is a few years in the workhouse, but the proportionate number of robberies is much lower. It is the near-certainty, not the severity, of the retribution which restrains.

2. *Act promptly.* The longer the time between the commission of the offense and the punishment (or correction), the less success you will have in getting your man to fully accept his punishment.

3. *Punish humanely.* Punishment so severe that it is out of proportion to the offense arouses resentment, feelings of injustice, and destroys rather than promotes discipline.

Everyone is acquainted with the parents whose children are "the worst in town," completely lacking in order and discipline. Some of these parents never punish their children. Others, on occasions when they are angered, inflict savage beatings. In other words the punishment is sporadic; it depends more upon the mood of the parent than upon the child's offense. Should you punish in a similar way results will be opposite to those desired. Nothing could be more demoralizing to discipline.

As the leader, it is up to you to punish your men personally, whenever possible. You will lose respect if you do not assume this unpleasant responsibility. But you must be an impartial and an impersonal judge. As pointed out before, avoid anger or any expression which will make the misconduct appear to be an offense against you. Instead treat the offense as a violation of your unit's standards of conduct. Explain the full significance of the offense and discuss the appropriateness of a penalty. Try to make the man realize that the penalty is just and proper. The man who accepts his punishment as just is at least started on the path toward an improved attitude. The one who considers his punishment unjust, or simply revenge, is more of a problem than ever.

It is all too easy to punish; it is difficult and requires skill to explain and convince. No doubt there will be instances when the punished man feels persecuted. In the final analysis the overall effect on the unit is your prime consideration. If unit discipline is improved, consideration for the man is secondary. The punishment has served its purpose.

[2] A. T. Poffenberger, *Principles of Applied Psychology* (The Century Psychology Series, New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942), ch. 31.

Section III. REPRIMAND

A reprimand may be considered a very mild punishment. The rules for a punishment apply for a reprimand with the exception that the unit should not be included in your action. It is a private dealing between you and an individual to remind him of his shortcomings and to inspire in him a desire to correct them. Furthermore, no punishment is given beyond the talk itself.

You are likely to have your eye on a man who is falling below par in his work or who continually slights well-established customs. You may give him the benefit of the doubt by attributing his failing to ignorance, and hope he will improve in time. When he fails to improve you are annoyed, not only because he has let down you and the unit but because he has forced you to take an embarrassing action. To be sure, he deserves a reprimand. You may delay it, however, and when the man's attitude becomes worse you are annoyed at yourself for having put off the distasteful task of calling him on the carpet. You are likely, then, to act in a surge of anger against the man and yourself. The result will not be a reprimand, but a bawl-out, making the situation worse than ever.

Act at once when you feel that a reprimand is necessary. There need be no cause for delay. An immediate private interview with the man may bring out causes that justify his actions so that no reprimand is necessary.

Reprimand only when you feel calm. If you are angry, it is doubtful that any self-control can hide your anger. Since anger breeds anger, he will become angry too. You are apt to use strong language inconsistent with his shortcoming and to jump at conclusions. The man will feel beaten and discouraged. He may even feel hatred towards you.

Reprimand in private, so that no one besides you and he can hear your conversation. You must show him his shortcomings in a straightforward manner without damaging his self-respect or his reputation. If others overhear, he will lose caste and his self-respect will be impaired.

Give him advice and encouragement. Your aim is to leave him anxious to improve, not to threaten or frighten him. As in all leadership, your effort should be concentrated in influencing him to have a desire within himself to amend his ways.

Never threaten. A threat is implied by the fact that you have taken him to task, and need go no further than that. Should you threaten him with a punishment you are committing yourself to a certain punishment before an offense is committed, without having a chance to follow the logical procedure covered in the preceeding section. On the other hand, should you fail to carry out your threat in the event the offense is repeated, your prestige will be considerably weakened.

Don't make first admonitions too stern nor sharp but appeal primarily to the man's self-respect and unit pride. Repeated offenses, however, should be punished adequately, sternly, and quickly. If you continue to hand-slap incorrigibles you will quickly lose respect.

Admonitions delivered to a group of men or to your unit are dangerous and you should make them rarely if at all. It is far better simply to restate and explain the regulation or the order to be certain that all are cognizant of it, that they know the reasons for it, and that they know you have your eyes open for offenders. Then, reprimand flagrant offenders in private, or, better, when you have assistants charged with responsibility for the discipline of their men, reprimand them for their lack of proper supervision.

In calling attention to the approved concepts of discipline it is important that you take a positive rather than a negative approach. Do not stress the matter of punishment for shortcomings, and do not appear to hold the attitude that the men will perform their duties and conduct themselves properly just because you order them to do so. Rather, stress the idea that the unit is a team, with every man having responsibility for the team's success. Leave the implication that you regard them as responsible and respected men, willing and capable to accept this responsibility and live up to it.

Section IV. JUSTICE

One idea of justice associates a certain punishment with each particular offense under all conditions. Only by so administering justice, it is believed, can complete impartiality be achieved. History evolved this system of justice to protect the common man from whimsical and tyrannical overlords who in one case might hang a starving man for stealing a loaf of bread and in another case overlook a brutal murder. The right of equal justice before the law for all people was won at great cost to mankind through centuries of struggle, and has approached the ultimate ideal in the United States. It is, therefore, a deep-rooted conviction of Americans that this is an inalienable, self-evident right, as it truly is. Many people, unfortunately, have the mistaken belief that the right of equal justice precludes kindness and mercy.

Military justice does not prescribe a certain penalty for a certain offense, rather it sets the *maximum* penalty that can be given. Neither our civil nor our military law insists that the maximum penalty be administered; it only insists that it not be exceeded. Our entire system of justice permits, even encourages, our judges, juries, and courts to prescribe lesser penalties for the offenses committed, depending upon the circumstances involved. This is the element of kindness and mercy in our justice that permits the rehabilitation of the offender.

As stated previously, punishment as such does nothing unless it educates the offender and his fel-

lows to improve their ways. You will not educate by "throwing the book" (giving maximum punishment) for every offense. But through kindness, mercy, understanding, and consideration of the underlying reasons for each offense, your punishment will still be just—and effective.

Each failure to conform, therefore, must be considered individually and dealt with on its own merits. What might constitute a just method of handling a dereliction of rules in one case might constitute a grave injustice in another case. The same infraction under different circumstances, by a different individual with different attitudes and background, will change the necessary correction steps. This is another way of saying that you don't punish for a crime, you correct an individual.

When your recruit joins the air force he takes on a new status; that is, he is subject to an entirely different set of laws and codes of conduct. Such laws as listed in Articles of War, regulations, and other orders, are based upon the fundamental principle that the military mission is paramount to all else. It is difficult for your recruit to accept this status wholeheartedly because it limits much of his former freedom and deprives him of many of what he considers his habitual "rights." It is doubtful if, in the few years of a war's duration, you will ever influence the civilian-soldier to fully accept his new status. Obviously, then you must respect his ideals as far as you possibly can by considering his former privileges and tempering your military justice with that consideration. Otherwise he is likely to feel that mission-guided justice, particularly when it is arbitrary and severe, is motivated by vengeance, partiality, or even cruelty.

One successful method of administering military justice is to give unusual punishment. It is often possible to combine the punishment with productive work, and, too, the punishment can be made most effective for each individual case. You need not necessarily resort to court martial even with major offenses. If you are a unit commander, the one hundred and fourth Article of War gives you authority to punish summarily. By being alert and imaginative, it is possible to invent punishments just as severe as are those in the manual for court-martial. You need never try a man formally except in those rare instances when you have no other recourse and it is for the good of the service that he be eliminated. In conceiving unusual punishments, however, guard against their being cruel or inhuman.

One fighter group commander took his pilots off combat status when they got out of line. In an outfit with very high morale this might be one of the severest punishments possible.

An opposite but equally effective punishment was administered to Lieutenant X, who was a pilot of a B–24 in the ETO during the early part of the war. Lieutenant X was one of the lucky ones to complete his 25 missions and get ordered back to the States. He had a good combat record and several well-earned decorations. To celebrate his "graduation" he became very drunk, stole a jeep, broke all station traffic regulations, and ran down an enlisted man, breaking his leg. Lieutenant X confessed fully and was remorseful. Under arbitrary justice he could have been dishonorably discharged and sent to a penitentiary, as a maximum penalty for his offense.

The leader in this case had a most pressing problem in relation to the mission. Because of the rapid rotation of combat personnel, he could not materially raise the standard of training in his group. Green men were continually coming in and then leaving the group just as they became skillful. The mission could be better performed if those combatwise veterans would fly more than 25 missions, yet the danger was so great that few volunteered. The leader could have ordered more missions, but a precedent of 25 had been so strongly established that any deviation would have lowered morale and efficiency.

The leader then conceived this punishment: Lieutenant X would fly 25 more missions, another combat tour. He would also be given the maximum fine under the one hundred and fourth Article of War, together with a written reprimand. If he deported himself well throughout his new combat tour, the written reprimand would be destroyed. To placate repercussions from the enlisted men, Lieutenant X (who was willing to accept any punishment) was directed to apologize for his act publicly and visit his victim daily in the hospital.

The punishment of Lieutenant X was unusual, but its success attested to its soundness. The mission objective was materially advanced, the men were not incensed over any partiality of justice, and similar offenses did not recur.

Had a man whose record was not good, and who was no credit to his unit or to the mission, committed the same offense, the leader could have taken that opportunity to "throw the book at him" and get him out of the oufit, or preferably, out of the air force. Each case and each offender should be judged as a distinct problem.

Tempering justice with kindness in military discipline is not a new concept. You will find it directed in pragaraph 2 *b*, AR 600–10: "* * * Military authority will be exercised with promptness, firmness, kindness, and justice * * *"

If you are to see that kindly justice is administered, you must do all you can to have it administered in your own unit. You should know the background of the offender better than an outside agency whose justice may be arbitrary. This should not go to the ridiculous extreme of protecting a guilty man from punishment. It is rather to assure that he be punished most effectively. Furthermore, if you abandon your man to an outside agency, he will feel forsaken by his unit. Unless you look after your own, serious injury to esprit

de corps may result; so do everything in your power to punish offenses in your own family.

Justice with kindness goes far beyond the mere administration of punishment. You must exercise kindness at all times with your authority, to achieve the highest state of discipline. Avoid kindness in the childish sense of excessive sympathy, pity, and show of emotion for minor ills and hardships, as this is indicative of immaturity and weakness. Kindness, as demonstrated in a sincere regard and effort to alleviate the major hardships of others, together with an active interest in their aspirations, should be the key to your conduct.

In scheduling duties you may consider it an injustice for one man to work longer and harder than another for the same rank and pay. It is not an injustice, however, unless the particular men feel it to be so. Whatever a man is able and willing to do, within reason, is a just assignment, provided he feels it so.

You may consider it an injustice to work your men to complete exhaustion whenever your unit has a blitz job to do, but if their unit spirit is good and the men know the job is important, they most likely will get satisfaction from their all-out effort; in which case the excessive work is justified from their point of view. Instances occurred in the early part of the last war when squadrons flew night and day with every man suffering from malaria. Yet no one complained of an injustice.

What is fair and what is unfair, what is kind and what is cruel, even what is good and what is bad, are all determined, within limits, by how your men *feel* about it. When they feel the action is right, you can proceed with maximum assurance of effective results. In the days of the Roman legion it was effective to decimate the legion for infractions of discipline because the legionnaires felt it was a just punishment. As we have stated before, discipline is a man's willingness to conform. Now we see that, to a large extent, justice is a man's *feeling* of justice. Here we arrive again at the crux of leadership: INFLUENCE of men. You must try to influence your men so that their *feeling* towards discipline and justice corresponds with your requirements and the demands of the service. The problem of influencing people will be discussed more fully in the following chapter.

Section V. MILITARY CUSTOM

A good mirror of discipline in any unit is the way in which military customs and codes of behavior are observed. Military conduct is based on accepted codes of behavior as demonstrated by good manners, consideration for others, and courtesy. By observing accepted social conventions you can deal with all normal people without giving offense. Codes of conduct vary considerably with different groups and nationalities, however. To use an extreme example, it is quite offensive to belch at a meal in New York, whereas a noisy belch at an Arabian meal is considered a high compliment to the host. Less marked variations in good manners, however, can be found right in one city between different groups of people. At a bricklayer's picnic, for example, it is good manners for the host to insist loudly that a guest have another bottle of beer, whereas at a Women's Christian Temperance Union meeting, the hostess would show good manners by softly inquiring if her guest cared for another cup of tea. To get along with each other, people must be able to practice the code of conduct of the social group with which they are associated and pattern their behavior according to its standards.

The air force, particularly during wartime, is made up of people from numerous social groups, from clerks to bank executives, from high-school boys to college professors, and from East Side toughs to Park Avenue socialites. The air force then becomes a cross-section of America itself, composed of all the differences of manners, aims, morals, and ideals that exist throughout the Nation. It is evident that, unless this heterogeneous social group in the air force accepted a common code of conduct, no semblance of unity would ever exist. Hence, there is a vital necessity for military customs.

Codes of behavior in the modern air force are based upon the American ideals of justice, integrity of character, self-realization, and the dignity of the individual. Sound military ideals of discipline are also a basis of these codes and are reflected in the respect and courtesies shown superiors. Some feel that these two ideals, i. e., dignity of man and respect for superiors, are incompatible. Yet experience in our air force units has proved that the two ideals can be completely fused into one acceptable and workable code of behavior. No one ever loses dignity by being respectful. Conversely, dignity is increased with respect.

All officers receive training in military customs and social behavior. But frequently, through lack of an understanding of the necessity, the customs are not practiced after training has been completed. Young officers too often give rein to personal idiosyncrasies or habits that are incompatible with the exercise of good leadership. These young officers apparently feel that military manners are dogmatic and obsolete, since they do not correspond to their sectional standards of social behavior.

Take, for example, an officer from a small town where it is considered proper to wear cowboy boots to a dance, never to wear a necktie, never to button a coat, always to wear a hat on the back of the head, never to use the address "Sir" (it being considered a sign of subservience), and always to greet people vociferously with a slap on the back. To this officer such codes of behavior are considered highly admirable, whereas the military codes may seem foreign, uncomfortable, and undesirable. Yet, should this officer revert to sectional behavior, he is apt to offend many of his men whose ideals

of conduct are different. The former clerk from Boston, the ex-high-school boy from Atlanta, and many others may not understand the conduct just described and may even think it crude. They are far more apt to respect the standard codes of military behavior. Since all Americans have been exposed to good military conduct through literature and the movies, they know something about it and generally accept it. Military conduct is a common meeting ground for all.

This manual is not the place to list military customs. It only attempts to show that military customs and their observance are indispensable to discipline, unity, and thus leadership; and to suggest methods of influencing their observance. Your aim, therefore, should be to achieve a high standard of military behavior in your unit. You will find that problems of discipline will almost disappear when your unit accepts the standards you require.

Social and moral conduct that you do not condone in your men can be corrected best by pressure from the men themselves. But they must first accept the "good" conduct as their own. During the war, for example, it became socially acceptable at some crowded air force bases to pick up the hat or jacket that seemed handy upon leaving a public gathering. In some cases this "borrowing" habit grew to be vicious. Individuals had to guard their belongings as if they were living in a den of thieves. Yet those same individuals tacitly condoned the "borrowing" custom because the masses condoned it. How was it stopped?

Mass punishment was not the answer and individual punishment proved ineffective, since most men accepted the habit as a custom and were equally culpable. The answer was to raise the moral standards of the groups as a whole so that the men themselves would frown on the "borrowing" acts. The true leaders, who were the judges and spokesmen for the moral standards of their men, were successful in stopping this customary theft. They merely frowned on it publicly and made a few talks to their men. Those leaders not so well established had a much more difficult task. By repeated talks and bulletins they reminded their men of their former moral standards and appealed to their sense of honesty and decency. They were forced to make repeated examples by punishing offenders. But until the moral standards of their units were such that the men themselves did not overlook indiscriminate borrowing, the practices continued.

Here we come to the fundamental criterion for measuring discipline: *Discipline is only as good as that standard accepted by the men of your unit as their own code of conduct.*

Unfortunately for you as a military leader, the environmental background of your men has resulted in a considerable lack of respect for constituted authority. You will find some of your people are actually opposed to you simply because you are the boss and for no other reason. You should not challenge these radical souls by attempting to "show them who's boss." It will only make your position worse. Simply assure yourself that they do their job and ignore their antagonism. When you have established yourself as a respected leader of the majority, your radical antagonists will find it very unpopular to condemn you, and they will quickly change their tune. Most of the time they are only attempting in their radicalism to be noticed by their fellow men. To gain their support, give them responsible jobs that will permit them to show-off. If they are able to perform a show-off job, they will more than likely do it better than the quiet, plodding type.

A B–29 squadron commander in the Marianas had a particularly loud-mouthed agitator who subtly criticized every move the commanding officer made. This noisy lieutenant spoke vociferously behind his commander's back on every possible occasion. Furthermore, he was listened to, and the more missions he had the more of an "authority" he became to the less experienced crews. He became a thorn in the side of the commander and a definite threat to his leadership. Since there was nothing specifically wrong with the lieutenant's actions, he could not punish him. So the commander recruited the loud lieutenant and made him an assistant operations officer with instructional duties which included frequent formal talks to new crews and phases of premission briefing. This permitted the talkative lieutenant to be as loud as he pleased, but *openly* and *officially*. Not only was the squadron commander's thorn removed, but the lieutenant, by directing his exhibitionism into authorized channels, became a loyal assistant and a valuable asset to the squadron.

There has been much discussion recently concerning the advisability of continuing military customs which differ from civil customs. Discipline and unity, it is argued, are also necessary in civil organizations. A little logical thinking boils the question down to one of *degree*. A higher degree of discipline and unity is essential in the armed forces because *the job is more vital.* It is more vital because it is more immediate, more hazardous, and the consequences of failure mean death or slavery. Failure, too, means incredible hardship and suffering for those at home.

If a higher state of discipline is essential, it follows that there must be symbols to indicate and continually remind all military people of that high degree of discipline. A show of respect for superiors, for example, is fundamental if firm control is to be exercised through discipline. In the air force, particularly, where complex maneuvers with thousands of extremely complicated machines must be timed to split-second precision, discipline is at its greatest premium. There can be little question that military customs which are symbols of high discipline, must be practiced.

Chapter 10

MORALE

Section — Page
I. Definition of Morale — 43
II. Influencing Morale — 44

Section I. DEFINITION OF MORALE

General Ulio, former Adjutant General of the Army, had this to say about the attainment of morale. "It is when a soldier thinks his army is the best in the world, his regiment the best in the army, his company the best in the regiment—and that he himself is the best damn soldier-man in the outfit." Morale is defined in Webster's New American Dictionary as "the mental state that makes it possible to sustain courage, determination, and endurance in times of test and trouble." Unfortunately this word has been so much associated with Special Services, the U. S. O., and the Red Cross that its meaning has been corrupted in many minds to refer to entertainment and personal needs. Morale is neither more nor less related to entertainment and personal needs than is esprit de corps or discipline. *Morale is the collective mental state and spirit of a unit.* It is influenced and typified by esprit de corps (team membership), individual recognition and responsibility, confidence, and discipline. You can see, then, that morale is a combination and integration of all the factors of leadership discussed in the last five chapters. When you have led your unit to realize those five factors, you will have developed high morale. It is that spirit which makes men willingly work all night in a blizzard to get an airplane in commission even though the task seems hopeless.

In good times high morale may be marked by cheerfulness—not hilarity or exuberance of spirits necessarily, but confidence and willingness to accept duty, recognizing the necessity of it, and performing it without inward hostility even though it is unpleasant. If a man detailed to K. P. gripes about his tough luck but pulls the extra duty without rancor, his morale is high. If, on the other hand, he curses not his luck but someone whom he personally blames for his misfortune and rages against the tyranny which robs him of his all-too-little free time, his morale is low. He is doing his work not because of a spirit of teamwork or responsibility, but solely because he feels a worse vengeance will be wrought upon him if he fails to do so. In the latter case, no work accomplished can be attributed to morale. When such feelings prevail, your leadership requires correction.

In times of adversity cheerfulness may not be found, yet morale can be excellent. It will be manifested in a determination to take the situation which exists and get from it the best possible outcome. Consider the purposeful determination and tenacity of the 19th Bomb Group in the early stages of World War II. Shot up, bombed, and decimated, it was still able to fight as long as one B–17 could stagger into the air. Contrast the 19th Bomb Group with the 8,000 American militia who in 1814, confidently marching out to defend Washington against 2,000 British, were routed at the first shot. The 19th Group had high morale; the militia of 1814 did not.

Morale does not have to be based on justifiable hope of victory, material comforts, or even an expectation of bettering one's state. History affords many instances of high morale persevering in the face of terrible misery or hopelessness. The defenders of the Alamo, facing inevitable death without even the alternative of surrender, sent out messages of cheer and determination during their last days. More recently the world has marveled at the epics of Bataan and Wake. The willingness of our forces to fight on, even after they knew that all was lost, cannot be explained by objective circumstances and reasons. It is traceable to that intangible something which is a necessity for any successful operation—morale.

It is often morale rather than military strength which gives one side the edge over the other in combat. History is filled with examples from Thermopylae and Cannae to the air battles of Guadalcanal and Schweinfurt where an inferior force continued to fight successfully because of high morale.

In peace or war, efficient work cannot come from men who are acting under protest, resentfully and with no desire to do anything except to avoid punishment. Some commanders have mistakenly believed that, because they have the power to compel obedience, it is unnecessary to try to inspire willing cooperation. This belief is manifested in harsh punitive systems of the "Tell-'em-nothing-they'll-do-it-because-I-say-so" school of thought. At times this practice may be essential to the successful accomplishment of a mission. The vital point (covered in ch. 2) is often overlooked: Men will maintain high morale while proceeding in the dark only if experience has convinced them that their leader deserves confidence. In other words, high

morale built up through proper training and policies of leadership over a period of time pays dividends in unquestioning obedience.

The disgruntled soldier on K. P. just mentioned may pull his extra duty and appear to be performing his job, but if that disgruntlement is typical of his whole attitude, would you want him in the crew servicing your plane? If you would, you are the stuff of which heroes are made—dead heroes. The embittered soldier will be so absorbed in self-pity that he is likely to take only routine measures to insure safety. He will not use initiative to seek out and guard against every possible danger. High morale is the only safe basis for dependability.

Section II. INFLUENCING MORALE

In preceding chapters we have discussed the basic factors in developing morale, and we have covered some attitudes and techniques which have proved successful in favorably influencing those basic factors. The methods you employ to influence each factor of morale, of course, influence morale itself. This section, however, will touch on vital attitudes and techniques not previously emphasized which will influence all factors of morale. Perforce there will be some repetition, for all the elements of morale and the techniques to achieve them are intertwined.

Throughout this manual it has been emphasized that your leadership comes into play to the extent that you can influence the thoughts and feelings of your men. How can you do this? First of all, of course, you must know them well—know what they are thinking and how they feel about things. Next you must alter their thoughts and feelings in such a way as to develop morale.

Thought and mental attitudes of people cannot be favorably influenced by force, and psychologists tell us that even reason has doubtful success. Emotion, they say, is the dominating influence in forming the mind-patterns. If you are, then, to influence your people favorably through their emotions you must have an attitude which will permit you to get close to them, to get along with them, and of which they will approve.

Cheerfulness has great significance in getting along with people. Its importance has long been recognized by the saying, "Laugh and the world laughs with you, cry and you cry alone." "Hap" Arnold's smile undoubtedly played a significant part in his becoming the top commander of the world's greatest air force. You say it was his personal magnetism, tact, poise, leadership? Certainly all these, too, but did his smile create these things, or were they created by it—who can tell? Many successful men have attributed their success to smiling. They smiled deliberately until, they said, it became a part of themselves. Always the results are a thousandfold return for the little effort. Cheerfulness spells confidence, optimism, fearlessness, and "I like people," which everyone recognizes and warms to immediately.

Not only should you present a personality which attracts and is compatible, but you should try to express yourself attractively. Influence of others through language is an art which largely appeals to the emotions. The fantastic sums of money spent yearly on advertising attest to the importance being placed on this pseudo-science. Have you ever bought something you didn't need? Have you ever learned through advertising that you want new things? A commonplace example demonstrates one trick of salesmanship. The salesman greets the lady at the door with: "Good morning, I believe you have two children. Is that right?" "Yes." "Are they in school?" "Yes." "Are they interested in music, reading, athletics?" These and other questions which normally require an affirmative answer are aimed at the mother's interests in her children. More than likely, she will find herself "yesed" into buying a set of books or whatever the salesman is peddling. If the salesman had started his conversation with a negative attitude it would have aroused unpleasant emotions. He would very shortly have received a final "NO" with the door shut in his face.

Tead lists eight important processes for influencing people: (a) Suggestion, (b) imitation [example], (c) exhortation, (d) persuasive argument, (e) publicity, (f) reliance upon the logic of events, (g) a show of affectionate devotion, and (h) the creating of a typical problem situation, the pressure of meeting which teaches its own lessons.[1] Most of these processes have been discussed in the manual elsewhere, but we have a few more suggestions to add here on how to influence your men through their emotions when giving your instructions.

In contacts with people ideas can be presented either directly or indirectly. Whichever presentation is made, all the principles of leadership apply. You should be courteous, considerate, cheerful, interesting, modest, sincere, enthusiastic, confident, and tactful.

The indirect presentation of ideas has advantages in that it implies that both individuals agree—that there is no coercion or "pulling of rank." There are numerous ways you can present ideas indirectly.[2] You can credit another with the desired thought: "Sergeant, don't you think there is time to inventory class 13 before the week-end?"

At Fort Donelson, when General Grant arrived on the battlefield he found his army half-routed but he saved the day by galloping down the line shouting to his men: "Fill your cartridge boxes quick and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape, and he must not be permitted to do so * * *." Although the Union position was critical, the suggestion that they were actually

[1] Ordway Tead, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 f.

[2] Wendell White, *Psychology in Living* (2d printing, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1944), ch. 1.

achieving victory (since the enemy was trying to escape), acted like a charm.[3]

You can also wait until the man acts in, or expresses, the desired direction and then compliment him highly. If you have subtly led him to that act, so much the better.

Good example is perhaps the most effective way of giving orders indirectly. It was said that General Marshall seldom gave a direct order, yet his success is renowned. Mrs. Marshall has described in her book how the then Colonel Marshall assumed command of a shabby and unattractive post. Without a word of criticism concerning the deficiency, Colonel Marshall industriously cleaned and trimmed his grounds and planted flowers. Soon the whole post flourished with well kept and attractive grounds.

If you present facts simply without drawing a conclusion your men may draw the desired conclusion. When they have drawn the obvious conclusions give them credit for the idea. Believing that the idea is theirs, your men will feel that they will lose credit or prestige if it isn't carried out.

You can avoid hurt to self-respect and pride by stating an idea in such a way that the other person will know you are aware of his knowledge of and interest in the subject. Examples: "As you know from your own experience * * *" "Perhaps we can work out a better way but until then * * *" "As you have already pointed out, we must * * *"

The military profession, however, and most particularly the air force, requires the ultimate in direct and immediate action. Since the factor of time is so dominant there is seldom time to present an idea indirectly. The terse, direct order is essential in most cases. It must be used in training to condition your men for its habitual use in combat. Repeated explanations covering the reasons why it is used will help your men to accept it. Even so, with a pleasant manner you can present your ideas directly without unnecessarily antagonizing your men. Would you rather be addressed, "Hey you! Assemble the pilots for briefing at ten sharp!" in a haughty, rough voice or would you rather have your leader say in an inoffensive yet firm voice, "Joe, we will have a briefing at ten o'clock. Will you please notify the pilots?" *The backbone of effective direct presentation is courtesy.*

Allied with courtesy is modesty. Modesty enables your men to feel that they also are important to the mission; you respect their opinions and rights and realize that you are not infallible. Expressing gratitude or admitting chance or circumstances as being responsible for your success will express modesty. Tread lightly with the "I" expressions which smack of arrogance. Whenever at all possible, give your men the full credit. Credit to them is implied in the phrases: "The best methods heretofore * * *," "Somebody dreamed-up a good one * * *," "We appreciate your cooperation in * * *," "It has been suggested * * *" Positive statements, too, should be used with caution. Even when you are right, positive statements are frequently resented.

Not only must you present ideas to your men but you must often change their ideas or even get them to discard a whole concept. Remember how steadfastly you hold to your pet ideas? Now imagine another person, perhaps your superior, saying about one of them, "That's stupid. That's not the way at all. *This* is the way it is * * *" Does that approach appeal to a pleasant emotion? What is your estimate of that man's intelligence? Has your respect for him increased?

Influencing a man to discard his ideas is probably one of the toughest nuts you must crack. Obviously, it will be better for everyone concerned if the desired changes can be wrought without ill feeling. All the tact and diplomacy at your command will be required. Sometimes you will be able to work it out with well-chosen questions which will reveal to him his error, at the same time crediting him with its discovery. Thus his self-respect will be saved. Or, you may first show genuine interest in his idea (his may still be a better idea than yours). Upon deciding against it, explain your reasons and reject it *courteously*. When it will not impair the mission, you should make concessions. He will be proud of his part in the project. In other words, act the same way you must in handling all leadership problems. Influence people by appealing to their individuality, interests, desires, self-respect, and ideals—their emotions.

We are all herd-bound and influenced tremendously by our social groupings. Hence the thoughts and feelings of any one group will generally run in a common pattern. When you are close to the pulse beat of your unit you can almost read its common mind and feel its emotions. You are then most apt to know *how* to approach your men at any one time. Once you have determined the method of approach to influence morale, your next question is *when* to spring it? Timing of your actions is of inestimable importance. The thoughts and feelings of your unit are not static elements, they are moving targets. Unless you trigger your action at the right time, you may miss your targets entirely or, worse, hit wrong ones.

If your men are depressed or under tension, for example, you should sense it, be able to think of something to raise their spirits, and spring your plan when it will be most effective. Maybe a grim joke at the right moment will do the trick. Invariably such a joke, no matter how corny, told by war leaders at a premission briefing drew a laugh and caused noticeable relaxation in the men. At other

[3] Fuller, J. F. C., Major-General, *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944), ch. 1.

times, a new and pleasant line of activity will deflect their thoughts and feelings into other channels. A ball game, a picnic, a maneuver, or almost anything that interests them will serve the purpose.

When you sense the feelings of your people and time your action, you exploit your best opportunities to improve morale. History is replete with examples of defeat turned into victory by a leader's action at the critical time. Caesar dashed on foot in front of his wavering legions at Munda and they turned to win. Napoleon's generals turned the tide at Lodi by the timely rallying of his grenadiers on the bridge. Washington calmly rode between the lines under full fire at Princeton and steadied his soldiers. Patton swam the Sauer in winter to speed his troops across. Eaker flew on the first daylight B–17 bombing mission of Europe against the advice of the Royal Air Force, who had given up such doubtful operations. The timing was right for all these actions of leadership, and the morale of the forces involved was materially raised.

You can frequently sense the thoughts and feelings of your unit by paying close attention to rumors. Rumors are essentially a distortion of a wish or fear, and while all rumors are not malicious or harmful, the temper of your unit is indicated by the ease with which rumor spreads and becomes distorted. Wild rumors, too, may indicate that you are not keeping your people fully informed or that they do not trust your statements. The correction required is obvious: shoot straight with them. Give them the true story. *Keep your men informed.*

You should be alert to guide or dispel rumors when they threaten to assume harmful aspects. Even a pleasant rumor may be harmful. If it doesn't materialize, it will more than likely result in an unnecessary lowering of morale. Any rumor based on fear will create anxiety, more fear, and possibly panic. You must take immediate action to quash all fear-inspired rumors.

One of Napoleon's maxims covers the handling of rumors:

> It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets them at the first chance. If discourses and harangues are useful, it is during the campaign; to do away with unfavorable impressions, to correct false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp.

When morale is high you will find your men talking about their unit and the people composing it—their skills, achievements, personalities, actions, and the like. You will find the talk flavored with pride and liking, not rancor and discontent. When people are truly interested in their work they like to talk about it.

Misunderstanding and confusion are fertilizer for the seeds of rumor and low morale. Keep this in mind when you give your orders, instructions, and explanations. You must spare no effort to get the exact thought you wish to convey to your people. Your first step, however, is to get the thought clear in your own mind by planning and discussing it with your assistants. This planning and mind-clarification phase of your orders must usually be conducted in the strictest confidence; otherwise your men will pick it up and a wild rumor is started. Some of your enterprising men may even take action on rumors of your embryonic plans, many of which you will likely reject. In any case the ideas are so immature that you do not desire them to influence your men.

Finally, after you have discussed your plan with your assistants, considering every possible ramification and effect it will have, and when you have decided how to implement it to best advantage, issue your order so that there can be not the slightest misunderstanding. It is always best to issue your orders verbally whenever you can, for then you can ask for questions leading to further clarification. To assure that there is no misunderstanding, ask various people to repeat your orders. There is no better way to be certain your true thought is conveyed. Make it standard practice after giving verbal orders to say, *"Are there any questions?"*

But never fail to follow up every order and instruction in writing. When it is in writing your people have a handy reference to refresh their memories. Too, absentees and new men will have a way to quickly learn the systems and procedures of your unit. The only ill that can result from written instruction is that they may become obsolete and your people therefore fail to heed any of them, even the current ones. Continually check your files to keep instructions up to date, else they will lose their value.

Here is one last caution which again considers your timing. *Do not oversell your ideas.* When you have sensed that a plan is not opposed by the majority and particularly by your keymen, it is time to act upon it *then*. Many people never make up their minds but stay on the fence. It is not likely that they will all accept your plan; only be concerned if they are opposed to it. Once your plan goes into effect it is a *fait accompli* (a thing done) and your people will soon accept it as a matter of course. Should you attempt to delay execution of an order until most of your people are enthusiastically in favor of it, you would rarely execute it. No amount of selling and argument will convince your people as much as an accomplished, working idea.

Surprise has a great emotional influence on people. When the surprise is pleasant, it is associated with adventure and gives a marked lift to morale. But when the surprise is unpleasant, it comes as a shock with a corresponding blow to morale. Whenever possible, then, you should attempt to give your men pleasant surprises and, conversely, avoid unpleasant ones. Hence you should always attempt to condition your people in advance for adverse changes and situations that may affect them. The element of personal security in the military service is precarious at best, and you should do all in your power to counteract feelings of insecurity. *Prepare your people for any adverse change which may affect them.*

Chapter 11

ATTRIBUTES OF A LEADER

Section		Page
I.	Introduction	48
II.	Integrity of Character	48
III.	Sense of Responsibility	50
IV.	Professional Ability	51
V.	Energy	52
VI.	Emotional Stability	52
VII.	Humaneness	52
VIII.	Summary	53

Section I. INTRODUCTION

The authors of *Men Under Stress,* a psychiatric analysis of army flyers in the past war, wrote: "It may be said that, owing to his psychological position as the father of the men, the character of the leader has the most profound effect upon the combat group." [1]

Throughout the body of this manual we have looked at your leadership from the viewpoint of your men. In other words, we have made a job analysis of your leadership. Now we must look at *you,* rather than at your job. Frequent reference has been made to the example you set and how it can exert a great influence upon your men. What attributes, then, should you have to present the most favorable example—the example that will influence your men to high morale and discipline?

If you feel that you may not possess leadership characteristics take courage from the fact that there is no magic formula for a leader. In the personalities of recognized leaders there have been wide variations, often extreme and even contrasting. The prime prerequisites for successful leadership, found in all great American leaders, however, are *integrity of character* and *willingness to accept responsibility.* Acceptance of responsibility signifies a desire to lead and this desire is strengthened by increasing interest. Some great leaders achieved success late in life and only after much effort. Their success can be attributed to infinite patience, hard work, and a desire for success that never recognized defeat. Comparatively speaking, such men were not equipped with a natural ability to lead, yet they utilized the attributes and personality peculiar to themselves and eventually developed outstanding ability. Not a few have hastened the development of these attributes by a personal religious faith and practice.

Besides integrity of character and a willingness to accept responsibility there are numerous other desirable traits. These traits may be expressed in innumerable ways and grouped under almost as many headings. Because all men have all human characteristics (positively or negatively) to some extent, it is difficult to agree upon what leadership traits are. When attempting to analyze the personality of a leader, it is convenient to think of his personality as composed of a number of traits or specific characteristics. The listing of such traits in the analysis of personality very easily leads to the assumption that there are a certain number of fundamental traits which are common to all people. No such list of human fundamental traits has yet been agreed upon.[2] The grouping of attributes which follows, therefore, is purely an attempt to paint a word picture of an ideal air force leader rather than to arbitrarily lay down a list of qualities that may be open to misinterpretation.

You should fully utilize the attributes and personality peculiar to yourself to develop greatest effectiveness. But don't fail to continually mature your lesser qualities by conscientious practice, study, self-analysis, and discreet imitation. Incessantly criticize your technique against the results you obtain.

The following six sections are groupings of similar attributes which are desirable for an air force leader.

Section II. INTEGRITY OF CHARACTER

One word almost covers the virtue of integrity of character—*honor.* It is a fine sense of ethics, justice, and rightness with readiness to apply it to your own conduct. It is the determination to meet any obligation however distasteful. In the words of Secretary of War Patterson, it includes "honesty so compelling that even the appearance of guile or deceit is out of the question; a sense of duty that gives a guaranty of performance of unpleasant and unrecognized deeds and of unassigned tasks; and a loyalty to superiors and subordinates, to cause, to the nation, and to conscience."

Integrity of character includes trustworthiness and dependability in fulfilling any task expected of you, no matter how trivial or how casually you agree to accept it. If a subordinate asks you at a social gathering to help him with a tactical problem and you tell him you will work on it tomorrow, it means you will do just that, and not that you have brushed him off.

A man who has integrity of character sincerely follows his own highly motivated conscience. He has unshakable self-respect, resolution, and both moral and physical courage. Integrity of character is that quality which distinguishes a gentleman; that quality which makes you perform the more difficult task when you know it to be the right one; that quality which forces you to be selfless instead of selfish.

How otherwise can you explain the actions of great American leaders except by admitting their integrity of character? Why did Washington refuse a crown at Newburg? Why did Lee lead the Confederate forces when he believed before the first shot was fired that the South could not win? Why did Billy Mitchell continue his fight for air power when he had reason to expect violent opposition?

There must be no question of your courage, since your men become closely identified with you and from this identification absorb strength. If you demand a sacrifice from your men which you are not willing to make yourself, you will not likely get results. Nothing is worse for morale than a leader who leads from the rear.[3]

In one of the opening scenes of Shakespeare's play, *Hamlet,* Polonius says to his son Laertes, "This above all: To thine own self be true; and it must follow, as the night the day, thou canst not then be false to any man." Here is the key to integrity of character—be honest with yourself. This is tougher than it seems because of the natural human failing to rationalize or kid yourself. You want something and so you think up reasons to justify your want. You make it *seem* right whether or not it truly *is* right when judged by someone who can look at it objectively without the desire that colors your own reasoning. If you indulge in wishful thinking, if you evade the issue at hand, if you fail to consider all the facts regardless of whether they support your previous convictions, your mental integrity will be nil. But remember that this failing is a natural one and cannot be corrected merely by making a resolution to be unbiased and unprejudiced henceforth. You must keep a watch dog on your mental processes. For every decision you make, attempt to extract yourself from the picture and look at the problem from a distance, as would some disinterested observer. *Then* what solution do you get? Only thus will your conclusions be logical and supported by the true facts. Each achievement in straight thinking adds to the tensile strength of your character.

If you are true to yourself you will be true to your code. Like all other professions, the "ancient and honorable profession of arms" has its own code of ethics. It is largely unwritten, being more of a tradition than an explicit set of rules. It differs from other codes of moral living only in the emphasis of certain aspects that are particularly essential to the smooth running of a military organization. True, our society and even our military organizations are in a constant state of evolution, and the outward manifestations of the code change with the evolution. But the underlying ethical principles *never* change. They are immutable because they are the elements of life, tried and tested throughout the ages in all societies, which permit us to live in greatest harmony with our fellow man. They are emphasized and supported by religion. They are in our laws and customs. But if you need personal evidence of their great value, you will note that following the accepted ethical principles will result in your greatest happiness. Your friends will respect and trust you. Their trust in you will give you greater opportunity to succeed. Their admiration for you will give you the day-to-day pleasure and confidence which comes from having true friends. When you violate an ethical precept you betray the trust of your friends. When it becomes known to them (and in time it will), they will either shun you or accept you only in a cold and formal way.

This manual is not the place to describe in detail the ethics peculiar to our profession. Such a manual is now being prepared which will be devoted exclusively to that subject. In passing, however, there are certain phases of our code that are so essential to the success of our air force that mention must be made of them.

First is the integrity of your word. Particularly when given in an official capacity, it is more than "good"; it is unequivocally sincere. In this connection, your signature (which is always "official") is a seal of your good faith. You stand behind it with your very honor. It is the assumption of responsibility and your firm promise to fulfill that responsibility. You need only look over past court-martial proceedings to realize how highly regarded is this phase of the military code. Penalties for violations are far more severe than found in civilian life. Not the least punishment is ostracism from the military profession. Unless you religiously follow this code, you will soon find yourself unwanted.

Another principle which stands out with accentuated importance in military life is property honesty. You may chuckle at this in the light of the story previously told of how men overseas had a hard time hanging onto their personal belongings. Or you may doubt it as a result of your own experience. But ask any old soldier. The "borrowing" habits that got out of hand during the war are *not* acceptable military behavior. It is much easier to get by with minor thefts in military than in civilian life. There are few locked doors and few private rooms. You daily handle many items of government equipment which you might personally like to possess. There just can't be enough checks and

[1] R. R. Grinker and J. F. Speigel, *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1945), p. 26.

[2] Floyd C. Dockeray, *General Psychology* (New York: Prentice Hall Inc., 1932), p. 539.

[3] Grinker and Speigel, *op. cit.,* p. 47.

guards to assure that none is pilfered. We must trust each other. That is the only way we can be sure that our personal and issued property is complete so as to perform our military duties. A single shortage might spell the difference between success and failure in our military operations. It goes deeper than the intrinsic value of the missing item. The missing item can cause death itself. Is there any wonder why the military code is so severe on this point?

A crack in this code of property honesty, although seemingly not serious in itself, unless promptly checked, will soon lead to a complete rupture of the code. During the war cases of "borrowing" minor items of clothing led to outright theft of vehicles and major tactical equipment. You need only guess what happened to the unit that found itself on the D-day beach minus some of its weapons as the result of "moonlight requisitioning." Or the squadron that had to fly its first mission without issued gloves. In the latter case 14 airmen went to the hospital with frostbite. Two hands were amputated, and many fingers lost. Anyone who thinks that funny has a rather perverted sense of hùmor. As a leader it is your duty not only to scrupulously observe property rights but to enforce them. You cannot expect to achieve your mission otherwise. Never let minor infractions of this code escape your attention, for the evil will grow into gigantic proportions and become so accepted by your men as to seriously tax your leadership in checking it. Above all, never be caught in the illogical trap which says, "It's not serious—everyone does it." When that attitude is present, it is more than serious, it is critical.

A third phase of the military code that bears mentioning here is that which has to do with personal dignity. The man in uniform holds a unique position in the public trust. In a sense he is public property. What he does is of special interest to the citizenry. He is paid out of public funds to guard the security of our country. Because he wears a distinctive uniform, he is conspicuous. Therefore all that he does will be examined in the light of two things: his cost and his performance. These are facts which you must accept willingly. It is right that the public in a democracy should so concern itself. Every one of your actions is subject to public scrutiny. Questionable conduct will frequently receive special treatment by the press. James Ducrot's misdoings will be referred to as those of "Lieutenant" James Ducrot, U. S. Air Force, of the umpity-umpth group and base. Now if James Ducrot were a civilian few of his connections would likely be reported, such as his lodge, club, church, or labor union. The identification of an undignified military man with his unit and service brings a measure of censure upon that unit and service. Public faith in the service is lowered, and national security itself is adversely affected. The basic reason for dignity thus becomes apparent. Your behavior must be equal to the highest standards laid down by the American public.

It is mandatory that you be meticulously honest in money matters. You will have occasion to handle large public funds. They must be administered with utmost circumspection. Beware of sloppiness in accounting. Irregularities will cast doubt upon your integrity. Your personal money obligations, too, must be met religiously. Pay your bills on time even if you have to live like a Spartan to do so. Your credit will be good and it will be easy to get into debt, but remember your pay will not get you out of debt very quickly. Letters of complaint from your creditors to your commanding officer may lead to your dismissal. The military code applied to money matters is inflexible. So it must be to retain public faith in the air force.

It is admittedly difficult to live so much under the scrutiny of both your military superiors and the citizenry. It is difficult to live always with dignity and self-respect. But that isn't all. There are other costs to leadership. When you make decisions based upon ethical standards which seem to be contrary to the general drift of things, your mental conflict will be intense and you may feel pretty lonely. But often the crucial phase of leadership is that time when you must lead people against an unwise tide of thought. You will not likely get much recognition for this at first. At first your decision may be attacked wholesale with criticism and ridicule. But if your moral courage is strong your later satisfaction will be profound. Your memories themselves will be a source of strength and self-respect rather than promptings to shame and self-accusation. Benjamin Franklin's words on this subject deserve framing:

> We must not in the course of public life expect immediate approbation and immediate grateful acknowledgment of our service * * * But let us persevere through abuse and even injury. The internal satisfaction of a good conscience is always present, and time will do us justice in the minds of the people, even of those at present the most prejudiced against us.

You might think integrity of character is a static personal condition. You say that an officer must have it, *per se*, to be an officer. True, it is the major element of the officer code. But it exists in varying degrees in all officers. Some have only enough moral strength to keep from being reclassified, while others have such unwavering staunchness of character that whatever commitment they make, even in an off-hand manner, is as sound as a certified check. So to be successful in your leadership you must continually strengthen and reaffirm your integrity of character.

Section III. SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

In chapter 4 we discussed many of your responsibilities of command. A *sense* of these responsibilities will develop in you as your capacity for leadership increases, and you will perceive many more responsibilities, accepting them without hesitation. This feeling of responsibility will give you the courage to "stick your neck out," to make decisions even when those decisions may endanger the lives of your friends, to act contrary to all advice when your conscience demands it, and to take full blame when all goes wrong. It will almost overawe you at times when you must make decisions affecting the lives of men. If you have a depth of nature sufficient to hold a feeling of awe at the destiny of men placed in your hands, you are on the right track. This capacity for reverence has characterized most great leaders, particularly in times of crisis. It encompasses not only the lives of your men, but in greater measure, the profound faith in the ultimate rightness of the cause for which you are fighting. In spite of this deep sense of the weight of your responsibilities you must be practical because decisions cannot always await a perfect solution.

A sense of responsibility is typified by quick and critical perception of all problems and a firm grasp of the true elements necessary for solution. Judgment and common sense—the ability to know what is or is not possible—is essential; so too are imagination and foresight, which permit vision of original solutions and their effects. Only with these qualities can your sense of responsibility be keen. You must *see* the responsibility before you can assume it.

A highly developed sense of responsibility assures prompt action and decisiveness. It is hard to imagine a man vacillating or procrastinating with a problem when he has a clear sense of his responsibility. His actions will have purpose and direction.

Thoroughly realizing your responsibility will enable you to be critical and to see those things which are not right. It will force you to take action and make constructive suggestion to improve the things you criticize.

A dominant sense of duty will mark your sense of responsibility and, by example, will inspire a spirit of unselfish service and cooperation in your men.

Section IV. PROFESSIONAL ABILITY

To be a good air force officer, you must first be generally well educated, not only in the liberal arts and sciences as befits the modern professional standards, permitting you to live and deal intelligently with all people, but in the technical phases of warfare in general and the air force in particular. Your education must cover every aspect of your professional career in the air force, even including human affairs, to give you an understanding of the political, social, and economic aspects of international relations. Your quest for knowledge must be always intense to keep pace with the ever-changing role of air power.

Your education must be seasoned with much practical application before you approach the ideal of ability, skill, and intelligence. Have you ever analyzed judgment? Judgment is the ability to pick the correct course of action from among several apparently correct courses. How is that ability developed? Education gives the experiences others have had in exercising judgment, together with the natural laws of cause and effect; practice adds *you* to the equation with a working knowledge of how *you* effect results. The sum of the two is good judgment and intelligence.

Sound technical and logistical knowledge of your job is essential to your judgment, as is a deep understanding of human nature. Plans, people, and material are the elements of your profession. You must be competent in dealing with each element, singly and collectively. No future combination of these elements duplicates a past one, hence you must be resourceful and sometimes find answers where none are apparent.

Among those qualities which are the essence of your professional ability, and of your ability to influence people, is effective oral and written self-expression. Knowledge and ideas are of little value to you or to your organization unless you can convey them to others by words in a clear, concise, and convincing manner. A bungled presentation of a thought, which leaves your men confused or with the wrong impression, can destroy more confidence than you have built in months of effort through good judgment, example, and technical skill. You must ever strive to gain a better command of language. More persuasion can be achieved through adroit use of the spoken and written word than by any other means.

The expansion of your vocabulary, while good, is not an essential; it is your use of words known to all your listeners skillfully assembled to emphasize, to influence, and to inspire. Mark Twain achieve world-wide fame using simple words, yet assembled so that his meaning was clear and strong. You must not only know words, you must know how to use them.

The personal safety of your men depends upon your skill and competence. If you demonstrate your technical ability to them they feel protected, but if you should prove inefficient they will lose confidence and resent your orders. They have no desire to die for stupidity.

In the rapidly advancing air force, foresight is a most necessary characteristic. Tomorrow is always upon you, and unless you can project your thinking into the future without being fettered by past bias and prejudice, you will fail in your job. Strive for a mental flexibility which will permit you to see both sides of a question in an objective light, and consider all aspects of any problem—past, present, and future. To keep up, you must exercise initiative with ingenuity and imagination.

Section V. ENERGY

You must be forever industrious. No matter how able you may be, your nervous and physical energy must always be apparent as an inspiration to your men. Superior energy will advance you to new heights of leadership.

No great military leader was lazy or dull. Each was a sparkplug, always driving himself with hard work and the addition of new responsibilities. This perseverance was characterized by a tenacity of purpose and a fighting heart that would never admit defeat, even though defeated through physical force. It can almost be said that the entire history of mankind is built on this ability to surmount obstacles, not to give up when everything seems lost.

Both Cortez and Julius Caesar burned their ships after landing on a hostile shore. They had to win as there could be no retreat. Scientific discoveries are the results of hundreds and thousands of temporary defeats which the experimenter overstepped until he reached the final goal. To be energetic you must have faith in yourself and in your objectives.

Aggressiveness and a certain amount of audacity should mark your energy. You must have enough faith to take a chance. Napoleon always wanted to know if his generals were "lucky." He knew that to be considered lucky they had to have the initiative and originality to take chances that, with good judgment, would turn out successfully.

Section VI. EMOTIONAL STABILITY

The strength and will to control your own emotions is a preeminent mark of a leader. War in battle is neither a business, a science, nor an art, but a very rough and dirty game.[4] In air battle, particularly, every phase is fraught with fear and tension. Your spirit must be robust to stand the shocks. You must have confidence in yourself and in your physical courage. You must be tough—not hard and brittle—but tough with resilience and stamina. Voltaire praised Marlborough for "that calm courage in the midst of tumult, that serenity of soul in danger." In no other way can you inspire your men so greatly by example than in your cool self-possession when catastrophe seems certain.

You are not emotionally stable if you blow your top under pressure. When the work piles up on you, you must learn to hold your voice down, keep your temper, and look at the job objectively. Always exercise composure to think clearly and act with a cool head when you are angry or otherwise emotionally upset.

Emotional stability in the final analysis depends upon the integration of your personality. To attain a well-knit personality, of course, is the work of a lifetime. We are not talking about perfection in this difficult business; we are talking about overindulgences, intemperate living, and the violation of what you know to be right and decent, all of which leaves you emotionally unsure and unsteady. Your men will frequently recognize the symptoms. They may wise-crack about "something eating the Old Man," but they will be much concerned nonetheless. They cannot be sure of good leadership when you are in such shape. Moreover, to think that proved capacity for alcoholic and sexual binges demonstrates toughness and manhood is a form of self-deception. Boasting of these binges only parades your self-deception. Such excesses indicate your emotional immaturity and lowers your stature in the eyes of your men.

Section VII. HUMANENESS

By virtue of your position as leader you will tend to become separated from your men. You must guard against aloofness that will prevent your knowing and liking them. Your sympathetic interest and concern for them and their welfare marked by your courtesy must come from your heart. Only when your interest is sincere and not mechanical will you secure full loyalty and devotion from them.

Many military practices emphasized in your training should stimulate tendencies toward kindness and consideration for others. Your duty to look after the general welfare of your men, to be vitally concerned with their health, pay, families, worship, entertainment, and other factors of their lives, all should help you be kind and courteous.

If you are courteous and human you will be loved by your men in much the same way that they love their own fathers. You may become known as "the Old Man" because your men believe that you, like their fathers, are vitally concerned with their welfare.

Dr. Hastings, head of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology, University of Minnesota, and a former member of the 8th Air Force in England, in an address before the Air War College, said: "As a father-figure you will receive from your men many attributes which you may not possess, and you may be thought to possess the quality of omniscience. You know what is right and you will be endowed with the attitude of forgiveness, just as we look to our father who knows what is right, who punishes us if we don't do right, and forgives us for doing wrong. This is natural equation we all have within us." [5]

To be a just and impartial father you must reward acts that exceed the ordinary call of duty with public citations, promotions, and decorations. And you must deal firmly with those who fail through disloyalty or unwillingness.

Don't go to the extreme of becoming too socially intimate with your men. Strike a happy medium of sociability; be friendly without being overly familiar. Familiarity may not breed contempt, but it will most certainly level mutual regard and confidence. You must use judgment in your humaneness and consider what stand best fits your own personality.

[4] General Wavell, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[5] Dr. Hastings, *op. cit.*

Section VIII. SUMMARY

A full list of the attributes of a leader would include everything that is recognized as finest in mankind. You must strive always to improve your character and personality, but in doing so, here is one last caution. Many leaders have failed for being too conscientious rather than for not being conscientious enough. For one thing, an overconscientious leader is apt to become so seriously wrapped up in the details of his job as to lose the "human touch." For another, the overconscientious man is not always the most stable man under battle conditions. For example, during the past war a pilot had the hydraulics on his plane shot out and crashed upon making a not-too-skillful landing. The bombardier was killed. The pilot said to himself, "I killed him. I made a poor landing, and I didn't tell him to get out of the nose." Such self-condemnation indulged in by an overconscientious man leads to anxiety, which sometimes results in the so-called "combat fatigue" and emotional instability. In any case, such brooding would be injurious to your personality as a leader.

Responsibility to yourself, then, must also be considered if you are to guide your energy into improving your leadership attributes. A sick man, mentally or physically, cannot lead.

You may draw encouragement from the fact that only a very small percentage of genuine leaders are not loved by their men. You must be very blind and thoughtless if you do not secure the sincere devotion of your people, for they, by nature, will always help you with your job of leadership. In fact, they will make you *be* a leader if you are at all reluctant. They will take every opportunity to push you out in front, force you to make decisions, and insist that you set the example.

Don't worry over your ability to lead. Be confident, but without the appearance of conceit. Your men will admire confidence in you. They want you to be decisive, firm in your purpose, and steadfast in your ideals, because they want their ideals to be steadfast too. Do not show trepidation, anxiety, or timidity. Be modest, but not retiring. Work for a balance between detachment and personal interest, confidence and humility, firmness and understanding, as befits your own personality.

If your men know that you are sincere in your efforts and if you establish yourself as part of your unit, they will want you to be everything good a man can be and much that he can't be. And they will want it so desperately that they will unconsciously minimize your shortcomings, magnify your good qualities, and even give you a reputation for outstanding characteristics you do not possess.

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Annex A

THE LEADER SPEAKS

Section — Page
I. Quotations ---------- 55
II. Maxims and Check Lists ---------- 57

This annex is included as an aid to both instructor and student. Although the principles involved have been covered in the text of the manual, it is hoped that a change in presentation will be interesting and useful.

In section I, *Quotations,* the suggestions have been arranged in order from those earliest recorded to the present era. Such an arrangement is provided to facilitate comparing the leadership principles which have changed little through the years. Unfortunately, many great leaders have recorded little of their leadership techniques. They seem to exercise their leadership as a matter of course, leaving specific leadership examples to live by virtue of personal accomplishments. Any writing which these leaders have done has been aimed at the strategy and tactics of warfare. Notable among these leaders who have not documented pure leadership theories are well-known air force commanders of the last few decades.

Section I. QUOTATIONS

1. Roman Empire (*ca.,* 380 A. D.):

(1) The proper qualities of a general are judgment and deliberation.

—Tacitus—Annales XIII

(2) Forethought and prudence are the proper qualities of a leader.

—Tacitus—Annales XIII

(3) He is a better leader whose command is well behaved through hard work and the habit of order, rather than he who must force his men to duty through fear of punishment.

—Flavius Vegetius

2. France (*ca.,* 1740):

The first quality a general should possess is courage, without which all others are of little value; the second is brains, and the third good health.

—Marshal Saxe

3. Prussia (*ca.,* 1770):

(1) It is the martial spirit that decides the issue, and not the tactical form.

—Frederick the Great

(2) The commander should practice kindness and severity, should appear friendly to the soldiers, speak to them, visit them, ask them if they are well cared for, and alleviate their needs if they have any.

—Frederick the Great

4. France (*ca.,* 1810):

(1) In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.

—Napoleon I

(2) Nothing is more important in war than unity of command.

—Napoleon I

(3) The important actions of a great general are not the results of chance or destiny, they arise always from planning and from genius.

—Napoleon I

(4) Hesitation and half measures lose all in war.

—Napoleon I

(5) One should encourage soldiers by all possible means to stay with colors; this will be easily attained by showing great consideration to old soldiers.

—Napoleon I

(6) That which is most desirable, and which instantly sets a man apart, is that his intelligence or talent are balanced by his character or courage. If his courage is greater, a general heedlessly undertakes things beyond his ability. If on the contrary, his character or courage is less than his intelligence, he does not carry out his plans.

—Napoleon I

5. South America (*ca.,* 1810):

The first requirement of a military leader, is to know thoroughly one's specialty and the second, to be loyal to one's subordinates. Both conditions will save one from mutual disloyalty.

—Simon Bolivar

6. Germany (*ca.,* 1865):

(1) The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with all possible social and public consideration.

—Baron de Jomini

(2) Like every art, war cannot be learned rationally, but only by experience. In war, as in art, there can be no set standards, nor can a code of rules take the place of brains.

—Field Marshal General von Moltke

7. World War I (1914–18):

(1) Techniques and tactics is the business of staffs; the leader, himself should furnish the spirit and the morale.

—Marshal Foch

(2) The success of a commander does not arise from the following rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work. Every great operation of war is unique. What is wanted is a profound appreciation of the

actual event. There is no surer road to disaster than to imitate the plans of bygone heroes and to fit them to novel situations.

—Winston Churchill

(3) Theoretical training is invaluable, as in any profession, but, as in most others, it forms merely the groundwork, as no two military situations are ever exactly alike. The necessity of professional education should not be minimized in the slightest degree; it is too highly important; but the best informed theoretical soldier without practical comprehension will often find his plans go wrong. To complete the qualifications essential to the successful soldier, there must be added persistence, force, initiative, and personal leadership.

—General John J. Pershing

8. World War II Era:

(1) Germany:

1. The final word regarding victory and defeat is spoken, not by the arms and equipment, nor by the means in which they are used, nor even by the principles of strategy and tactics, but by the morale of the troops.

—Colonel of the General Staff Foertsch

2. The martial virtues of the troops will be in vain if they are not inspired by the genius of their commander.

—Foertsch

3. Commanders and their troops will never be spared occasional disappointments. The most gifted leader will never have the good fortune to see all his thoughts about the future completely realized, or have all his calculations about the unknown come true, without an error.

—Foertsch

4. The basis of training is knowledge, its aim is ability to act. What the theory of military education demands, therefore, is not learned minds, but trained minds. The basic elements of this kind of military training in leadership is critical thought, and intellectual flexibility.

—Foertsch

5. Imposing the will of the commander on the troops is not a matter of technical means of communication, but of the effect of personality.

—Foertsch

6. The man whose mind is open to everything that happens in the field of technological achievement, who is imbued with the sense of his own duties and responsibilities, whose life is wholly lived in communion with his people—that is the kind of officer for whom the present and the future are calling.

—Foertsch

(2) Brazil:

1. Wars are fought and won by men, not weapons; in the last analysis it is the knowledge and courage of the men who fight and the officers who lead them that wins victories. Take care of your men first, last, and always.

—Revista Militar

2. It is necessary that every superior commander give proof of his capacity for judgment, of his foresightedness, and even of his spirit of decision. This is of much greater importance than is thought by those without experience, and it is necessary that, in the maneuvers of large units in time of peace this be exploited to the limit.

—A Defesa Nacional

3. The higher the post of a commander, the more must his valor march hand in hand with prudence.

—A Defesa Nacional

(3) England:

The ideal officer should be afraid of nothing, not even a new idea.

—Lord Wavell

(4) America:

1. Leadership cannot be learned from a set of rules. However similar soldiers may be in the mass, individually each man has a distinct personality.

—Gen. O. W. Griswold

2. Humiliation of a junior can never be condoned.

—Gen. O. W. Griswold

3. The fixed determination to acquire the warriors soul and, having acquired it, to conquer or perish with honor is the secret in war.

—Gen. G. S. Patton, Jr.

4. The ability to produce endurance is but an insistence of that same martial soul which arouses in its followers that resistless emotion defined as "elan"—the will to victory.

—Gen. G. S. Patton, Jr.

5. The secret (of military success) lies in the inspiring spirit which lifted weary footsore men out of themselves and made them march forgetful of agony.

—Gen. G. S. Patton, Jr.

6. By his personality, enthusiasm, and solid knowledge, the leader must supply the spark which infuses his men with his spirit and carries them individually and collectively along with him.

—Gen. L. J. McNair

7. When the competition is close, superiority in morale is always the margin by which you win.

—Gen. E. L. Hibbs

8. Insure that a mutual understanding exists between you and your men—tell them what you want and why—take them into your confidence, and they will die for you.

—Gen. H. A. Drum

9. The leader should always seek the easy, correct way to perform a task.

—Gen. C. H. Corlett

10. The badge of rank which an officer wears on his coat is really a symbol of servitude—servitude to his men.

—Gen. M. D. Taylor

11. No one can dispute the importance of the art of command, but by inaction we imply that it is a subject which we cannot teach, but also that it is a subject which cannot be taught—and so, to

comfort ourselves, we say that a man is either a born leader or a born fool and that is the end of it.

—Gen. E. I. King

12. A decent regard for the rights and feelings of others is essential to leadership.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

13. Leadership is the most important consideration, if any one thing is more important than another.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

14. The most important mission of the Regular Army is to provide the knowledge, the expert personnel, and the installations for training the civilian-soldier upon whom, in my view, the future peace of the world largely depends.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

15. To those who consider the introduction of a system of Universal Military Training an imposition on democracy, I would reply that in my opinion it would be the most democratic expression of our national life.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

16. The efficiency of our air defense, will be largely dependent on the quality of the personnel.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

17. You must have morale first and foremost, and morale is determined by a great many things. Primarily, it depends, of course, on leadership, on the possession of equipment, and in the long run—on the people back home.

—Gen. G. C. Marshall

18. When you exact respect from soldiers, be sure you treat them with equal respect.

—Col. C. A. Bach

19. Leadership not only demands but receives the willing, unhesitating, unfaltering obedience, and loyalty of other men; and a devotion that will cause them when the time comes, to follow their uncrowned king to hell and back again if necessary.

—Col. C. A. Bach

20. What military history needs is not more study of battles, but more study of the peoples who fight them.

—Maj. John H. Burns

21. In the end, the methods of leadership are good to the exact extent that they encourage human devotion and cooperative response.

—Col. Richard M. Sandusky

22. If the policies of the leader quicken the desires of the men, advance their interests, protect their rights, heighten their pride, and self-respect—if they accomplish these things, he is observing the principle of leadership, and the result is irresistible.

—Col. Richard M. Sandusky

23. The prime purpose of the armed forces is to win without excessive loss of life. In that purpose the Army won a success without precedent in our history, and this is proof enough of the character of the military leadership. It could not have succeeded if there had been anything radically wrong with our leadership, and I mean the leadership supplied by those in uniform.

—Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson

24. The function of command requires continuous alertness and a willingness to accept changed conditions.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

25. Knowledge of conditions and the principal problems of lower echelons is a prerequisite of sound command function.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

26. Any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

27. It is the team of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces working in close cooperation that gives strength to our armed services in peace or war.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

28. Our Air Force must be flexible in its basic structure and capable of successfully adapting itself to the vast changes which are bound to come in the foreseeable future.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

29. Every incentive must be given to encourage select individuals to volunteer for careers in the Air Forces, in commissioned as well as enlisted grades.

—Gen. H. H. Arnold

Section II. MAXIMS AND CHECK LISTS

Paragraph numbers which follow are presented in order of chapter headings of the manual.

1. *Introduction*

2. *What is leadership?*

a. Leadership is a way of life.
b. There is no divine right of leaders.
c. Leadership is not the prerogative of a class.
d. The successful leader is a man who has learned to put first things first.

3. *Mission*

4. *Responsibility of command*

a. To decline responsibility is to renounce leadership.
b. Suggestions on attitude towards superiors:
(1) Make sure you understand his orders; if possible, his intent.
(2) Be punctual.
(3) Be tactful and considerate.
(4) Be loyal.
(5) Be honest.
(6) Be accurate.
(7) Recognize superior ability; compliment success tactfully.
(8) Avoid flattery, bootlicking, and servility.
(9) Never go over the head of your immediate superior.

(10) Be tolerant of your superior's shortcomings and eccentricities.
(11) Retain a sense of humor.

5. *Team membership*

a. In improving organization unity a good leader will:
(1) Recognize that a good organization often prevents discipline troubles.
(2) Always examine his organization when an excessive number of problems present themselves.
(3) Always conform to the rules of the organization himself.
(4) Never permit anyone to violate the rules of the organization.
(5) Develop a technique of questioning to discover weaknesses of his organization.
b. In enlisting cooperation a good leader will:
(1) Never criticize an officer to the men, or before the men.
(2) Take his junior officer into his confidence.
(3) Say "we" instead of "I" whenever possible.

6. *Individual recognition*

a. Suggestions on attitude toward your equals and juniors in rank:
(1) Get the reputation of being cooperative for the good of the command.
(2) Be sociable.
(3) Be friendly.
(4) Be fair.
(5) Recognize the ability of your associates ungrudgingly.
(6) Cooperate.
b. In giving recognition, the leader:
(1) Gives praise only when praise is due. He does not flatter.
(2) Is always available to his men.
(3) Encourages his men to prepare for advancement.
(4) Sees to it that he is the first person to whom a man might turn in case of trouble.
(5) Has respect for the feelings of men of all ranks.
(6) Expresses sympathy and interest in a man's cause even though he might disagree with him.
(7) Is interested in the men's quarters and mess.
(8) Studies his men.

7. *Individual responsibility*

a. In giving commands observe that:
(1) A command must be definite.
(2) A command must be given in a tone of voice that leaves no doubt that the leader expects it to be executed.
(3) The leader must look at the men when giving a command.
(4) A command must not contain so much that the men cannot remember it.
b. In giving orders a good leader will:
(1) Not only tell what he wants done but advise as to how it can be accomplished if the men cannot be expected to devise methods of accomplishment themselves.
(2) Never talk down to the men in giving instructions.
(3) Give his instructions to the man in charge and not to the group. He should follow the chain of command.
(4) Not club or coax his men. He should lead and coach.
(5) Remember that the man is serving his country, not him.
(6) Not get into a position where he has to "pull rank" to have his orders executed.
(7) Get across a feeling of "let's go" instead of "get going."
(8) Avoid an overbearing attitude.
(9) Always act as though he expects his men to do a good job in carrying out his orders.
c. In improving the feeling of security, a good leader will:
(1) Let his men know just what is expected of them.
(2) Let his men know when he is satisfied with their work.
(3) Let his men know what is in store for them in the future, if possible. If not possible, he tells them so.
(4) Never make a promise which he, at that time, cannot expect to keep.
(5) Grant favors willingly, if deserved.
(6) Keep in constant touch with the morale of his men.
(7) Never "pick on" a man for an insignificant infraction.
(8) Always be certain that a man understands why he is being censured.

8. *Confidence*

a. In fostering respect for officers, a good leader will:
(1) Take unusual care that he makes a good impression on his men with the first contact.
(2) Never act as if he thinks he is good.
(3) Be interested in the promotion of his men.
(4) Give praise when praise is due. He knows that a very effective occasion to give praise is soon after the laudable act has been performed.
(5) Give his juniors credit even when he is mainly responsible for a successful piece of work.
(6) Always stand behind his junior officers.
(7) Watch his bearing.
(8) Always be polite and considerate.
(9) Assume the same attitude toward the service that he expects his men to assume.

9. *Discipline*

a. In discipline situations a good leader will:
(1) Praise in public and censure in private.
(2) Always give the man the benefit of the doubt.
(3) Avoid mass disciplining of his men.
(4) Take into account whether or not an infraction of discipline was intentional.
(5) Consider a man's record before disciplining him.
(6) Be impersonal in giving discipline.
(7) Never take an infraction of discipline as a personal matter.
(8) Inspire enthusiasm for discipline rather than fear.
b. In handling punishments a good leader will:
(1) Get all the facts bearing on the misconduct.
(a) Interview witnesses and those concerned to determine facts.
(b) Review rules and customs.
(c) Study the record of the accused.
(d) Talk with the accused.
(e) Determine the underlying cause for the offense.
(2) Weigh and decide his actions.
(a) Forget revenge.
(b) Punish so as to:
1. Improve unit discipline.
2. Reform the offender.
(c) Always take some corrective action.
(d) Act promptly.
(e) Punish humanely.
(f) Administer punishment personally and objectively.
(g) Try to have punishment accepted.

10. Morale

The following principles of leadership are time proven, and though their application to specific cases will vary in some degree with the individual and with the situation, we may consider them immutable. In that each will become a FACTOR in your ultimate success in leading men, they are worthy of your continued study, thought and application. As FACTORS they are listed below:

Factor A: KNOW YOUR MEN, and by knowing human nature and yourself, learn how to handle them. Know their viewpoint. Know the *capabilities* and *limitations* of each. Handle each as an INDIVIDUAL where possible.

Factor B: TAKE CARE OF YOUR MEN.

Factor C: SHARE THE PROBLEMS OF YOUR MEN. (And when indicated, the HARDSHIPS.) If you do, you will share their exultations and triumphs.

Factor D: SEE FOR YOURSELF. Get around.

Factor E: DEVELOP UNIT SPIRIT. Dominate and feed your "UNIT'S OPINION." Implant high ideals and standards. *Affirm* your faith in your men and in your unit. *Foster pride.*

Factor F: BUILD RESPONSIBILITY. Organize mentally each task given you. Delegate responsibility to carry out the several component parts of that task. In so doing, develop INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY in your subordinates.

Factor G: KEEP YOUR MEN "IN THE KNOW."

Factor H: BE KNOWN AND BE SEEN.

Factor I: SENSE THE CRITICAL POINT, and be at the critical point at the critical time, ready to take decisive action.

Factor J: KNOW YOUR JOB. (It includes a working knowledge and understanding of these listed FACTORS.) Know also the job of your subordinates, and your immediate commander.

Factor K: FOLLOW UP ORDERS. Before giving them, think them through. Then give them *precisely* and in the proper manner. Enforce them by "follow-up."

Factor L: KNOW YOURSELF—BE YOURSELF.

Factor M: SET THE EXAMPLE. Fully understand the power of example (for good; for bad). Use it POSITIVELY in your daily dealing.

Factor N: FOSTER LOYALTY—Up and down—and to the *job.*

—U. S. M. A. *Leadership* (See Bibliography)

Annex B

PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

Section		Page
I.	Psychology is Useful	60
II.	Approaching the Problem	61
III.	Why Do We Act As We Do?	62
IV.	Psychology Looks at Leadership	66
V.	Awareness of Self	68
VI.	Creating Interest	70
VII.	Presenting Ideas to Others	75
VIII.	Acting in Groups	77

Section I. PSYCHOLOGY IS USEFUL

The purpose of this annex is to supplement the practical approach to leadership, as presented in the manual, with accepted theory of human relations.

The manual repeatedly cautioned you to avoid the pitfalls of "mechanical" leadership because hard-and-fast rules for leadership are not only inefficient but may be detrimental. Certain techniques were suggested but, admittedly, only a few of the many leadership problems could be covered. Think of your flying instruction in which you were given patterns for manipulating the airplane controls. In comparison, piloting is infinitely more simple than leadership. Yet, your flying instructor could not tell you precisely what controls to use, nor when or how much to use them. You soloed and found that you could fly mechanically, yes, but you were not a proficient pilot. Acceptable piloting technique came only after you achieved consistency, reliability and confidence from: (1) Practice and (2) a suitable understanding of theory of flight. Your leadership traits must be developed in a similar manner. You need some knowledge of theory. Psychology is to leadership as aerodynamics is to piloting.

The science of psychology must first be distinguished from the less accurate body of knowledge about human activity which "everyone knows to be true." You undoubtedly have shaken your head at an impetuous act of a friend and admonished him with the cliche, "It's your fault. Always look before you leap!" Yet, under different circumstances you have sagely advised him, "He who hesitates is lost." Literally, living is so commonplace that it is difficult to become objective about the actions of others. The average person has neither the inclination nor the training to analyze the true causes and results of human behavior. If he has any ideas concerning the actions of his fellowman, they are usually from the homespun philosophy of his personal experience. In that there are scientific bases for these beliefs when they are used wisely, the accuracy of such philosophy depends entirely upon its application.

The ritualistic and empirical methods of leadership are likewise correct to a certain extent. The universally accepted truisms could not have persisted unless they seemed to be correct more often than wrong. This is not without reason; expressions not laced with truth would eliminate themselves. But even "dependable" philosophy is not sufficiently accurate. Certainly you wouldn't attempt to fly an airplane you knew would crash. Well, then, do you prefer to pilot an airplane which may fly upon occasion but again may not or one which you *know* will fly commensurate with your ability? There isn't much doubt as to your answer.

Within the last 75 years the speculative and theorizing methods of philosophy have been supplemented by the statistical and experimental methods of science. The aim of any science is to understand the subject in order to predict accurately the results which will evolve from a given set of conditions and, ultimately, to control those conditions and results. Psychology, a branch of the social sciences, is no exception. The task of psychology is to discover the general laws and explain the behavior of living organisms and of man in particular. Studies toward this end obviously encompass the complete life cycle of man. His mental and physical activities must be examined objectively and with respect to everything that may relate to these acts. Theoretically, if all the facts concerning human behavior could be known and applied, ideal social activity under ideal conditions would be possible. Psychology has not progressed to such a stage, but principles have been arrived at which, when applied to leadership and other social relations, produce amazing results.

Two of the many reasons why psychology proves more consistent, efficient, and flexible than philosophy are: (1) It enables you to eliminate the empirical rules that are least appropriate and choose the proper method under existing conditions, and (2) it can help you develop effective techniques when empirical formulas or ritualistic rules are not adequate.

This annex can only introduce psychology to you. It is not intended to be authoritative. It would be absurd for air force personnel, whose efforts are directed toward carrying out their military mission, to set themselves up as authorities on psychology.

Indeed, brilliant scientists who have spent their lives in research on the subject have yet to agree in detail. The resulting "schools" of psychology, which differ in varying degrees, create a problem of choice. Generally, accepted theories will be presented in as little technical nomenclature as possible. The views of Freud, Watson, Thorndyke, and others who lean less toward middle-of-the-road theorems will not be discussed. They should not be neglected in your future reading, however. The study of any scientifically demonstrable theory of human nature will aid in developing your leadership technique. You are encouraged—you should feel it essential—to read as much as possible from the numerous texts on psychology, sociology, anthropology, and related subjects, some of which are listed in the bibliography.

This annex, then, will present briefly a few elements of psychology which apply to leadership in general and this manual in particular. To avoid being arbitrary, at least one source is given for any psychological principle or thought which appears herein.[1] When feasible, more than one point of view will be presented, not to confuse you but to stir your interest and imagination.

In conclusion, an apology is made for the great wealth of material which could not be included. The bibliography indicates only a small number of the excellent books and articles which can broaden your concept of leadership.

Section II. APPROACHING THE PROBLEM

Many people seem to associate psychology with mind reading, mental telepathy, character analysis by the stars, handwriting, or the shape of the face, head, or the hand, and various other types of occult "sciences." Although the field of psychology includes all human activity, such methods as those just mentioned cannot be considered because they are beyond the realm of true scientific procedure. Psychology has adopted methods of study that are reliable, accurate, and dependable in order to arrive at results that have real value. Different interpretations of these studies do not seem to minimize their significance but, on the contrary, lend interest and versatility to their application.[2]

In psychology, as in any science, it is assumed that everything has a cause. It follows that, if the psychologists search for the origin of human behavior long enough, the reasons for any and all activity will be found. Investigations indicate that men behave very much alike because they meet the same kinds of situations and because they have inherited such common structures as hands, vocal organs, nervous system, etc., which make certain behavior possible under certain conditions.[3]

Two extreme views have been held regarding the influence of heredity on the activity of men. One states that all the development and activity of a person are determined by heredity. The other states that heredity has little to do with the picture and that all activity is the result of external conditions, or, in other words, environment. Different animal species are studied in order to throw more light on the problem. In the first stages of life, animals are found to have a very short period of helplessness. Quickly their ready-made (instinctive) patterns of activity take care of all their needs. At maturity, they have little ability to learn new activity and practically none to think. Although you can teach a dog tricks, he may watch you open a door each day of his life but will never realize the significance of the door knob. Species lower than dogs in the animal scale have less learning ability and more fixed instinctive actions. Man is a higher animal with less ready-made patterns and greater learning ability. The period of infancy for a human is prolonged to enable his development into an individual who can take care of his wants and adjust himself to the complex situations of life. What few instinctive forms of behavior the child has are soon submerged under the more important learned activities acquired as the child conforms to his environment.[4]

In studying man, psychology has not yet found a precise method of measuring heredity. The influence of environment upon the development of an individual is more clear. As a result, psychologists normally approach the study of man with emphasis upon the learned activities. "Once the individual is born, there is nothing that can be done about his heredity; but a great deal can be done about the kind of environmental influences he is to be subjected to during his lifetime. Despite the influence of heredity, almost any kind of development is possible if the appropriate kinds of environmental stimulation are brought to bear on the developing organism. Whether the child becomes delinquent or not, a social person who gets along well with others, or one who is unsocial or antisocial; whether he has a pleasing personality or not; and, in general, what kind of person he turns out to be, is determined to a large extent by the kind of training, education, and experience he has during development." [5]

Unlearned patterns, however, cannot be completely neglected. All of the characteristics of an individual may not be traced to environment. The physical and mental constitutions which are inherited have some influence upon a person's ac-

[1] A footnote number at the end of any paragraph denotes that the thought content of that paragraph has been taken from the source indicated in the footnote. When material in a paragraph is taken from more than one source, a footnote number will mark the end of ideas taken from each source.

[2] Bernhardt, Karl S., *Practical Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945), p. 3.

[3] Dockeray, Floyd C., *General Psychology* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1932), p. 10.

[4] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 & 32 f.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

tions. Most psychologists agree upon the basic theory that the total development of a man is the product of both heredity and environment. Yet it may be interesting to note just how much influence various authors credit to environment and how much to heredity.

"Human and animal conduct is determined in part by innate tendencies. In function, on the one hand, these tendencies serve to keep the infant alive until he may be able to learn for himself; on the other, they enforce general lines of conduct essential to the preservation of the individual, the race, and the social group. As opposed to habits and rational activities, so-called instincts are vague and prescribe only the end to be attained, not the precise means. Even the specific responses are soon modified by habit. Instincts cannot be set apart from habits and other intelligent movements in the adult; all that can be said is that certain acts are more largely native, others more largely acquired." [6] "Instincts mark out only the rough outlines of conduct. The limits of instinct, or the demarcation of one necessary instinct from another, is not given in the instinct, but must be learned by the individual or society. These checks and balances must arise through social intercourse and are just as important for the survival of the social group as are the instincts themselves." [7]

Prof. William James, universally recognized as a profound thinker on psychology, said: "Deep in our own nature the biological foundations of our consciousness persist, undisguised and undiminished. Our sensations are here to attract us or to deter us, our memories to warn or encourage us, our feelings to impel, and our thoughts to restrain our behavior, so that on the whole we may prosper." [8] "Habit is a second nature * * *. Acquired habits of our training have by adult life inhibited or strangled most of the native impulsive tendencies which were originally there. Ninety-nine one-hundredth of our activity is purely automatic and habitual * * *. So far as we are thus mere bundles of habit, we are stereotyped creatures, imitators and copiers of our former selves." [9]

Professor Bernhardt thinks of habits as patterns of action easily set in motion. "That is, once a habit is established, it becomes almost automatic and requires only a stimulus to set it in action. Every individual has habitual modes of reaction, of thought, and of belief. These ways of thinking and acting are, of course, the lines of least resistance, and therefore are the ways in which the individual usually responds to any situation. It usually takes some rather unusual situation or some rather strong motivating factor to divert the individual's action from these habitual channels." [10]

Psychology admits the complexities and uncertainties of human activity. As indicated by the quotations in the preceding paragraphs, the psychologists grant the puzzle and try to solve it in different ways. Because of the many different solutions given, the difficulty of understanding human activity looms larger than necessary. To those of you who, as laymen, wish to use psychology as a basis for your leadership, the various explanations need not become obstacles. All schools of thought may contribute something to a better perspective of human relations if in no other way than to make you pause to think over the problems for yourself. It becomes evident, furthermore, that you do not need to try to settle much of the controversy. Whether a certain action is founded upon inherited traits or upon acquired tendencies is not so important to you as it is to have a description of the act, the conditions under which it will be manifest, and the possible results.

The use of psychological terminology may present a problem. To be accurate the psychologist's terms should be used as he intended them to be used. As evidenced in the next section, however, the terms used are a compromise at best. For instance, one author said, "The term instinct has had many meanings. * * * I will use the word to refer to unlearned behavior patterns. In this sense the term is for use mainly in animal psychology." [11] He then refers to innate tendencies of man as "organic needs or appetites." Another author may express these basic "appetites" as instincts.[12] You must, again, not be too greatly concerned with the precise school to which an author may belong. Interpret his thoughts into practical principles which supplement your leadership traits.

Section III. WHY DO WE ACT AS WE DO?

There is a reason for everything we do. It is often difficult to know just which of the hundreds of thousands of possible causes may have influenced and shaped a particular action. If you are to predict what an individual will do generally, you need to know something about his abilities, his past experiences, and his desires or ambitions. If you wish to predict what a person will do in any given situation, you should have a picture of his established habits, the state of his mental and physical well-being, and his activity at the particular time. The accuracy of your predictions will depend upon your general knowledge of the "kinds of influences that affect and direct human activity." [13]

[6] Pillsbury, W. B., *Essentials of Psychology* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930), p. 137.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 367.
[8] James, William, *Talks on Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1916), p. 24.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 65 f.
[10] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[12] Munson, Edward L., *The Management of Man* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1921), is one example. Also refer to page 137, this section.
[13] Bernhardt, *op cit.*, p. 43.

In general, a man will act a certain way at a given moment because he wants to. The soldier performs a repugnant duty because he desires even less the possible consequences of his not doing it.

> Such consistency directly arises, however, from the nature of an individual's goals, ideals, standards, aims, purposes, desires, and forms of satisfactions. * * * When such are characterized by common meaningful characteristics, a high degree of consistency may unquestionably be found. Thus * * * we discover the significant part which meaning plays in the determination of life activities. * * * Man may be buffeted by many adverse situations, yet as a result of goal-meaning he is given stability. * * * As long as fairly similar meanings are observable, the same personality patterns must appear * * * Some interesting experimental data have been gathered on the extent and consistency of cheating, lying, generosity, and stealing. The results clearly reveal that such patterns appear under certain conditions and that, as long as the same conditions exist, a high degree of consistency is to be found. * * * There is "consistency" under like conditions; there is "inconsistency" under unlike conditions. * * * Such studies indicated that there is no general personality trait, force, or cause such as honesty. There are only particular human beings who are honest under particular situations. * * * The data indicate, moreover, that there is no generalized trait of generosity. * * * Since commendable behavior actually does occur under certain conditions, it is definitely suggested that desirable behavior patterns may possibly be substituted in the place of the undesirable, if only the proper remedial steps can be taken. Such recognitions accordingly encourages us to scrutinize each particular set of causal conditions underlying an undesirable pattern instead of talking vaguely about universal characteristics. Causation is always specific. There is no generalized determination. A careful study of man's personality furnishes excellent evidence of this fact. * * * Under particular conditions, only one type of product can possibly appear. And as causes change, so does behavior.[14]

It is hardly ever possible to determine accurately the exact conditions which produce behavior but it is possible to outline some of the generalized causes of human conduct.[15]

Basic organic needs, which demand periodic or continual satisfaction, are motives which initiate and direct activity toward an end to satisfy that want. They may be called appetites. Basic organic needs are:

(1) Hunger.
(2) Thirst.
(3) Rest and sleep.
(4) Change in variety.
(5) Sex.
(6) General physical well-being.[16]

Although feelings and emotions may be considered the same for practical purposes, psychology separates them for discussion. Emotions may be simple, moderate, and short-lived or they may be expressed dramatically or even violently. Forms of emotion are normally aroused in cases where there is a real emergency, an outstanding achievement, or a serious hindrance. Emotions may develop into habitual forms of adjustment, however, and occur in all kinds of situations. Emotions are:

(1) Anger.
(2) Fear.
(3) Joy.
(4) Surprise.
(5) Disgust.
(6) Grief.[17]

Feelings are motives which range from extreme pleasantness to extreme unpleasantness. They may be long-lived sentiments which become organized around some phase of environment. Again, feelings may be the quicker-than-thought evaluation of a proposed activity. The sensations in flying and your first impression of a newly met person are examples of the two. "They [feelings] are the inner core of personality. They have functioned in the making of each personality long before thinking gathered momentum, either in the individual or the race." [18]

Social motives are the complex drives which result from man's social existence. These motives are highly significant to you in your leadership role. They will be discussed in the sections that follow. They are:

(1) Self-assertion and self-submission.
(2) Social approval and disapproval.
(3) Social security (belongingness or gregariousness).[19]

Other human motives are:

(1) Activity in progress (constructiveness).
(2) Habits.
(3) Objective environment (results of conditions and associations).[20]

A particular action is rarely the result of a single motive or a direct instinctive reaction. A normal adult has become settled in his habits as the result of experience. Pleasure and pain have either inhibited or altered the expression of native responses. His various motives have become organized, by memory and reflection, into large systems and actions which derive from the complex summation of past experience. The person's inspiration usu-

[14] Higginson, Glen DeV., *Psychology* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1936), pp. 610–615.
[15] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 f.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 44–50.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 50, and Bogardus, Emory S., *Fundamental of Social Psychology* (3d ed., New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1942), p. 35.
[18] Bogardus, *op cit.*, pp. 35, 38.
[19] Bernhardt, *op cit.*, pp. 55 ff.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 54 ff.

ally radiates from the sentiments, such as affection of a friend, or wife, or child, the love of home or country, devotion to the pursuit of wealth or power, desire for recognition or acclaim, hatred of social injustice or tyranny. The path from knowing to doing lies through such feelings.[21]

Action remains the final goal of knowledge. But first, man must perceive or see. This cycle of perception-feeling-response is the essential unit of the mental life, the elements of which are highly modified and complicated. Reason cannot provide motives, although it can and does weigh and balance conflicting tendencies and coordinates the motives of man into a unity for action. The basic motives are organized into larger mental systems integrated with the impression of experience and the results of memory, imagination, and thought.[22]

The mind, therefore, is merely a term applied to a number of different functions spoken of collectively. When certain of the separate functions are grouped in one way so as to attain one end, the process is called perception; when grouped in another way, imagination; in a third, memory; and in a fourth, reasoning. When other influences are introduced (for example, when some motive is experienced) and practical activities are controlled, the process is will.[23]

Our picture of *fundamental drives* is roughly complete. Now let us briefly go back over the material we have covered, using the thoughts and concepts of other students. Professor James introduces man's basic motives (which he calls instincts) as he sees them develop in a normal individual. Excluding the basic instincts which function to preserve life, such as hunger, thirst, breathing, etc., the first motivation experienced by a person is *fear*. The feeling of *love* appears almost as soon. *Curiosity* is next awakened. The impulse toward better cognition is soon followed by a tendency to *imitate* which shades imperceptibly into *emulation*. Emulation fosters *rivalry*. The two are married into *ambition* which soon begets *pugnacity* and *pride*, all of which may be collectivly called the *ambitious* impulses. Next *ownership* and *acquisition* tendencies are evidenced with their byproduct, *constructiveness*. From the composite of all such tendencies, *belongingness* and *essentiality* are manifest. Professor James does not imply that these "instincts" appear in this order of importance. The degree of drive each tendency will have depends upon the conditions that make up a particular situation.[24]

Another author lists 21 basic instincts: Hunger, thirst, fear, repulsion, pugnacity, self-assertion, self-submission, rivalry, curiosity, gregariousness, sympathy, imitation, acquisitiveness, migratory, sex, parental, religious, rhythm, comic, sublimation, and side-tracking.[25] Other authors will say there are more or fewer innate tendencies. The most simple classification places all the dominant unlearned responses under "ego" except the sex and herd instincts.[26]

There is another general feature of man's actions that should be mentioned here. "Once an activity is started, there is a tendency to go on to some sort of completion. Experiments with children have shown that to break off an activity before it is completed is to produce a slight strain that directs the individual's behavior in such a way that he will have a tendency to return to that activity and finish it as soon as opportunity allows. An activity in progress, then, seems to carry sufficient motivation within itself to carry it to some kind of completion." [27]

Motives and drives, whatever their origin, must be satisfied in some way. Each of the urges, impulses, appetites, or tendencies has a life history. It started somewhere and somehow and persists until the individual makes some kind of adjustment to it. This account of human motivation would not be complete unless you have some idea of how these drives express themselves under difficult circumstances.

A motive may not have a direct course in which to act. A person's natural tendencies are continually colliding with customs, traditions, and the demands and satisfactions of other people. Conflict between urges and their satisfactory completion is a daily occurrence. When these urges cannot be satisfied (adjusted) in the manner indicated by the desire, they must find some other activity for expression. Much of any individual's activity consists of this indirect adjustment. "If this adjustment to conflict, difficulties, and obstacles is a happy one, so much the better for the individual and society in general; but if the reverse is true, both the individual and society must suffer in consequence." [28]

Generally, a motive is more persistent and intense when it is interfered with or frustrated. Such obstructed motives may be due to any number of reasons. Several motives may be active at once, and all cannot be gratified. In addition to colliding with the laws and taboos of society, a motive may conflict with the habits, ideals, and conventions of the individual or with natural realities such as wars, business adversities, death of loved ones, and many more.[29]

"There are great individual differences in the ability to withstand the thwarting of active motives. At one end of the scale there is the solid individual who maintains his poise through everything; nothing seems to upset him. At the other extreme is the individual who is easily upset; the slightest setback and he is neurotic, greatly disturbed, has a temper tantrum, or a fit of 'nerves,' or becomes sulky." [30] The manner in which an individual adjusts himself to a frustrated urge depends greatly upon his experience, training, and environment. Common ways in which a person may adjust himself to interference and obstacles are:

1. *Surrender.*—Surrender, as a form of adjustment, cannot be permanent in any situation, but it may become a habit, the habit of failing. It is commonly called an "inferiority complex." The individual is reluctant to try anything, for he does not expect to succeed and he does not wish others to find out that he isn't so good as they.

2. *Direct attack.*—The direct attack may be in terms either of an anger adjustment or an intelligent attack on the difficulty. The danger is that in acting in anger the individual may be ruthless and too severe and may not act with good judgment. If the method of attack is kept within the bounds of common sense, the direct attack is a wholesome form of adjustment.

3. *Introversion.*—Perhaps the most common form of adjustment is introversion, or turning inward, a mental substitute for action which may take the form of *imagined success, persecution complex,* or *identification*. Introversion is really a partial surrender, the giving up of the outward struggle, to carry the battle to a new arena within the thought and imagination. A mild form of imagined success or identification is a perfectly normal and satisfying kind of recreation and does little harm. Introversion is dangerous when it becomes habitual and strong or when it leaves accomplishment to fictitious characters and prevents real action.

4. *Rationalization.*—Rationalization is an attempt to fool others, as well as self, as to the real reason for an action or failure. The process is unpremeditated. Rationalization is always convincing to the person who engages in it irrespective of the effect it has on others. "Our thinking is full of beliefs, superstitions and prejudices that we have been able to keep impervious to evidence and have rationalized so long that they are fixed." [31]

5. *Defense mechanisms.*—Not so common as those already mentioned is another form of adjustment which "is Nature's way of protecting man's mind against those things that it is just not strong enough to bear." [32] These adjustments are usually called defense mechanisms. They are evidenced by an authentic organic condition that is adequate to remove unpleasant situations. Headaches, nausea, and, less frequently, partial or complete paralysis may occur without physical cause. This does not mean that the person who uses such an adjustment to a difficult situation is a malingerer. The condition is involuntarily and unknowingly attained; the individual is as sick, or more so, as if the illness originated from physical causes. Afflictions resulting from war neuroses provide many examples.[33]

6. *Denial.*—An adjustment which ignores or attempts to ignore a difficulty or danger is called denial. In war, for an example, denial is practiced by the individual who adopts the feeling that "there is one bullet which has my name on it, no others are dangerous." He can then refuse to admit tension or anxiety.

7. *Sublimation.*—Sublimation is a type of adjustment which is used when the individual finds a new outlet for a frustrated motive. You will recognize an illustration of sublimation in the soldier who, not achieving fame in his assigned job, satisfies his intense desire or recognition by being the unit's "problem-child." Sublimation is not confined to the desire for social recognition. It may occur in the case of any obstructed motive. This adjustment, furthermore, does not always take an undesirable course. Many great accomplishments result when the energy and determination of a blocked motive is redirected toward a secondary objective. "How little repression and sublimation are understood may be seen in the practices of stern and relentless parents failing to provide opportunities for sublimation. Repression produces storms of angry opposition, ranging from temper tantrums to permanent disobedience and hatred. Lenient parents and teachers sometimes tighten up sharply on children without warning and promptly lose control over them. It is well to remember that psychic energy cannot be abolished." [34] Energy must be explored, converted into action, or remain within an individual until some motive sets it off.

8. *Compensation.*—When there is an obstacle to the natural expression of an active motive, the substitution of some worth-while activity is one of the best kinds of adjustments that can be made. When the direct means of satisfaction is barred, one compensates by inventing new ways of doing things. Compensation differs from sublimation only in the mental approach. Compensation, on one hand, is a less premeditated type of adjustment; the person would prefer to believe that the substituted goal is the original objective. Sublimation, on the other hand, faces the difficulty more honestly and turns away from the obstacle with a determination to find a new aim. Applied wisely, both adjustments are worth while. "The easy road never spurs men on to great efforts; but difficulty, obstacles, and problems often call for supreme efforts." [35]

9. Other adjustments may be in the form of

[21] Brierley, S. B., *An Introduction to Psychology* (London: Metheun & Co., 1923), p. 113.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[23] Pillsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 429.
[24] James, *op. cit.*, ch. VII.
[25] Munson, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–209.
[26] Tansley, A. G., *The New Psychology* (5th ed., New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1929), p. 199.
[27] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 58 f.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 61 f.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[32] National Research Council, a committee of, *Psychology for the Fighting Man* (5th Printing, Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Penguin Books, 1944), p. 292.
[33] Grinker, Roy R., and Spiegel, John P., *Men Under Stress* (Philadelphia: Blakiston Co., 1945).
[34] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
[35] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

emotional explosions, escape by alcohol and drugs, running away, and *regression.*[36]

The most complete picture of why a man acts as he does cannot tell you exactly what a particular person will do at a given time. You can be fairly sure, however, that an individual will act in such a way as to satisfy his basic needs. As a leader, you can be reasonably sure that an appeal to the basic needs of your men will meet with some amount of success.

Although a man's behavior in a group will be discussed fully in succeeding sections, it is necessary to mention it here in describing why we act as we do. The mental life of a society finds collective expression in laws, customs, traditions, institutions, religions, and forms of government, yet its actual existence is in the modification of the character, conduct, and beliefs of its members by the fact that they live in definite relationship with their fellows. Often it appears that the group acts as an entity independent of the individuals composing it. Such social phenomena as the spread of rumors, panics, lynchings, and war fevers have led to an acceptance of "mob mind," "group spirit," and similar terms. These terms have become familiar and are useful for descriptions and discussions. They are, however, no more than convenient forms of reference. There is no "mass mind" as a separate entity. These are individual minds which cannot be added together although they can and must modify each other. It is just this type modification, this shaping and controlling of beliefs, desires, and ideals, that each member of a society contributes to the whole. Under certain physical and mental conditions, individuals tend to feel and to act on the level of simple motives which are common to all. In the presence of a large crowd in a theater, for instance, there is a sudden alarm, "Fire!" The common perception of the common emotion reinforces the reaction of each individual with often disastrous results. In more permanent groups, such as the family, village, club, or nation, essentially the same fundamental situation occurs with the exception that normally in these cases the highest levels of thought and action are involved. The characteristic reactions are not the expression of simple innate tendencies but of common habits, beliefs, and sentiments. In any case, however, it is the individual who acts and feels although the phenomenon of the reinforced behavior of all the individuals is referred to as the behavior of the "group-mind." [37]

The brief summary of human nature given here has barely scratched the surface of what psychologists know about human activity. As an outline, however, the summary will serve as an introduction to the following aspects of psychology that can be applied to military leadership.

[36] Horney, Karren, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1937).
[37] Brierley, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

Section IV. PSYCHOLOGY LOOKS AT LEADERSHIP

"Psychology is a point of view. It is a way of regarding man as having certain capacities and limitations, some of which are subject to change in certain limited and specified degrees. * * * When you know human limitations, you do not ask the impossible of men, but adapt requirements to what is possible. When you know human capacities, you know with what you have to work and you can utilize all the available human resources. When you know the causes of human behavior, you can often find the means of changing behavior by altering its causes. * * * You may change him by training, but not always. You have to know what he can learn and how fast, and also how in these respects he differs from the next man. * * * The possible applications of the psychological point of view are very numerous indeed. * * * Often it seems, after it is applied, nothing more than good sense. * * * In other words, the psychologist is a human engineer. He seeks to do with human material what other engineers do with other material. * * * At least the leaders would have to have the psychological point of view, and it would be better if all the soldiers and sailors could have it, too." [38]

The practical psychological approach is taken in *Air Force Leadership* because the manual is aimed at helping you to be a practical "human engineer" in your leadership practices. The purpose of this annex, to repeat, is to give you some theory as a background or, in other words, to use psychology as a magnifying glass with which to examine some of the principles of leadership.

Environment will be of great interest to you. The scientific observer recognizes that environment is of tremendous importance in developing and motivating man, although the exact extent of its influence has yet to be ascertained. As a leader, knowledge of environmental influences will be one of your best means for understanding the behavior of your men. It will enable you to predict with reasonable consistency what a man may do under certain conditions. Frequently this knowledge may be used to lead him to do what is required to further the mission.

Environment is even more significant to you than this. It permeates the whole of leadership problems and solutions. In addition to affecting motives, environment has much to do with habits, with training, with conditions, and, in fact, with everything a man has ever done or will ever do. For

[38] Boring, Edwin G. (ed.), *Psychology for the Armed Services,* prepared by a committee of the National Research Council (1st ed., Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal, 1945), pp. 21 f.

instance, if a soldier has served 25 years in the air force, his environment should have adapted his thoughts and actions to the air force mission. Few leadership problems of a serious nature ought to originate with this man. Normally he should be a mature leader who is an example to younger men. On the other hand, environmental influences are active even when a man has been exposed to them for only a relatively short time. The new serviceman behaves in unfamiliar patterns by the mere fact of his living as a soldier with soldiers on a military post and performing the duties required of him.

Courtesy, morale, confidence, discipline, unity of action, belongingness, pride, customs, and all the subjects which interest a leader either arise from environmental influences or are based upon them because of their very nature. Environment, therefore, is always in the background. Actually, military leadership has neglected somewhat certain phases of environment. Such an oversight is understandable. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to divorce environment from the means it assists or the ends it supports; environment is so much a part of the principles and tools of leadership that it cannot be separated from them. In the discussions that follow, you should always keep environment in mind whether or not a specific reference is made to it.

If you accept such definitions of leadership as "the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable," [39] one of the most important tools a leader can have is an understanding of the fundamentals of *group action.* Group action is here intended to mean the uniting of many individuals into an organized cooperative unit. It implies many things which create unity of action, one of the most significant of which is the mere fact of *belonging to a group.* How psychology explains gregariousness in man should be of particular interest to you.

Influencing people has much psychological significance. Psychologists have written many books on this subject alone. Methods of influencing people, in effect, are the practical results obtained from studying why individuals act as they do.

Concerning the ways of influencing people, you should consider the four desires which the sociologists Thomas and Znaniecki describe as being present to some degree in everyone: (1) Desire for security, (2) desire for new experiences or adventures, (3) desire for response; for the return of love or affection, and (4) the desire for recognition.[40] The wish for security is largely expressed by Bernhardt's "basic organic needs" and his "change in variety" would be the same as the adventure factor.

[39] Tead, Ordway, *The Art of Leadership* (12th printing; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1925), p. 20.
[40] Thomas, W. I., and Znaniecki, Florian, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (New York: A. Knopf, 1927), I, p. 73.

From the desires for response and recognition, you have a clear picture of man's wish to feel essential; they express his ego, his pride, vanity, and self-respect. You will do well to think about man's awareness of self.

Confidence, morale, and discipline will not be discussed separately in this annex. These aspects of leadership seem more abstract than those chosen above. In a manner of speaking, confidence, morale, and discipline are the intangible results of the leader-follower-condition triangle. Just as environment must be ever in mind, so much confidence, morale, and discipline.

In order to prepare yourself for the more difficult of the leadership situations which may confront you, you should think of the individuals discussed herein to be typical of young soldiers and conscriptees. Drs. Maskin and Altman describe, from the standpoint of psychological observers, how a new soldier reacts:

> The very uniform the soldier wears obscures identity, and his personal name is replaced by a serial number. Anonymity is enhanced by distinction-obliterating activities, such as constant waiting in line, marching in cadence, mass calisthenics. The individual loses significance in his own right and merges imperceptibly into the background of squadron and group. * * * The soldier can rarely be alone. He sleeps in a barracks and uses common latrines. There are no situations where his privacy cannot be invaded. The initiative for personality functioning passes into other hands. The soldier starts and stops at commands; his activities are predetermined by regulation. * * * It is no longer a civilian life, "What do I think, feel, want?"—but "What is the directive?" Familiar old functions of self-planning are denied.[41]

Dr. Pratt interprets the adjustment that a civilian must make to life in the service:

> From the day that a man reports into military service, three adjustments stand out with particular prominence: (1) Adjustment to the loss of individuality; (2) adjustment to separation from entrenched habits of living and from accustomed interpersonal relationships; (3) adjustment to the loss of the freedom he possessed in civilian life to shape his surroundings and environment in accordance with his own needs or wishes. * * *
>
> Of all human possessions our individuality or our awareness of self as a special sort of person is the most prized. Lessen our sense of personal identity and you throw open the door to lowered self-esteem and make easy the entrance of feelings of inferiority and anxiety. * * *
>
> A man finds, rather to his surprise, that he derives a sort of group support from the expe-

[41] *Psychiatry,* Vol. 6, No. 3, quoted by Pratt, George K., *Soldier to Civilian* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1944), p. 36.

rience [of losing identity in the army]; it was necessary to efface the former self, then by compensation he began to discover a new self [a squadron X self, a group Z self, a Y air force self]. * * * From a military point of view this growth of identification with the unit is highly desirable and is encouraged at every point. And so long as our man remained in military service he likely found it a source of security—a realization of belongingness and a realization of acceptance.[42]

From whatever angle you approach the leadership problem you may be assured that, eventually, you will arrive at the conclusions that: (1) The sense of belonging to a unit is essential to efficient collective action, (2) the leader must somehow profoundly affect this unity of action and feeling of responsibility to it, and (3) the individual is the smallest and, therefore, most important element of an organization. This suggests that you will find it interesting and profitable to seek the psychologist's point of view concerning these subjects which are discussed in the sections that follow: (1) Awareness of self, (2) creating interest, (3) methods of presenting an idea to another person, and (4) acting in groups.

Section V. AWARENESS OF SELF

One of the fundamental needs of man is the *need of a sense of personal worth.* This need is persistent and forceful; it directs much of man's activity. Professor Bogardus considers the sense of personal worth, which he calls "status," not only to be the most valued possession of man but a significant factor in the development of his character. Personal worth is the result of the impressions a person feels he is making on others, in other words, what he sees in "his behavior reflected in the estimates of other persons." [43] "How hard man struggles to avoid a feeling of worthlessness—to achieve a feeling of importance! How insistently he demands his worth be acknowledged! And how much he prides himself when he feels that he is, and is considered to be, of especial significance among his fellow men!" [44]

The attitudes of other persons towards one's self are rarely accurate but are nevertheless positive in effect. Friends, strangers, and enemies will reflect entirely different attitudes toward the same person. Friends may exaggerate one's importance. A rival minimizes one's virtues. The stranger reflects confused impressions. All reflections of a person are important, however, and even essential to his well-being. From them he may effectively analyze and develop his personality if he is careful to appraise the bias of each reflection. He must not become too self-satisfied with the impressions of friends. He should not become too despondent because of the disparagements of foes. The attitude of strangers can indicate only one's obvious tendencies, whether good or bad, and infer advantages to be gained in correcting certain traits or developing others.[45]

You, as a leader, should understand the factors which contribute to a sense of personal worth:

> First, there is a social group with its standards of evaluation. Second, there are the actual evaluations of a person's actions. Third, the given person imagines or estimates the nature of these evaluations. Fourth, the person reacts in the terms of pride, shame, or indifference. The all-powerful influence of social judgments is due to the innate nature of personality and to group-made configuration of personality.[46]

The attitude of others which influences feelings of personal worth may be expressed in many ways but the most understandable is by oral or written communication. Praise is highly gratifying to any person. Any commendation you make must be thought warranted, however, or the person receiving it may feel even more intensely his failure to meet the standard for which you credit him. Also, his increased remorse may be matched by his resentment of the insincerity, which can only result in greater loss of esteem for both himself and you. To a normally intelligent man, undeserved praise means that either you do not accurately know the facts or you consider him stupid and easily deceived. "Those who * * * paint other persons most truly praise them best." [47]

Yet, flattery is often very acceptable. Why? The vain person does not recognize flattery; he feels any praise is justified. Others who do recognize flattery as undeserved praise accept it because it can be interpreted to mean that their favor is sought after. If praise can be truly deserved, however, its value is greatly increased. So it may be said that praising people for weak qualities is greatly inferior to acknowledging their good qualities.[48]

If a man is given sufficient facts which he can understand in the light of his self-interest, he normally is effectively motivated. The athletic coach, for instance, does not praise each individual play. He knows that judicious praise of occasional feats will instil the proper attitude among all the players. Each participant soon learns that he must work for the team and that the selfless spirit of teamwork will bring him more approval from coach, teammates, and spectators than will his attempts to be a "one-man team." A person learns from most of his experiences and observations that recognition is surer and more satisfying when it is

[42] Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff.
[43] Bogardus, *op cit.*, pp. 100 f.
[44] White, Wendell, *Psychology in Living* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1944), p. viii.
[45] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, ch. VII.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 108.
[47] White, *op. cit.*, p. viii.
[48] *Ibid.*

received because of some socially approved act. When this attitude becomes soundly mature, the person's self-interest has become intelligently reoriented and he has learned that: "As conditions change, the individual must change with them, adjusting his behavior accordingly. He lives in a society from which he cannot well withdraw even if he would, any more than a basketball game can be enjoyed without players willing to play for the sake of the game rather than their own momentary satisfaction." [49]

You will recognize that awareness of self spills over into most of man's activity. Self-interest is closely related to a man's feelings for others; he desires and needs others to confirm his self-analysis. Thus, self-interest and interest in others are merged into a single force, fundamental to man's acting as a member of an organization. Yet, the two interests often conflict with one another and create many unpredictable situations.

There is a common tendency, for instance, to strive to excel, to succeed, or to demonstrate superiority over difficulty. Referring to the basic drives, *self-assertion* seems to activate much of man's activity. Whether this tendency is inborn or is the result of social customs and education (environment) is, to reiterate, of no consequence. The power it generates is of great consequence. It seems to provide additional determination when difficulties are encountered; it produces more energy to surmount obstacles. It dictates the completion of a project to the point where success must be achieved for its own sake. Tenacity, will to win, fighting instinct, "to do or die," and the like are manifestations of its being.[50] "It appears in the most aggressive form of striving to command, to lead, to dominate the situation, to master and manage an object, and in the most defensive form of resistance to domination and dislike of defeat. Some persons who are not specially eager to dominate nevertheless hate to be dominated. * * * Yet the mastery motive cannot be wholly a learned affair. Practically all the 'conditioning' that a child gets would tend toward making him submissive and not masterful." [51]

The mastery motive may be expressed at home, at work, at play, or in any field of activity. If self-assertion is not satisfactorily expressed in a certain outlet, satisfaction is even more urgently desired in one or more of the other possible outlets. An example immortalized by playwrights and cartoonists is the little man who, unable to be somebody in his working environment, rages with the tyrannical abandon of a dictator in his home. Or the henpecked husband may be the lion of Wall Street. Sublimated outlets such as these cannot entirely eliminate the original urge; the individual would prefer to realize his primary desire, to be somebody within the realm of his close associates. The self-assertive urge can be made to work for you in leading. Your men can be encouraged to exercise self-assertion if you provide them with conditions favorable to that expression. Watch for sulkiness, peevishness, stubbornness, jealousy, laziness, and indifference. Those who demonstrate such attitudes probably do not have them ordinarily but are giving evidence that their self-respect has been wounded in some way. Their self-assertive tendency has been seriously thwarted and it is up to the leader, if he desires peak efficiency, to compensate for the maladjustment.[52]

A helpful fact concerning the self-assertion trait is that it expresses itself relative to the existing attainments of the individual. The soldier who is promoted from corporal to sergeant, as an example, gets thereby a satisfaction as great as, or greater than, that of a Major General being promoted to Lieutenant General. A man's normal aspirations always seem comparable to his present accomplishment. Even when he does not state his aspirations, you may assume that he wants something closely related to current conditions and achievements rather than some hypothetical and attractive "demand" which you might imagine he desires. Your men neither want nor expect the moon; they do want "an effective opportunity to register personal progress *in relation to the point that they have already reached.*" [53] Material manifestation may not even be necessary to a man as long as he thinks he measures up to some self-established aspiration. "But he must measure up to something, be successful in some regard, feel essential in whatever he is doing." [54]

The opposite of self-assertion is the tendency to submit, to give in, to subordinate one's self to someone or something. This *self-submission,* or *self-negation,* is not the common and unpleasant forced subordination; it is an unconscious or deliberate adaptation which is satisfying. Awe, reverence, respect, hero-worship, and similar responses are natural expressions of this trait. One willingly submits to some experienced or powerful person, to an idea or system of right and authority, or to an influential group or society. Such submission is desirable because of the protection and security it affords or because the conditions require greater ability than that possessed by the individual. "We like to have a boss, as well as to boss others." [55]

Real reasons behind self-submission may include: (1) Sincere devotion to another person or ideal believed to be more worthy than self, (2) a reluc-

[49] Meier, Norman C., *Military Psychology* (1st ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1943), pp. 57 ff.
[50] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 f.
[51] Woodworth, Robert S., *Psychology* (3d ed.; New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), pp. 57 ff.
[52] Tead, Ordway, *Human Nature and Management* (2d ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933), pp. 22 f.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Boring, *op. cit.*, p. 332.
[55] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 52 f.

tance to accept personal responsibility, (3) a fear of possible consequences if other than the particular course is followed, (4) the "getting on the bandwagon" to further selfish ambition, or (5) insufficient ambition which is willing to follow the easiest way. Submission because of sincere respect and conviction is the most reliable and, therefore, desirable. Moreover, if submission is created by fear, laziness, selfishness, or other unstable factors, the conditions may change and provoke other factors which destroy self-negation altogether, leaving a type of self-assertion which may conflict with the group-action.[56]

Devotion to one person alone is generally not desirable. A leader should avoid capitalizing too exclusively on his own popularity. Rather than make himself the soul of his unit, subject to the uncertainties of his popularity, the possibilities of his transfer, and the narrow scope of his opinions, the leader should "see himself as really an educator whose job it is to build upon those submissive motives other desires, purposes, and reasons which are integral to the self-respect and permanently underlying self-assertiveness of his followers. * * * The submission ideally should be to the demands of the situation and the requirements of orderly coordination in a joint enterprise and not to a leader who may have ends of his own he is trying to impose." [57]

"There are occasions when self-assertion is called for, and there are also situations when the individual's interests are best served by submission. Social intercourse is possible only on the basis of give-and-take, of assertion and submission. So, the socially well-adjusted individual is the one who at times is assertive and at other times is submissive." [58] And "we all want tangible evidence of our social importance. We want to have a skill that is socially recognized as useful." [59]

As an individual, the American soldier "likes what appears to be extemporaneous and presents appeal to his reason and personality. His tendency for constructiveness or manipulativeness is strong and he is perhaps as interested in working out the methods by which a task is to be accomplished as in the results obtained." [60] The desire to attract attention by being creative, by being first or best, appears common and powerful. Few people can just live. They wish to do things which will make them outstanding or, at least, noticed. "When a person has marked * * * aptitudes, this tendency to constructiveness and * * * creativity is balked with great peril. * * * The desire to create is, in short, a far more powerful impulse than one would be led to believe in view of the frequent attribution of laziness to people. The trouble so often is that people seem lazy because they have not found the kind of outlet which is for them self-realizing. The practical conclusion is that the greatest care should be used in trying to get people into occupations which are for them congenial. For to have one's activity congenial means that the individual's creative drive is expressing itself in a satisfactory way. And no better motive to a specific line of effort is to be found than this profound inner sense that one is creating in a self-expressive way." [61]

Man's awareness of self is described in the biblical quotation, "Whatever a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." Tansley said, "The ego-complex is the most fundamental part of being." [62] Pride, self-respect, and a belief of self-importance to the mission—being essential—seem to compose man's personality framework upon which is hung his character, intelligence, and ability.

Section VI. CREATING INTEREST

How easy it would be to lead, to influence others, if you could read the mind of each man in your organization. You could insure that each member completely understands your orders and policies and, concurrently, avoid hurting his pride and self-respect. High morals would depend less upon chance than it does now. The unit would progress smoothly and easily at maximum efficiency. Influencing your men would be just as simple as that, for the mental world of a man is literally his only world. All of his best experiences are a part of his present stage of development irrespective of just how much he can remember. Appetites and needs, feelings and emotions, thoughts and habits, seeing, touching, hearing, and all processes of his living have a conscious or unconscious mental interpretation which, so far as that man is concerned, is his only image until some other interpretation expresses itself with greater intensity. You cannot read minds but you normally can understand the simple mental processes of a man.

The perception-feeling-response cycle was mentioned earlier.[63] The beginning of this action cycle of knowing to doing is called attending. It can be said that a conscious person is always attending to something; the object or event most distinct in his consciousness at the moment is considered to be that which he is attending. Attention may wander over the field of consciousness in much the same way the eye wanders over the field of vision. As each object comes into the focus of attention, so to speak, it tends to eliminate all other objects preparatory to perceiving that particular one.[64]

[56] Tead, *Human Nature and Management,* pp. 24 f.
[57] *Ibid.,* p. 25.
[58] Bernhardt, *op. cit.,* pp. 52 f.
[59] Roethlisberger, F. J., *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 24.
[60] Munson, *op. cit.,* p. 74.
[61] Tead, *Human Nature and Management,* pp. 25 f.
[62] *Op. cit.,* pp. 202, 207.
[63] Section III, p. 141.
[64] Pillsbury, *The Fundamentals of Psychology* (Rev. ed., New York: The MacMillan Co., 1927), p. 266.

Three kinds of attention can be distinguished: (1) *Involuntary* or *random attention* which is unsupervised, unlearned, and even unwanted. It is the effortless attention resulting from a stimulus which cannot be ignored. A child characteristically attends involuntarily. You may involuntarily attend a loud noise or a strange odor even though you desire to attend something else. (2) *Voluntary attention* is given with conscious effort. It is forced, unnatural, and predominantly unpleasant. Such attention is the result of social conditions; you attend because you wish to gain the recognition of your fellow men or to avoid disapproval. Although his inclinations are elsewhere, the child, as an example, usually forces himself to attend his school work because he fears punishment or desires approval. (3) *Nonvoluntary* or *spontaneous attention* is the most economical and efficient. It is intended, interested, pleasurable and effortless. For that moment it is the predominant desire and thus no conflict exists. Yet all three forms of attention produce the same effect in one's mental functions and so no sharp line of division can be made between them.[65]

Intention, wish, belief, desire, knowledge, expectation, purpose, and needs serve to *determine* attention.[66] Conditions of attending, aside from the necessity or motive, can be divided into the *objective* and the *subjective*. Objective conditions refer to sensations from the environment which have no relation to the personality of the attending person. A child or an adult is equally attracted to objective factors of attending. Subjective conditions depend upon the person, his state of readiness to attend as derived from his learning, experience, and state of being.[67]

Objective factors attract attention for many reasons: (1) *Intensity* causes a stimulus to force itself upon the attention however much one may desire to attend something else. That is why the brightest lights, the loudest sound, and the sharpest taste or odor are noticed quickly. (2) *Size* determines attention also. Large objects are seen when small ones escape notice. (3) *Quality* will attract notice, especially when abnormal. The musician will hear a note sounded off pitch. Red, orange, and yellow are more easily seen than other colors. (4) *Change* diverts attention. A whistle of changing pitch or intensity will be attended to when one that remains constant would escape notice. (5) *Cessation* is similar to change. The ticking of a clock is appreciated when it stops although the previous continuous ticking may not have been noticed at all. (6) *Repetition,* the alternating on-and-off position-lights of an airplane flying at night are more readily noticed than lights which burn steadily. (7) *Movement* of an object attracts attention. The same object might escape notice when stationary. If the object is moving away or approaching, it becomes smaller or larger, and then the additional factor of change attracts attention. (8) *Novelty,* or the unusual, attracts attention. A horse and buggy on the main street of a big city would be obvious even to people who had failed to notice other traffic.[68] (9) *Definite* form and outline attracts attention more quickly than an indistinct form. Military camouflage uses this principle. (10) *Basic* needs provide factors which direct attention to the normal appetites or physical well-being of the individual. Means of relief from heat, cold, hunger, thirst, pain, and similar sensations are powerful in arresting attention.[69]

Factors which reflect the earlier experiences of the individual and which can increase the conditions of attending (subjective conditions), as listed by Professor Pillsbury, are: (1) Preceding sensations, (2) the purpose or idea in mind, (3) earlier training and previous experience, (4) beliefs, ideals, and other influences resulting from social forces, and (5) innate tendencies.[70]

Dr. Bernhardt subdivides the subjective factors still more and gives a good description of them:

> (a) What the individual is doing at the time conditions what he will pay attention to. * * * (b) Present desire also dictates the direction of attention. The individual who desires a new car attends to cars as they pass. * * * (c) Interest is another powerful dictator in the realm of attention. * * * A farmer, an artist, a real estate man, and a botanist standing on a hill together and looking out over the land actually perceive different things, because they attend to different aspects of the situation, depending on their interest. (d) The emotion or mood of the moment also directs attention. The pessimist sees nothing but ruin, while the optimist sees a glorious future. * * * (e) Fashion is a powerful director of attention. What "everybody" is doing or saying demands attention and commands action. * * * (f) Imagined situations direct the attention to anything that is related. * * * (g) You can build up habits of attention to certain kinds of objects. * * * These habits are built up because of some of the factors already mentioned—interest, fashion, necessity—but, once established, they are very powerful in directing the attention. * * * To educate oneself, it is necessary to develop interest and desires that will, in turn, direct one's attention and thus produce the first essential of knowledge. To influence other people in any line of action requires making use of stimuli that are effective in capturing their attention. If a per-

[65] *Ibid.,* Chap. IX, and Bernhardt, *op. cit.,* ch. XVI.
[66] Higginson, Glenn D., *Psychology* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1936), p. 256.
[67] Pillsbury, *Fundamentals of Psychology,* pp. 277 f.
[68] Griffiths, Joseph H., *The Psychology of Human Behavior,* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1936), pp. 451 ff.
[69] Bernhardt, *op. cit.,* p. 229.
[70] *Fundamentals of Psychology,* pp. 278, 284.

son is interested, he is attentive. If interest is not present, then the next best thing is to manipulate the stimuli so as to capture the attention through the objective factors mentioned above.[71]

It is impossible to attend to one simple object for more than a few seconds at a time. Attention shifts from one object to another naturally and with an apparently rhythmic regularity. Even when one concentrates upon a complex object, attention will not remain rigidly fixed but will fluctuate rapidly from one feature to another. Moreover, only one item can be attended to at once if it is among unlike items, but, if all the objects are alike, as many as six items can command attention at the same time.[72]

Efforts to keep the attention from wandering will result in strain and fatigue; prolonged efforts may leave the person powerless to control his behavior. For instance, "when the movements of attention are artificially restricted by the devices of the hypnotist, the patient will fall asleep." [73] Nervous breakdowns and other mental disorders are undoubtedly caused in part by the strain of concentration for a long time. Even under normal conditions, the sustained attention of an exacting type is wearisome, boring, and monotonous. The competition of attention that occurs between what one *wants* to attend to and what one *ought* to attend to is eternal and complicated; there are innumerable objects demanding attention under ordinary circumstances.[74]

Although it requires effort to attend specific things, it is obvious that random attention does not occupy a prominent place in man's mental processes. He can select for himself, within limits, what he shall attend. Were there no selection a man would be dominated by the persistent and confusing sensations of his environment. Selection is the control with which he can proceed from attention to the desired action.[75]

Attention has been treated broadly, at least from a comparative standpoint, because, to repeat, it is preparatory to mental functions. Attention or any of the mental processes associated with doing cannot be separate and distinct functions, although they may be separated for discussion.[76]

To perceive, for instance, is to attend. In that a conscious man is always attending to something, it can be said that perception is normal during every waking moment of life. Perception means more than "visual sensation" (the blind perceive with other senses); it means the impressions made by objects and how well one's experiences account for those impressions. "Attention brings the observer into the presence of a fact and perception consists in his grasping or knowing the fact. Attention explores, perception discovers." [77] And it is evident that what has been said of attention applies to perception as well.

Perception is selective, fluctuating, and inaccurate because of inability to grasp all details at once. Experiments indicate that perception can be enhanced by: (1) Proximity, (2) similarity, (3) continuity of elements in a pattern, (4) inclusiveness, with all elements in a single pattern (if not inclusive, elements fall into more than one group with stragglers left outside), (5) familiarity, (6) set or readiness (a subjective condition of attending, the purpose or idea in mind), and (7) the whole that is perceived, which is similar to the first three but places the advantage of integral parts over separate parts.[78]

How does the inattentive person fit into this picture of attention? Actually there is no such thing as an inattentive person. If he is perceiving something all the time, he is not inattentive but distracted. Hence, a distracted person is one who attends something other than that which he is supposed to attend. Distractions are elements which possess some factors of advantage strong enough to conflict with attempts at sustained attention. "A person who has no strong interest in what he is doing, or one who has something else in mind that he would much prefer to do, or one who is not negatively adapted to the noises and other distracting stimuli that reach him, is for the time being a distractable person." [79]

As has been indicated, perception is very much affected by learning. Yet this is but half of the fact; while one perceives because of learning, he learns largely by perceiving.[80] In the perception-to-knowing cycle, the more frequently, the more recently, and the more intensely a given attention-perception-response has been exercised, the stronger it becomes and the more ready for action.[81] Learning, then consists in going through with an activity and repeating it sufficiently for the act to become thoroughly familiar.[82] No matter how much you may read concerning leadership, for instance, and no matter how firmly you believe you understand leadership, chances are you will not be a good leader until you have "the feel" of leadership by practice.[83]

Memory is a direct use of what has been learned. It consists of two main phases: (1) *Remembering* is performing a previously learned act or mental function and may be divided into (a) *recall* and (b) *recognition.* Recall is reproducing what has been learned. Recognition is knowing or recognizing a previous experience. (2) *Retention* is the process by which something learned can be remembered.[84]

When a person recalls previously learned facts and rearranges them into a new and not necessarily accurate relationship, the mental manipulation is called *imagination.* Reasoning also uses recall, but places the various facts in an actual and logical relationship.[85]

Professor Higginson presents *understanding* as a part of *reasoning* and uses the two terms to describe different forms of *thinking.* In this wise, man understands by realizing the ordinary relationship of a thing with other things. Then reasoning examines facts until a particular one "clears the situation by integrating the various features into one whole bearing a characteristic meaning." [86] Reasoning, therefore, commonly begins where understanding leaves off. Higginson attributes the following as being the explanation for too little reasoning: (1) *Lack of problems;* Although man uses understanding often, he is not commonly stimulated to reason. (2) *Prejudice and opinion:* Set forms of knowing and doing take the place of reasoning. (3) *Lack of persistence, suspended judgment* and *desire;* Many persons are unwilling to spend the time and energy to seek the required facts for reasoning; others seem unwilling to await the necessary facts or are unable to control their desires. (4) *Lack of factual material;* Reasoning is impossible without the necessary equipment. (5) *Lack of critical approach or of inherent ability,* which is self-explanatory.[87]

Thinking, then, introduces no other type of activity than those discussed. Thinking is an indirect use of what has been learned, the doing of something partially new by combining the elementary forms of mental activity such as perception, learning, and memory. Not all the mental activities are present in every instance of thought. But if there is some purpose, thinking seems to follow a pattern: "(1) Orientation towards some goal; (2) seeking this way and that for an approach to the goal; (3) recall of previously observed facts; (4) grouping and patterning of these facts (understanding); (5) inner speech and gestures (of reasoning)." [88]

Professor Poffenberger introduces his explanation of the thinking process by referring to the *motor habits* of the mind:

> * * * habitual responses may occur in a seemingly automatic fashion. * * * But all all of our behavior cannot be of this routine sort. * * * When obstacles or difficulties interfere with the smooth flow of habits, some slight shift in the series of habits may be all that is necessary. But when no ready-made response is adequate, the human being is said to think, to reason, to judge what to do. A new adjustment to this strange situation must be created. * * *
>
> 1. First, a problem or difficulty must be clearly perceived.
>
> 2. Correct thinking implies a rich and varied experience out of which tentative answers come. * * *
>
> 3. * * * Utilization of past experiences will depend largely upon the systematic and orderly arrangement of one's memories. * * *
>
> 4. Not every idea that flashes into the mind proves to be a correct answer, so that each one must be carefully tested to determine whether or not it satisfies the conditions of the problem.[89]

Choice of action involves a definite task; something is to be done; there is an end to be arrived at. Indecision is normal until one can decide which action is best for the situation. "It is unnecessary to maintain that the vacillating individual *can act,* but *will not.* On the contrary, the individual *cannot* act; he cannot proceed; he is momentarily helpless because no adequate preparation for functioning has been previously established." [90] Yet, the period of indecision should be consistent with the problem. If the period is not overlong, "indecision" is deliberate thinking.[91]

The introduction of *will* into the action pattern implies a refusal to abandon a task which has been undertaken. It is not a thing or machine but a way of acting which seems to depend upon having an obstacle or difficulty to overcome in reaching a definite goal.[92]

A desirable goal may be considered analogous to a motive or drive when it refers to an activity which has begun but is not yet completed. Moreover, most activity occurs as a large action pattern rather than numerous individual reactions. This is to say that "you fly an airplane" by doing just that instead of determining to do each single act required in the flight. Thus the act itself may be a motivating influence.[93]

Motive uncovers a wide field which requires more discussion than can be given here. The often controversial factors of pleasure and pain, reward and punishment, will, however, be introduced here.

Dr. Griffiths states that "neither commendation nor sarcasm, reward nor punishment, has absolute value for purposes of motivation." [94] This does not say that praise and reproof have *no* value but that the quality is doubtful. "Of course, a wide background of successful experience in dealing with human beings does provide a fairly accurate basis for knowing when and to whom to apply praise, and

[71] *Op. cit.,* pp. 230 f.
[72] Griffiths, *op. cit.,* pp. 454 f.
[73] Poffenberger, A. T., *Principles of Applied Psychology* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1942), p. 186.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] Pillsbury, *Fundamentals of psychology,* p. 268.
[76] Higginson, *op. cit.,* pp. 256 f.
[77] Woodworth, *op. cit.,* pp. 361, 387 and 418.
[78] *Ibid.,* pp. 425 ff.
[79] *Ibid.,* p. 437.
[80] *Ibid.,* p. 452.
[81] *Ibid.,* pp. 256 f.
[82] *Ibid.,* p. 273.
[83] Bogardus, *op. cit.,* p. 23.
[84] Woodworth, *op. cit.,* pp. 261 f.
[85] *Ibid.,* p. 488.
[86] *Op. cit.,* p. 449.
[87] *Ibid.,* pp. 437–461.
[88] Woodworth, *op. cit.,* pp. 457 ff.
[89] *Op. cit.,* pp. 85 ff.
[90] Higginson, *op. cit.,* p. 319.
[91] *Ibid.,* p. 320.
[92] Woodworth, *op. cit.,* pp. 329 ff.
[93] *Ibid.,* pp. 299 ff.
[94] *Op. cit.,* p. 111.

when and to whom to administer reproof." [95] However, in order to give praise and reprimands effectively, one should clearly understand the psychological grounds and should account for individual differences. A person is not affected, for instance, by implying he has "low" ideals. In so doing, you would only indicate a standard of judgment which that person does not perceive, does not clearly comprehend. Such "preaching" is not only unnecessary but futile for, as soon as a man senses and accepts the higher ideal, he will feel an urge toward it. "No one needs to be goaded to learn or to improve. Attraction, rather than compulsion, is the true psychological method. And all this becomes fully recognized upon realization that a real goal, by its very nature, is always compelling." [96]

Professor Woodworth believes that "in most instances of learning, the environmental factor of reward or punishment is clearly present."[97] Or, as Professor Poffenberger expresses it:

> One of the best known of the so-called laws of learning and the one that has aroused the most controversy in recent years is the law of effect, which says that a satisfying after-effect tends to stamp in the response that produced it, and that a dissatisfying after-effect tends to inhibit the response that produced it. * * * but the fact remains that in practical life situations, in the training of animals, in the teaching of children at home and in school, and in the learning of skills by adults, rewards and punishments are effective in the long run.[98]

Under all conditions, however, the problem of punishment and reward depends upon the characteristics of the individuals concerned and of the situation. Reward seems to have more positive effect although punishment, within limits, may be as effective as reward. From his early days man has been aware that certain things are unpleasant and that other things are pleasant. As a result, he habitually deals with things in terms of the nature and degree of pleasantness. Introduction of penalty or possible punishment into the scheme of his work may make him more cautious, observant, and thus efficient. But unless the controls are logical, such as penalties for violating flying regulations, threats may make him fear or dislike the task. Criticism of the man, in contrast to constructive criticism of the job, tends to be unpleasant. Encouragement and praise are pleasant. Tests consistently indicate that the most progress is made by people who are kept fully informed of the nature of their progress and are given praise or criticism as justified. Those who are given some information do not progress as well, whereas those who are given no information make little progress or even retrogress.[99]

Play and *recreation* are expressions of the change factor in attention. A person may not find full satisfaction in his job, or, even if he is fortunate in his vocation, working for prolonged periods may become monotonous. Forms of play usually involve skill in which an appeal is made to the imagination, the adventure spirit, or the competitive interests.[1] Professor Bogardus believes that more creative opportunities and less routine in everyday work would stop "the cry for shorter hours and for more hours to spend in useless or nerve-wracking amusements. More chances to create would usher in a world of growing personalities." [2] Man is active by nature, lazy only when nothing stimulates him. Human nature, when hitched to routine tasks, "grows restless and revolutionary without always knowing why." [3]

Purposive action, which sustains attention and possesses elements of an unsolved problem, has its intrinsic motive. Sustained attention in this wise does not mean the cramped attempt to fix perception on one point but the attention that is maintained upon a certain object or within a certain field while still moving within that field. And it can be said that desire, interest, or other form of imagination can sustain attention.[4]

"Observation and concentration are aspects of insightful, configural organization of perceptual data under the dominance of goals or interests. * * * Thus one may conclude that interests will take care of concentration." [5]

Warren Hilton explains how to keep interest fresh so that a man will be induced to put his best efforts into his job:

> It is not enough to have a mere general passion for success. Mere indefinite wishing for success will never get you anywhere. Besides this general passion you must have definite *interests continually renewed.* You must give the mind something specific and tangible and immediate to work upon. You must incessantly add new details. Otherwise interest, attention and activity will wane.
>
> Your biggest problem is how to keep your efficient output of mental energy at a high level. The solution lies in maintaining interest. * * * You must continually devise new ways of renewing the interest of your men and inspiring them to concentrate their attention upon * * * [the mission.] You cannot [give] a young man * * * monotonous and routine duties to perform and expect him to take the interest that you take in your business. You must make his work interesting for him. You must give him a game to play, not expect him to put all his energy in your game. * * * Appeal to his self-interest, arouse enthusiasm, concentrate his mind on the job with rewards, commendations, competitions, and ingenious devices calling forth a fresh play of forces. * * * Keep [his and] your interest alive by trying to discover new things in old surroundings and new aspects to everyday tasks.[6]

[95] *Ibid.*
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[97] *Op. cit.*, p. 257.
[98] *Op. cit.*, p. 76.
[99] Higginson, *op. cit.*, pp. 538 ff.
[1] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 85.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[4] Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 434 ff.
[5] Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

Section VII. PRESENTING IDEAS TO OTHERS

It would require several large volumes to treat adequately the subject of presenting ideas to others. Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People* has been so widely read and commented upon that it has become a household word. Many books have been written on the subject of getting along with people in supervising or influencing their activities, a few of which have been used in the preparation of *Air Force Leadership.* These and similar books are recommended to the leader, for too much cannot be learned concerning the how's and why's of influencing people.

The many practical techniques of influencing people will not be repeated here, but presenting ideas to others will be examined with the magnifying glass of psychology.

At this time it would be well to consider some obvious leader-follower manifestations. If "leadership is a process of changing the attitudes of numbers of persons in important matters," [7] it follows that influencing a person is leading him in a particular situation. Thus, as opposed to the common understanding that there are a small percentage of leaders and a large percentage of patient followers, social psychology holds that "every person is both a potential leader and a follower. No one can lead in all things. Nearly everyone has one or more things in which he does well; nearly everyone must look to others to be his leaders in some phase of life." [8] Leadership resulting from superior knowledge or talent need not conflict with the leadership issuing from authoritative positions. The leadership of a competent line chief, for instance, enhances the efforts of the engineering officer and of the squadron commander in a manner similar to the leadership of a genius of science, or music, or finance who exerts his influence upon the world and contributes to the general welfare. On the other hand, the power to influence people may become a harmful force. A leader should be well versed in the techniques of influencing others so that he can counteract unfavorable influences as well as create desirable reactions.[9]

Ideas may be presented in either of two ways, directly or indirectly. But whatever the technique, remember that it must work through the basic motives and emotions previously outlined in Section III, this annex.

The direct presentation of ideas to other persons, as it implies, is a straightforward statement. It may take many forms from the peremptory command to an apologetic request. Logic, argument, admonition, appeal, compulsion, exhortations and orders usually employ the direct approach. The success of a direct approach will depend upon two factors: the degree of antagonism it stirs in the mind of the recipient and the responsiveness induced in the individual by training. These two factors are closely related; each compliments the other. Men who much of their lives have been subjected to the discipline and control necessary in thickly populated areas will respond to direct orders and commands with little or no resentment. Yet, no matter how well-trained a man may become, no matter how responsive he may be to direct supervision, a poorly worded command or the offensive attitude of a superior can cause resentment because it hurts the man's pride and self-respect. Men accustomed to more personal freedom are apt to resent the direct approach even more. At times this resentment is so strong that the person who harbors it appears to be diligently striving to misinterpret his leader's supervision of unit activity.[10]

When coercion is not apparent or when previous preparation has cleared the way, the force of ideas directly presented can stimulate men with determination to accomplish a goal. Preparing men for the role of submission means training them to understand the service, the mission, command concepts, and discipline. Here are some hints:

> The follower must have habits of attention and obedience. These habits must, moreover, be firmly rooted in his nervous system. They must have become second nature to him. * * * How are such habits formed? By motivation and practice. * * *
>
> The habit of attention is important. It is basic to discipline. A soldier cannot obey unless he first sees or hears commands. The command "ATTENTION" means his stopping all activities that might interfere with his looking or listening. Upon this command he takes an attitude of readiness to obey the next one. * * *
>
> As with the habit of attention, so it is with all the other basic habits which are learned and made second nature in drills by means of motivation and practice. The successful follower of

[6] Hilton, Warren, *Applied Psychology,* Vol. 7, *Processes and Personality* (San Francisco: The Applied Psychology Press, 1920), pp. 97 ff.
[7] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 179. (This definition is quoted instead of the one previously used to indicate the similarity of ideas.)
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[9] Poffenberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 92 f.
[10] Munson, *op. cit.*, pp. 283, ff.

a leader must have an assured repertoire of habits which the leader can count upon. It is part of the leader's task to secure this discipline as he trains his men, but he secures it as a set of responses to any leader, not merely to his own person. * * *

So the follower contributes discipline—his repertoire of habits—to the success of leadership, although it is the leader who has to help him to discipline in the first place. Besides habits, the good follower also contributes his good morale—his readiness to follow leadership and to cooperate by directing his own initiative toward success whenever habits alone are not adequate, as is so often the case in battle.[11]

Techniques for giving commands and issuing orders directly were discussed in the manual. To prevent undue repetition, only two principles for presenting ideas directly will be given here: (1) How effectively a command is presented depends to a large extent upon the leader's personality. Modesty and courtesy tend to diminish the sting of the dictatorial manner. If the leader also has an air of competency, and is actually competent, so much more force will his command have. (2) Insofar as possible orders should be positive and provocative of action. If repressive, orders may "arouse opposition, frost the bud of aspiration, rebuff genius, dampen endeavor, and repress that enthusiasm which means efficiency and accomplishment." [12]

All Americans dislike a dictator. Our religion, our politics, our education, and our very existence loathe dictatorship. Although we know it is necessary to recognize authority higher than ourselves, we still prefer to have our submission compatible with our ideals. For this reason the indirect presentation of ideas is of great importance to you. You should not believe that the indirect approach can ever be used exclusively, however. The efficiency of the air force depends upon the degree and promptness of each man's compliance with official dictates directly presented. But the indirect approach should be used upon every opportunity when suitable and it should always be used in the preparatory, fundamental training that inculcates ideals upon which to build the habits and motives for conduct in the air force.

Presenting an idea indirectly consists of presenting it as though it had originated with the other person. Why should you present ideas indirectly? You should do so to spare another from feeling inferior or menial by giving him the satisfaction of being a part of the idea. This approach also fixes the idea more firmly in another's mind by creating a fear that he will lose prestige unless he adheres to the idea for which he is credited. When you get another person to look upon your idea as representing in some degree his own thinking you do not give the impression that you are trying to dictate his behavior, decrease his independence, or humiliate him.[13]

Professor Bernhardt feels that there are but two convincing kinds of influence. The first is a statement of logical facts or proofs. The second is suggestion, which is by far the more commonly used and is the keynote of the indirect approach. When a man adopts the ideas of others without any real evaluation of those ideas or when he does what others do without thinking out the course of action for himself, he may be said to be acting on suggestion.[14]

In using suggestion to influence others, it is well to keep in mind these facts:

1. The suggestion should be indirect; that is, it should seem to arise spontaneously within the mind of the individual and not to come from another.[15]

2. There must be a high degree of attention to the idea that is suggested * * * there must be no conflicting ideas if a given idea is to lead to action. A high degree of attention to an idea may be obtained by the removal of distracting conditions of all sorts.[16]

3. The force of suggestion, other things being equal, varies directly in proportion to the imputed superiority of itself or of its source. * * * It is those who are thought to be superior, and hence have prestige, who possess special powers or suggestion. * * * Rank, fortune, birth, office fascinate the populace more than personal worth quietly expressed. * * * [Yet,] familiarity may puncture prestige.[17]

4. Suggestion varies in inverse proportion to social distance. The closer persons are to each other, the more responsive they are. Since social nearness is a high degree of sympathetic understanding, the stage is set for suggestion to operate.[18]

5. The force of a suggestion depends in part upon the frequency with which it is applied. Repetition tends not only to increase the strength of the suggestion by driving out competing ideas, but tends also to make the suggestion seem spontaneous. In the course of the repetition, consciousness of the external origin of the suggested idea is lost. * * * Repetition is said to be a favored device of the political dictators in forcing acceptance of their idea.[19]

6. Positive suggestions are more effective than negative suggestions. * * * Ideas tend more directly to the production than to the inhibition of action. There is a strong tendency to react to suggestion in the positive fashion no matter how it may be presented.[20]

[11] Boring, *op. cit.*, pp. 415 ff.
[12] Munson, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
[13] White, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 74.
[15] Poffenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[17] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 291.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 292.
[19] Poffenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

The late Major Burns, after reading psychology extensively, came to believe that man is subject to suggestion anywhere and always.[21] Most psychologists either confirm this theory or state that each person has a degree of response to suggestions at any given time, be it negative or positive. One very definite conclusion has been reached: People cannot be classed into suggestible and nonsuggestible groups. A person who is very suggestible in one situation is not necessarily suggestible in another situation.[22]

Some characteristics of suggestibility tentatively stated by Professor Bogardus throw more light on its nature:

1. The more social minded the person, the greater his suggestibility.

2. The comparatively easy life in warm climates fosters more suggestibility than life in frigid regions.

3. The independent social patterns and attitudes developed by rural people result in their having less suggestibility than their cousins from the crowded city.

4. Impulsive persons are suggestible in proportion to the quickness or thoughtlessness of their actions.

5. Similarly, the nervous person is more suggestible than one who is calm and easy-going.

6. Suggestibility varies with age; a person becomes less suggestible as he grows older.

7. Fatigue increases suggestibility in proportion to the resulting decrease in ability to rationalize.

8. Suggestibility varies with knowledge. The more information a person has, the less inclined he will be to accept irrational suggestions concerning a subject. However, this same person may be highly suggestible in other matters about which he is not so well informed; he will have fewer ideas to conflict with the proffered one.

9. Suggestibility is influenced by the excitement of a crowd. In a crowd a person tends to act with the mass, to resist suggestion less, and to feel less repugnance toward being swayed by others.

10. Suggestibility varies with reasoning. If a person habitually scrutinizes and criticizes every proposal for its meaning and probable outcome, his suggestibility is low.

11. Suggestibility varies with education insofar as that education has increased information and instilled habits of reasoning. Generally the more education one has, the less suggestible he is.

12. "Suggestibility is related to conservative-mindedness. Although the conservative person may be habit-bound, custom-controlled, static, and stubborn, nevertheless he is very suggestible about possible dangers to his way of thinking. He wants to believe certain things so much that he is suggestible to almost any proposal that will help him protect his special interests." [23]

"Suggestion is a dynamic process reaching into the hidden phases of life everywhere. * * * Its practical emergencies involve the dominance of human life by both fashion and custom. Rare is the personality that can recognize its gigantic power." [24]

There is another aspect of suggestion worthy of mention. Suggestion can be put to work to produce opinions that crystallize into beliefs. It is fairly obvious that a man can, and will, criticize a direct statement with the intention of finding it at fault. A productive suggestion, on the other hand, can neither be objected to nor resented and may lead another person on to form a desired opinion without even stopping to question the assumptions upon which it is based. The opinion becomes a fixed, self-apparent truth similar to a religious belief and, once established, it rarely can be changed or even tempered by reason.[25]

Suggestion, then, is a method of implanting ideals in a group. The leader who continually and subtly conveys to his men that their squadron is the best squadron in the air force, that prompt obedience is a soldierly quality, and like ideas, will in a short time have all his men believing them. But the officer who tries to demonstrate any such idea logically is never convincing. Abstract qualities can seldom be developed merely by presenting concrete facts; a man may question proof and reason but rarely will he question his emotions. Suggestion need not be conveyed by word of mouth alone. A gesture or the example a leader gives in dress, deportment, or efficiency is a potent form of suggestion. A leader should be ready to present ideas indirectly to his men at all times when it is justifiable to do so.[26]

Section VIII. ACTING IN GROUPS

Personality has been defined as *the total quality of an individual's behavior.*[27] So far this annex has discussed man as an individual. Yet it must be recognized that in most instances he is only relatively separate from the rest of the world, that all his activity is concerned directly or indirectly with environment, that he participates in what is going on about him, and that at the same time he always seems to be resisting some of the environmental forces.[28] Personality, then, cannot be understood apart from environment. "Since personality is essentially a matter of social behavior, the particular group of which the individual is an integral part

[21] Burns, John H., *Psychology and Leadership* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1934), p. 10.
[22] Poffenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[23] *Op. cit.*, pp. 293 ff.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[25] Trotter, William, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (9th impression; London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1924), pp. 43 f.
[26] Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[27] Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 3 f.

must be always considered in the total causal picture." [29]

A well-disciplined military machine creates a picture of well-trained personnel working together with little or no dissension. A soldier senses that such an organization somehow results from the mental outlook of the group. If he stops to consider long enough though, he may realize that the feeling of well-being and confidence emanates from each individual and not, as it would appear, from the group as a whole. Nevertheless, the group is more than the sum of its parts. The members of a football team may play together so well that they can overwhelmingly defeat another team which has better players, man for man. Some families are so closely knit that, to an outsider at least, none of the members can do wrong. They may criticize each other and bicker among themselves, but let an alien attack a member and, even if the attack is deserved, their family loyalty and unity remains steadfast.

What is group spirit? Everywhere we see its effect, feel it, and are ever a part of it whether we like it or not. It has many names: belongingness, unity, gregariousness, group loyalty, herd feeling. It may be described by various names: cooperation, confidence, meeting of the minds, coordination, solidarity, mutual respect, and esprit de corps. One who has been part of a group realizes: "It is pleasant to win a personal contest; but it is little short of sublime to be a member of a victorious group." [30]

A military leader, or any leader for that matter, must direct the unit's combined action toward accomplishing the ultimate aim. Thus the mental ties which bind a number of individuals into a unity for action are of great significance. The means of obtaining unity of action are a part of the practical approach to leadership described in the manual: the "mission religion," living and working conditions, tradition, unit pride, delegation of authority and responsibility, justice, humaneness, courtesy, self-realization, and many other factors. In explaining the psychology behind group spirit the controversy between the instinct school of thought and the learned influences is again encountered. As before, you need not be greatly concerned with the conflict. In section III it was pointed out that most psychologists recognize belongingness in some form or other, whether it be called a gregarious tendency, herd instinct, or one of the social motives. If various observations about group spirit are presented without an attempt to reconcile them, you will have a background for forming your own conclusions:

Man belongs with the more gregarious animals, like the deer or the wolf, rather than with the so-called solitary animals like the lion. But it is very difficult to decide whether man's preference for living, working and playing in groups is learned or unlearned. From his prolonged period of dependence, the human child is bound to be "conditioned" to group life, even if he were naturally indifferent to it. Learned or unlearned, the social motive is strong and dependable. It is a love not simply for company, but for participation in the activity of the group.[31]

By gregariousness is meant the desire of people to seek out and find satisfaction in association with other people. This desire has been usefully characterized as giving the individual comfort in the presence of his fellows, making him fearful of prolonged solitude, making him more highly suggestible to the wishes, emotional states, and beliefs of his fellows (as represented by conventions, fads, styles, etc.), making him more suggestible to the claims of the group's leader, making him want to enjoy activity with and in his group.[32]

Gregariousness is a special phase of social nature. In animals it is the "herd instinct." Higher animals which live in herds, flocks, schools, packs, covies, bevies, exemplify the survival value of gregariousness. Individual members go wild with uneasiness when they become separated from their kind. It is not enough to belong to a group; one must be with his own kind. Many animals will risk their lives in order to rejoin their special group.[33]

Several critics have objected to the use of the word "herd" (taken, of course, from Trotter) for the social environment of the individual human being. It is suggested that this degrades man's social relation to the animal level, and even that it may weaken the sanction of the moral law! No doubt it would be possible to substitute "society" for "herd" in a great many places without altering the general meaning, but "herd" has been used quite deliberately. The whole argument is directed to showing that the human social relation is based on the herd instinct of the gregarious animal, and that many of its leading traits are directly traceable to that instinct.[34]

Professor McDougall, one of our greatest authorities on Social Psychology, will not admit the existence of a "herd instinct" in addition to the "gregarious instinct" which implies merely association with one's fellows. He regards the instinct of submission as the basis of the power of suggestion (including herd suggestion) on the individual mind, and he makes out a respectable case for this view (*Journ. Neur. and Psychopath.* I, p. 5 ff., 1920). * * * It seems to be clear that the attitude of the individual man to his "herd" is marked by a well consolidated typical instinctive mechanism whatever view we take as to how that mechanism is built up, and it seems in no way misleading to call it "herd instinct." This instinct, like others, is not in itself good or bad—it is simply an inevitable part of man's heritage. It is a material which can be moulded and directed to the higher human purposes.[35]

After reviewing recent literature on the subject, Klineberg concludes that gregariousness (1) possesses "a doubtful continuity with the behavior of animals," (2) that thus far no reliable psychological or anatomical foundation for it has been discovered, and (3) that while it is expressed among all peoples in at least a minimum form this appearance may probably be explained "on the basis of family relationships." Hence, gregariousness in its specific expressions may be viewed as largely learned or acquired or conditioned, but this fact does not minimize in any way the practical and vital role that gregariousness plays in every day life.[36]

Professor Bogardus further believes that, once formed, the group is "prior" to all persons composing it; although people create and develop a group, the group soon becomes more important and more influential than any individual in it. His explanation presents a picture which can almost be likened to, "Which came first—the chicken or the egg?"

> Into all groups individuals are born; up through them personality emerges; and in turn persons dominate, and create more groups. * * * At birth, the human infant is an inchoate mass of reflexes, impulses, sensitized protoplasm. Physically, psychically, socially helpless, he is ready to respond to elemental stimuli from persons, the spokesmen of groups. Not being able to creep, to walk, to talk, or to care for himself, he is at his greatest point of social need.
>
> On the other hand, look at that into which he is born. There is his parental group with its age-old language, its developed beliefs and ironclad rules of behavior, its political, economical, and religious convictions. Into this family group environment are fed streams of neighborhood, occupational, national, racial heritages; some of them are millennia old. Often these culture patterns are shot through with superstitions and myths mixed with truth but possessing all the force of the ages. * * *
>
> Moreover, ancestors, generation before generation, were reared in groups, under group control, and survived only within the limits of group protection. An infant thus is born into groups with a history and a civilization. If it were not for group transmission, the infant of today would have to begin in a far cruder, simpler way than the Neanderthal man began.[37]

The study of human nature may not tell us the precise origin of the group feeling but it never fails to indicate the strength of such feelings. Furthermore, everything concerned with a person's behavior seems capable of being turned toward group activity. To belong; to be liked, admired, or respected; to feel secure, important, or essential; to dominate or to submit—all are elements of group action. Even the basic appetites are more easily satisfied with membership in a group. Also, suggestion is possible only in association with other persons and the force of suggestion increases as the number of like-minded people increases. In fact, a purposeful group has high suggestibility. Its members will do almost anything to avoid social disapproval just as they will exert every effort to satisfy the desire for social approval.[38]

The effect of group opinion in determining action goes back to the "fear of the mass." This fear is vague at first. A shy or awkward person attempts to find out what is approved by the group and then conforms as closely as possible. With experience he is capable of gaining more and more approval. Thus, all activities become subordinated to social pressure, which is the supreme instructor indicating what habits to develop and what knowledge to acquire. Even though social pressure is not enforced by physical pain, it is the great controlling force of civilization; "social disapprobation is a greater punishment than any bodily suffering.[39]

In general, the ideals of a person are the ideals of his lifelong group. The standards of right and wrong are set by public opinion. A law, either statutory or moral, is respected only insofar as it is supported by the people to whom it applies. Proper ideals can be developed only by placing a person, preferably at an early age, in the proper social atmosphere. Living in actual contact with people and their ideals is the most effective method of learning group standards. Moreover, instruction from books and direct exhortation have little effect unless the person can be made to feel that he *belongs* to the group from which the ideals come.[40]

The more obvious gregarious characteristics displayed by man, according to a summary by the psychologist William Trotter, are:

> 1. Man is intolerant and fearful of solitude, physical or mental. * * * [This] betrays itself in the deepest recesses of personality as a sense of incompleteness which compels the individual to reach out toward some larger existence than his own. * * *
>
> 2. He is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence. * * * It can endow him with energy, courage, and endurance, and can as easily take these away. * * *

[29] Higginson, *op. cit.*, p. 633.
[30] Allport, F. H., *Social Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), p. 282, quoted in Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[31] Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
[32] Tead, *Human Nature and Management*, p. 29.
[33] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
[34] Tansley, *op. cit.*, p. 10 of preface to 5th impression.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 73 with quotes from Otto Klienberg, *Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1940), p. 157.
[37] Bogardus, *op. cit.*, pp. 371 f.
[38] Bernhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 ff.
[39] Pillsbury, *Essentials of Psychology*, pp. 130 f.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 370 ff.

3. He is subject to the passions of the pack in his mob violence and the passions of the herd in his panics. These activities are by no means limited to the outbursts of actual crowds, but are to be seen equally clearly in the hue and cry of newspapers and public after some notorious criminal or scapegoat and in the success of scaremongering by the same agencies.

4. He is remarkably susceptible to leadership. * * * Experience has shown that * * * there need be no specially arduous training [for leaders], no great weight of knowledge either of affairs or the human heart, no receptiveness to new ideas, no outlook into reality. Indeed, the mere absence of such seems to be an advantage; for originality is apt to appear to the people as flightiness, scepticism as feebleness, caution as doubt of the * * * principles that may happen at the moment to be immutable. The successful shepherd thinks like his sheep and can lead his flock only if he keeps no more than the shortest distance in advance. He must remain, in fact, recognizable as one of the flock, magnified no doubt, louder, coarser, above all with more urgent wants and ways of expression than the common sheep, but in essence to their feeling of the same flesh with them. In the human herd the necessity of the leader bearing unmistakable marks of identification is equally essential. Variations from the normal standard in intellectual matters are tolerated, if they are not very conspicuous, for man has never yet taken reason very seriously, and can still look upon intellectuality as not more than a [minor fault] if it is not paraded conspicuously; variations from the moral standard are, however, of a much greater significance as marks of identification, and when they become obvious, can at once change a great and successful leader into a stranger and an outcast, however little they may seem to be relevant to the adequate execution of his public work. If a leader's marks of identity with the herd are of the right kind, the more they are paraded the better. * * *

5. His relations with his fellows are dependent upon the recognition of him as a member of the herd.[41]

Professor Bogardus summarizes the interaction of group life thus:

1. Group life enables human individuals to survive and furnishes the stimuli whereby they develop into persons.

2. The prolongation of infancy under group protection and stimulation reduces the need for instincts and magnifies the role of acquired behavior patterns.

3. According to the principle of group priority the matured group becomes the teacher of each helpless infant.

4. Cultures are transmitted through groups, thus freeing each person from having to start anew at the beginning of civilization.

5. The face-to-face or primary group exerts the greatest influence on developing human beings.

6. New means of communication have created powerful secondary groups without physical presence.

7. Groups are either congregate or genetic but generally both.

8. Groups range from the passing and temporary to the stable and relatively permanent.

9. Permanent groups vary from the purely instinctive to the highly purposive.

10. The essence of group life is communion of attitudes and activities.[42]

The monograph by Burns describes how a man acts in a group. Although the study supports the concept of instinctive over acquired tendencies (it draws heavily upon the theories of Trotter, Tansley, McDougall, and others, which have been modified somewhat by more recent experiments), it has not lost its significance. Burns's hypothesis is "discussed rather fully, since it is believed that the part played by these group factors in forming, controlling, and fighting military units has not been fully appreciated." [43]

In making a unit from the "raw human material," two stages, the civil and the military, must always be considered. It is a fatal error to disregard the civil stage and concentrate on the military. It was perhaps because some officers make this fatal error that they had difficulty in handling the civilians who made up our war army.[44]

The military stage of creating unity consists of two parts: the first is to secure the allegiance of the men to the group; and the second, to develop ideals of military conduct in this group. The first phase is not too difficult. When men have to eat, sleep, and work together, they will imperceptibly acquire this unity or group feeling. The rhythmic beat of one hundred boots on the pavement is to each man the veritable footfall of the herd and each glows with the sense of power which comes to him with the knowledge that he is one with it. Close-order drill is a powerful integrating factor. Even the Egyptians knew this. But, when the drill is so complicated that the man fears every second that he will do something wrong which will throw him out of step with the herd and thus prove to all that he really does not belong to it, then it becomes an irksome process and a disintegrating factor.[45]

All drill should be simple. It should stress rhythm and not be engaged in too long. Through simple drill the soldier recognizes the group, feels himself a part of it, and is rapidly assimilated into the herd. Man's instinctive desire to dress like his fellows is satisfied with a uniform. His desire to think like his fellows should be satisfied by giving him interests which all share in common and which can be the subject of conversation. His physical well-being should be looked after; he then can know that he belongs to a group which is of great worth. It is a superficial analysis to think that men always lose morale and confidence because their physical appetites are not adequately satisfied. Poor care indicates to a man that he has poor leaders or that he is not a member of a worthwhile group or herd and thus his confidence in his group and in his leader becomes shaken. As a consequence he loses faith. Without this faith units cannot fight.[46]

Informal and occasional competitions covering a wide range of events are excellent. These competitions should not be held to grade the units but to give the men something in common to talk about. Competitions should be friendly and provoke considerable laughter and good-natured chaffing. Once they become so serious that units work for weeks bending every energy to win, they become a disintegrating factor. Competition is a two-edged sword which can cut two ways. Long-continued and systematic competitions may secure a high degree of excellence in messes, police, and the like, but at best they are only a test of officers. Some units with mediocre commanders will consistently lose and, since members of the organization will not and cannot admit they belong to an inferior group, they place the blame elsewhere. It is strange that commanders, seeing the elation of the one unit which won, do not sense the depression of the many units which lose.[47]

Thus, both physically and mentally, a man must feel himself a part of his group irrespective of whether he is a member by choice or by circumstance. He wants to know that the group has identified and accepted him as a member. Man's relations with his fellows is dependent upon this mutual recognition of the group by the individual and the individual by the group. The expression of the gregarious tendency is seen in almost every conscious act of a man's existence. Fortunately, it is not necessary to differentiate between the innate gregariousness and the unwritten laws by which men live. It is sufficient to know that man will follow the example of the group as well as its spoken dictates with a fixed determination of which he may not be conscious. And because of this powerful group influence, the problem of efficiency in the organization is almost reduced to the formation of closely coordinated and identifiable groups with appropriate ideals of conduct which are eventually considered correct and desirable by each member.[48]

The herd instinct is so strong and so valuable to a military organization that a leader should consider it first. "The individual is far more afraid of what his comrades think of him than he is of what his officers think, unless the officers have been accepted as judges of herd conduct. Only when the leader becomes closely identified with the herd and is accepted as a leader, do his decisions carry weight. Then he is all-powerful, for he is speaking with herd authority." [49]

[41] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 112–121.

[42] *Op. cit.*, p. 383.

[43] Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 23 ff.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 27 f.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

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